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Abstract
Mechanistic explanation is often held to be necessary for providing causal explanations within the special sciences. A countervailing push for non-mechanistic explanations, often appealing to dynamical models, has been met with criticism from mechanists, who claim these dynamical explanations are incomplete unless reduced to
mechanisms. This mechanist critique incorporates the widespread view that mechanistic explanations are objective explanations, and hence possess exclusive causal
explanatory power for the special sciences that trumps dynamicists’ efforts. The
mechanist–dynamicist debate has subsequently featured prominently in arguments
over the desirability of E-approaches to cognition—such as enactivism—versus traditional cognitivism. While traditional cognitivist explanations describe computational mechanisms, E-approaches tend to explain cognitive phenomena by invoking
dynamical models. Yet, if mechanists are right, it follows that dynamical explanations of cognition are incomplete, and the explanatory power of the E-approaches
is rendered suspect. My purpose in this thesis is to defend dynamical explanations
and argue they are not always sensibly improved via reduction to underlying mechanisms. I also cast doubts on attempts to use mechanism to integrate accounts of
explanation and cognition. First, I develop an account of dynamical explanation for
cognitive science based on an even-handed application of interventionism. Second,
I show how dynamical causes are not always reducible to mechanistic explanations.
Third, I discuss problems with recent attempts to use mechanistic explanation to
integrate theories of cognition. Fourth, I argue, similarly, that attempts to integrate
mechanisms into enactive cognitive science have not been successful. Finally, I argue
that mechanistic standards of explanation are not objective, derived from nature,
and value-free, as some proponents claim.
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Preface
The motive for this thesis is “an agitation of mind over seemingly odd questions”, in
the words of the film director Werner Herzog. A little over four years ago I did not
know what philosophy was. If anything, my time as a psychology undergraduate had
exposed me to a general suspicion of philosophy. Physicists, chemists, and biologists
do not seem to worry about accidentally dissolving their entire discipline by getting
too philosophical—sometimes psychology is a little anxious of the prospect.
Fortunately one psychology undergraduate course grappled with—though I did
not realise it at the time—the philosophical side of studying cognition: the History
and Meta-theory of Psychology. We were asked to think seriously and critically
about the ingrained assumptions of our field. I wrote, with great passion but little
art, an essay on the mutually reinforcing nature of (what I felt were the deeply
wrong) assumptions that the mind is modular, computational, and mechanistic.
Re–reading it recently, two things jumped out. First, it wasn’t very good.
Secondly, and more importantly, I saw the roots of the agitation of mind that resulted
in the present thesis.
Encountering Tony Chemero’s (2009) book on Radical Embodied Cognitive Science some time later (and in retrospect, only understanding about a quarter of it
at the time), the agitation grew. Here was a story about cognition I could get
behind—one that made sense of our lives as embodied agents.
It may seem strange, then, that this thesis instead focusses chiefly on mechanistic
explanations, and less so on cognition. However, this thesis represents my attempts
to get underneath questions about cognition by asking how our picture of scientific
explanation, and our picture of cognition, frame one another. The explanatory
questions we ask about cognition—and the answers we consider acceptable—are my
targets, and perhaps the real source of this ongoing agitation.
This has consequently been a steep and immense learning experience. I am still
climbing it. I hope what I have left behind here will be of interest.
A small note: some of these papers have been submitted to or published in
different journals, and so I apologise for any lingering inconsistencies in style or
tone that have resulted from this process.
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Introduction
The question this thesis grapples with is this: how are accounts of explanation
shaped by the needs of theory, and how are the needs of theory informative of our
accounts of explanation? I see both questions at the heart of the discussions that
will form the bulk of this thesis, and I also see them as mutually informative—yet
critically under–discussed.
How we ought to explain phenomena, and what these explanations ought to look
like, is a key question in the philosophy of science. Often this discussion involves
general concerns over the “justificatory step” (Bokulich 2017) that marks the turn
from a mere description into a bona fide explanation. Divisions between broad
perspectives on explanation often hinge on where precisely this comes about. For
instance, is an explanation an observer-independent accomplishment, rooted in the
ontic causal structure of the world, or is it an epistemic achievement? (Salmon 1984)
Contemporary discussion has turned towards scientific practice, and in particular the role of models in science (Potochnik 2015, Bokulich 2017). Many kinds of
models are deployed in science, and many seem to grant us insight into nature in
one way or the other. Yet how this insight should be characterised, justified, and
distinguished from failure, remains difficult to chart in a single, uniform fashion.
Scientific successes—description, prediction, explanation, understanding—seem to
take many forms, and require just as many stories to make sense of them.
One of the more successful accounts of scientific explanation—and my target
in this thesis—has broad, sometimes unificatory ambitions. The mechanistic resurgence, beginning in earnest with Machamer, Darden & Craver’s (2000) influential
paper Thinking With Mechanisms, proposes that explanations ought to reveal the
underlying causal processes that produce phenomena. Along with the mechanist
touchstones of Bechtel & Richardson (1993) and Glennan (1996), this Mechanism
proposes a far-reaching account of scientific explanation. Mechanistic explanation
aims to decompose and localise mechanisms into their component parts and activities and show how they interact to produce phenomena. Craver (2007) influentially
combines the equally influential interventionist (Woodward 2003) and mechanistic
stories together into an overarching framework for mechanistic explanation that
aims to be satisfactory both in terms of its relevance to actually–existing science,
1

and broad spectrum application across different domains of science.
I see mechanistic explanation as holding to a few broad claims about its nature,
often only indirectly stated but key to the endeavour:
(i) Mechanism—rooted in interventionism—is the exclusive mode of explanation for its target phenomena.
Identifying strongly with the ontic conception of scientific explanation (Salmon
1984), some strains of mechanism—as in its classic, Cartesian form—claim to explain
by revealing the real ontic causal structure that underlies the phenomena we observe
in nature (Craver 2007, 2014; Craver & Kaplan 2018). One consequence of this
view seems to be a belief in the exclusivity of mechanistic explanatory power within
its target domains: since mechanism gets at the causal structure of nature it is
authoritative and exhaustive.
This view is expressed as a rejection of non-mechanistic, and non-causal approaches to explanation in the cognitive sciences, on the basis that these sorts of
accounts do not reveal causal structure. Some pushback on this front has concerned discussions of non–mechanistic explanations in computational neuroscience
(Chirimuuta 2014, 2017) as as dynamical systems theory–based explanations (Issad
& Malaterre 2015; Ross 2015).
Chapter 1 of this thesis makes a similar move, but this time on the home turf of
mechanism: I show how an even–handed application of interventionism, the foundation of Craver’s (2007) mechanistic account, reveals that dynamical models are
equally capable of providing causal explanations. This commences a running theme
of the thesis—that interventionism does not necessarily act as a guarantee of exclusivity for Mechanism.
Chapter 2 similarly argues for a causal reading of dynamical models, only this
time extending its reach to an example from systems biology—cell fates. The cell fate
literature reveals how scientists describe and explain the differentiation of animal
cells into distinctive stable phenotypes by reference to dynamical models of complex
gene regulatory networks (GRNs). I also argue, using Woodward’s (2010, 2018)
criteria of specificity & proportionality, that the dynamical causal story is here
preferable to the possible mechanistic one. Once again, interventionism does not
necessarily support a mechanistic reading of phenomena.
(ii) Mechanism, as theory-neutral, works to unify and integrate other
modes of explanation, as well as disparate theories.
At around the same moment a wellspring the mechanistic philosophy began
to bubble over, so too did a split in cognitive science over how cognition should
be conceived of, and how, therefore (or so I will argue) it should be explained.
2

While analytic philosophy had come to think of cognition as best understood as
the operations of a neurally–realised computer—the brain—manipulating contentful
symbols or representations (Fodor 1983; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) several discrete
lines of investigation in the sciences and philosophy dissent.
Arguments from ecological psychology (Gibson 1979), phenomenology (MerleauPonty 1965), and robotics (i.e. Brooks 1991; Beer 1995; Chiel & Beer 1997)
among others have argued that basic cognition is better thought of as fundamentally
extensive—extended outside the central nervous system—embodied, and rooted in
the direct perception–action capacities of organisms rather than indirect computational and symbolic ones.
This extended–embedded–embodied–enactive perspective (sometimes called E–
cognition) ranged from cognitivism–friendly over to the more radical embodied and
enactive perspectives (Varela et al 1991; Chemero 2009) which mostly or entirely
eschew computational explanations. These radicals have found themselves in need
of a new account of explanation—after all, the sorts of explanations favoured by
mainstream cognitivism (i.e. Marr 1982) do not seem viable if one is committed to
a strictly non–computational, non–representational position on cognition.
Dynamical systems theory (DST) is supposed to provide a solution. According
to the dynamical hypothesis (Van Gelder 1995, 1998) instead of proposing functional,
representational and computational accounts of cognition, E-cognitive science ought
to appeal to dynamical models of cognition (Kelso 1995) for a descriptive and explanatory resource. In dynamical models, cognitive systems are characterised by
differential and difference equations that describe and predict with great accuracy
the dynamical unfolding of a system’s behaviour over time.
The natural alliance between DST and embodied cognition is clear: E-cognition
wants to explain extensive cognitive phenomena without appealing to internal neural
mechanisms, and dynamical models provide accurate descriptions and predictions
of phenomena without appealing to mechanisms. The role of dynamical models in
this new school of cognitive science is seen as both a necessity, and a source of great
insight through these descriptions and predictions (Chemero & Silberstein 2008;
Stepp et al 2011; Silberstein & Chemero 2013).
Mechanism re-enters the story here as a sharp critic of this dynamical hypothesis.
While mechanists agree on the descriptive and predictive power of dynamical models,
they do not see them as standalone explanations. There are several reasons for
this (explored in depth in Chapter 1), but the biggest one is that explanations in
cognitive science, in the view of mechanists, ought to speak to causes (Craver 2007).
Dynamical models do not specify the causal-mechanical workings underneath the
dynamics they predict and describe, and therefore do not provide explanations.
Only by mapping onto a mechanistic model which does provide this causal detail
3

can dynamical models explain (Kaplan 2011; Kaplan & Craver 2011) providing
dynamical mechanistic explanations (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010, 2013).
Mechanism is portrayed here as a neutral arbiter of theoretical claims—by testing claims via interventions, these differences of opinion about the boundaries of
cognition can be resolved (Kaplan 2012). Nevertheless, many E-cognitive accounts
reject Mechanism, possibly in small part because of the existing allegiance between
Mechanism and cognitivism (Milkowski 2013) but also more substantially because
in their view cognition is not decomposable, localisable, or explicable in terms of
its constituent parts (Chemero & Silberstein 2008). Mechanistic models, therefore,
do not provide the sorts of answers radical embodied accounts are looking for in an
explanation.
In Chapter 3 I examine Milkowski et al’s (2018) attempts to dissolve both the
dynamical–mechanistic debate, and the enactive-cognitivist divide at the same time
using mechanism as a neutral arbiter. This account claims that mechanistic explanation is capable of taking over the role of unifier in place of competing theories,
integrating E-cognition with traditional cognitive science, while also subsuming dynamical explanations. I argue that Milkowski et al’s (2018) arguments however do
not smooth the substantial and empirically significant differences between E- and
cognitivist accounts, and hence do not genuinely integrate them. I also suggest their
proposal to broad the definition of a mechanism in order to incorporate dynamical
explanations does more harm to mechanistic explanation than good. In a similar
vein, Chapter 4 assesses two attempts to integrate mechanistic explanation into enactivism, by Abramova & Slors (2019) and Walmsley (2019). I find that as a result
of the differing explaantory goals of enactive cogntive science versus
(iii) Mechanism gains its explanatory bona fides from nature: mechanistic explanations are objective explanations
A continuous theme in these discussions, and in the literature, is that mechanisms are seen to occupy a more metaphysically robust position compared to other
kinds of explanantia. Craver (2014) for instance argues that mechanistic explanations are objective explanations; the explanatory standards of mechanism are derived
from nature. Mechanistic models explain when they completely, and accurately, describe the ontic causal structure of the world. Consequently mechanistic standards
of explanation lie outside time and place—they are independent of the explanatory
goals, background assumptions or values of investigators. The explanatory standards of mechanism are guaranteed and closed off via their objective character.
In Chapter 5 I address this mechanistic objectivity, and the assumptions of ontic
mechanism. While mechanistic explanation is (in its ontic variant) supposed to be
objective because it reveals the real ontic causal structure of nature, I show how
4

there is little argumentative force behind the claim other than the assumption that
nature is mechanistic. An appeal to interventionism (Woodward 2003) is also shown
to be insufficient to provide objectivity. I argue that the explanatory standards of
mechanism are not derived from nature, but instead driven by the explanatory taste
of mechanist investigators. This taste reflects their goals, values and background
assumptions. I make the further point that objectivity is better thought of as the
consequence of inter-subjective criticism (Longino 1990).

5

Chapter 1
The Non–mechanistic Option:
Defending Dynamical
Explanations
This chapter demonstrates that non–mechanistic, dynamical explanations are a viable approach to explanation in the special sciences. The
claim that dynamical models can be explanatory without reference to
mechanisms has previously been met with three lines of criticism from
mechanists: the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws concern, and
the charge of predictivism. I argue, however, that these mechanist criticisms fail to defeat non–mechanistic, dynamical explanation. Using
the examples of Haken et al’s (1985) model of bimanual coordination,
and Thelen et al’s (2001) dynamical field model of infant perseverative
reaching, I show how each mechanist criticism fails once the standards of
Woodward’s (2003) interventionist framework are applied to dynamical
models. An even–handed application of Woodwardian interventionism
reveals that dynamical models are capable of producing genuine explanations without appealing to underlying mechanistic details.

This chapter has been published as Meyer, R. (2020). The non-mechanistic option:
Defending dynamical explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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CHAPTER 1. THE NON–MECHANISTIC OPTION

1.1

7

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that mechanist objections to non–mechanistic, dynamical explanations are unsuccessful, as they do not hinder dynamical models from
being genuinely explanatory. The justification for this defence comes from the even–
handed application of interventionism (Woodward 2003) which will be shown to be
a viable framework for both mechanistic and non–mechanistic accounts of explanation.1 By applying the interventionist framework (specifically the notions of ideal
interventions, invariance, and counterfactual explanation) in an even–handed way to
dynamical models, it is shown that non–mechanistic, dynamical explanations are not
deflated by these critiques. Moreover, Woodwardian interventionism provides the
foundations for a fully–fledged account of non–mechanistic, dynamical explanation.
Some critics, mechanist or otherwise, may argue that there is something wrong
with the interventionist account offered by Woodward (or simply take a neutral
stance towards it) and may be unswayed by my arguments since the whole enterprise
of interventionism seems suspect or unconvincing. My goal here is however not to
offer a broad defence of Woodward. Interventionism is not necessarily the hill I
intend for non–mechanistic explanation to die on. The aim of this paper is rather
to make the case that for mechanists who do agree with interventionism (and there
are many), and who rely heavily on it for their own accounts (and many do), they
must accept that non–mechanistic models like dynamical models can also explain.
The scope and application of mechanistic explanation is a major contemporary
topic of discussion in philosophy of science (Boone & Piccinini 2016; Bechtel 2017;
Chirimuuta 2017; Matthiessen 2017; Craver 2017). Since the earlier and more restrictive iteration of mechanism laid out by Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000)
mechanism has been increasingly extended in scope. Its proponents claim that
mechanistic explanations are applicable across a broad range of domains, including
systems and cognitive neuroscience (Zednik 2014; Boone & Piccinini 2016), systems
biology (Matthiessen 2017), cognitive science (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010, 2013)
and psychology (Piccinini & Craver 2011). This encroachment on new domains has
in turn resulted in disagreements over how appropriate mechanism is to these ’special sciences’, with some critics preferring to advance varieties of non–mechanistic
explanation (Weiskopf 2011; Dupré 2013; Brigandt et al 2018).
While critics differ in their rationale for preferring a non–mechanistic approach
to explanation,2 there is a common feeling among these dissenters that mechanistic
1

Related arguments have been presented by Gervais & Weber (2011), Dupré (2013), Silberstein
& Chemero (2013) and Woodward (2013). In these cases, the specifics of how interventionism
would be applied to dynamical models is left unsaid. Here I have attempted to greatly expand
on these sketches and show in detail how interventionism can be integrated into an account of
dynamical explanation.
2
While this chapter focusses on dynamical modelling and dynamical explanation, the term
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explanations are not suited to the kinds of nondecomposable, nonlinear or otherwise complex phenomena that are frequently investigated by biologists, cognitive
scientists and psychological scientists.
One particularly vocal source of non–mechanistic criticism of mechanism comes
from proponents of dynamical modelling, some of whom claim that dynamical models are better suited to some phenomena in cognitive science, psychology and related
domains than mechanisms (Chemero & Silberstein 2008; Stepp Chemero & Turvey
2011; Silberstein & Chemero 2013; Lamb & Chemero 2014). It is this dynamicist
tendency that I will focus on in this chapter.
Contra the dominant mechanist trend, these dynamicists argue that dynamical
models can explain by abstracting away from the mechanistic details of a system
and describing highly predictive mathematical models of a systems’ behaviour. One
influential branch of dynamicism advocates for a revival of covering–law explanation
(Walmsley 2008; Gervais & Weber 2011; Stepp et al 2011). This attempt at building
a dynamical, covering–law mode of explanation has become widespread enough to be
deemed the “received view” (Zednik 2011, pg. 239) amongst dynamicists about how
dynamical models could explain. The attempted revival of covering–law explanation
has subsequently been criticized heavily by mechanists (Bechtel 2011; Craver &
Kaplan 2011; Kaplan & Bechtel 2011; Kaplan & Craver 2011) who consider it to
be a flawed approach to explanation, and one that retains the existing flaws in
law–based explanation.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines mechanistic explanation
and Woodwardian explanation, and Section 3 will similarly outline dynamical modelling and the covering–law mode of explanation using the example of the HKB
model of bimanual coordination. Sections 4, 5 and 6 then identify and respond to
the criticisms made by mechanist, interventionist philosophers and directed towards
proponents of dynamical covering–law explanation. Three lines of criticism will be
investigated—the genuine laws concern, the causal relevance concern, and the error of predictivism on the part of dynamicists. In Section 7 I address Woodward’s
criticisms of the HKB model in particular as explanatory within an interventionist
framework. Section 8 puts these solutions together into a coherent whole, showing
how an account of dynamical explanation would work.3
“nonmechanistic explanation” refers to a diverse range of explanatory strategies including topological explanation (Huneman 2010; Sporns 2011; Stepp et al 2011), structural explanation (Hughes
1989a; Bokulich 2011) and functional explanation (Weiskopf 2011).
3
Concerns about decomposition and localisation strategies may be conspicuous by their absence
in this paper. The same dynamicist and mechanist camps are engaged in an ongoing (and closely
related) debate about the necessity of these heuristics in explanation. Silberstein & Chemero
(2013) for instance claim that some nonlinear and complex phenomena are best explained without
low-level mechanistic detail, a view echoed by Woodward (2013). Some mechanists (Bechtel &
Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Craver & Kaplan 2011; Kaplan & Craver 2011; Kaplan 2015) by contrast
argue that decomposition and localisation are vital for genuine explanation, and that dynamical
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Interventionism and Mechanistic Explanation

I will outline a few key aspects of Woodward’s account of explanation (1997, 2003,
2002, 2008, 2013) namely ideal interventions, the notion of invariance, and counterfactual explanation. In addition, I will show how mechanists appeal to Woodwardian
interventionism, and incorporate it into mechanistic explanation. The foundation
of much mechanist thought is Craver’s (2007) influential account of mechanistic
explanation, which in turn heavily integrates Woodward’s notions of ideal interventions, invariance and counterfactual explanation. Craver’s account has in turn
been integrated by a wide range of mechanist philosophers (Bechtel 2008; Darden
2008; Piccinini & Craver 2011; Zednik 2011, 2014; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010,
2013; Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Kaplan 2015). When speaking about mechanists or mechanistic explanation in this section, I am referring to this contingent of
mechanist thinkers and their approach to explanation.

1.2.1

Causal relevance and ideal interventions

The issue of causal relevance has caused difficulties for several accounts of explanation.4 If an explanation is unable to distinguish which facts are causally relevant
(and should be included in the explanation) and which are causally irrelevant (and
should be excluded) then it will fail to properly explain. Explanation requires a
description of the causal structure (Salmon 1984) that resulted in the explanandum
phenomenon—and describing the causal structure requires a clear picture of what
features of the world are causally relevant.
Woodward differentiates causally relevant features of an explanation from causally irrelevant ones by employing an interventionist framework. Woodward’s claim
is that “causal (as opposed to merely correlational) relationships are relationships
that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control.” (Woodward 2008, pg. 219). Those relationships that can be possibly intervened on are
causal relationships, and relevant from an explanatory standpoint.
This process is formalized by Woodward as:
(M) X causes Y if and only if there are background circumstances B such
that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of X (and no
other variable) were to occur in B, then Y would change. (Woodward
2008,, pg. 222).
models only explain when they incorporate mechanistic details. I bracket this issue here, since
my focus is on the interplay of interventionism and dynamical explanation, not the necessity of
mechanistic detail for explanation.
4
For an overview of the recurring problems with several other (now historical) accounts of causal
relevance, see Craver (2007).
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Establishing causation therefore requires finding relationships that can be manipulated. Here manipulation is cast as an ideal intervention. An ideal intervention
is a manipulation made on the value of a variable, and it is ideal because the intervention needs to be possible in principal, but not necessarily in practice. The target
might be too big, too small, too far away, or in some other condition that makes
an actual intervention impossible. Woodward makes this point to avoid an anthropocentric concept of causation and intervention—causation would still be a feature
of nature without humans around, and interventions occur all the time without the
involvement of humans. An intervention on X ought also to isolate its effect on Y
and eliminate confounding variables.
Mechanistic explanations make heavy use of Woodward’s notion of an ideal
intervention for establishing causal relevance:
To say that one item (activity, entity or property) is relevant to another,
is to say, at least in part, that one has the ability to manipulate one item
by intervening to change another. (Craver 2007, pg. 93–94)
The use of ideal interventions is a crucial aspect of mechanistic explanation:
Craver claims that Woodward’s account of causal relevance provides “an essential
normative component to previous counts of mechanistic explanation” (Craver 2007,
pg. 105) marking it as an improvement over the previous mechanist accounts produced by Glennan (1996), Machamer et al (2000) and Bechtel & Richardson (1993).

1.2.2

Invariance

The next component of Woodward’s account is invariance, a measure of both the
stability and causal potency of a generalisation, and that bears some resemblance
to the notion of a law of nature. While Woodward (2003) does not consider laws
of nature to be crucial to explanation, he is however keen to distil out something
useful from the notion of laws. What laws do for explanation, Woodward claims,
is to provide stable generalisations that hold between a collection of variables. The
problem of distinguishing a generalisation from a bona fide law of nature is a moot
point, since Woodward argues that lawfulness is not really the useful or interesting property of a given generalisation. The truly important distinction is between
generalisations that are accidental, and those that are invariant.
Accidental generalisations (everyone in this room is currently sitting down; every
coin in my pocket is silver) are unstable, do not expose causal relationships and are
hence not particularly explanatorily useful. Distinguishing merely accidental generalisations from more stable and explanatory useful generalisations is, for Woodward,
conducted by establishing the invariance of these generalisations:
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Because invariance is the key to explanatoriness, we don’t need to decide whether
a generalization counts as a law (and hence we don’t need to find a sharp dividing
line between laws and nonlaws) to distinguish between the explanatory and the
nonexplanatory. (Woodward 2003, pg. 183–4)
...it follows that whether or not a generalization can be used to explain
has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is
lawful. (Woodward 2000, pg.2)
How can invariance be established?
A generalization is invariant if (i) it is... change–relating and (ii) it is
stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a
special sort of change called an intervention. (Woodward 2000, pg. 198)
Establishing invariance necessarily requires the use of interventions. Both (i)
and (ii) involve the application of interventions. In the case of (i) the goal is to
establish that this set of relationships between variables depicted in the generalisation is “change–relating” (also known as “difference–making” - both are synonyms
of causally relevant).
This criterion eliminates the kinds of accidental cases discussed earlier. For
instance, the case where being present in this room (P) is related to sitting down
(S), the truth of P relates to the value of S. However, this generalisation breaks
down if we intervene on P and S and observe their effects on one another—someone
could stand up while remaining in the room, or be outside the room but sitting.
This relationship between P and S is merely accidental, and we cannot explain the
value of P or S by citing this relationship.
For criterion (ii), Woodward also states that this relationship needs to demonstrate stability, and show that it holds under a “range of interventions”. The more
stable the relationship, the more explanatory “depth” is established, meaning a
broader range of scenarios under which the generalisation continues to provide explanatory power. It is important to note that neither stability (and hence invariance)
is a binary condition, but rather stability “admits of degrees” (Woodward 1997, pg.
34). A generalisation that remains stable over a great range of interventions is explanatory over a greater range of scenarios, but this does not exclude less stable
generalisations from explaining within a narrower range of conditions.
Invariance is a key part of mechanistic explanation, and there is a broad acceptance by mechanists that “interactions in a mechanism should be characterized in
terms of invariant change relating generalizations” (Kaiser & Craver 2013, pg. 25).
Craver claims that mechanistic explanation ‘relies closely on James Woodward’s account of the role of invariance in explanation’ (pg. 94), and integrates the criteria
of change–relating and stability as important for explanatory power:

CHAPTER 1. THE NON–MECHANISTIC OPTION

12

...causal relations need not be universal to be explanatory, nor need they
be unrestricted in scope, nor need they lack any reference to particulars. All that matters is that there is some stable set of circumstances
under which the variables specified in the relation exhibit the kind of
manipulable relationship sketched above. (Craver 2007, pg. 100).

1.2.3

Explanation

So far, we have seen how interventions establish the causal relationships between
variables, and that these kinds of causal relations can be captured and described
systematically in the form of invariant generalisations. In addition, mechanistic
explanations make use of both ideal interventions and invariance in order to provide
explanatory accounts.
Following from this, Woodward claims that “explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual dependence” (Woodward 2003, pg. 191).
Once we know the “systematic patterns” (the invariant generalisations) at work in
producing a phenomenon, we can also investigate counterfactual scenarios. Knowing
what happened, and what would have happened if circumstances had been different (counterfactual dependence) is the key to explanatory power.5 A model that
provides a combination of a description of the invariant generalisations at work, and
predictions of what would happen in counterfactual scenarios based on the description of those generalisations, is explanatory. Explanations in the Woodwardian sense
can tell us why things obtain, and what would have happened had circumstances
been different.
Mechanistic explanations also utilize counterfactual notions of explanation. A
mechanism shows the counterfactual dependencies operating between its components (a collection of invariant generalisations between components), and in this way,
provides an explanation of why a certain phenomenon occurred, and how things
would have occurred in different conditions.6
5

Those who do not subscribe to counterfactual explanation or interventionism may already
have different views on nonmechanistic explanation. However, my targets are specifically those
mechanists who do uphold Woodwardian interventionism.
6
Craver (2007) extends this counterfactual account by also specifying that a mutually manipulable, inter-level constitutive relationship must hold between the mechanism and the explanandum
phenomenon. The scope of this article, however, only covers the causal and counterfactual side of
mechanistic explanation and its relationship with interventionism.
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Covering–Laws and Dynamical Explanation
Dynamical models

Dynamical models are a kind of descriptive model used to investigate systems by
way of the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory (DST). The techniques
of DST developed out of the field of synergetics (Haken 1983; Kelso 1995), and have
come to be applied across a wide variety of domains including circadian rhythms
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2009, 2010, 2013); infant locomotion (Thelen & Smith 1994)
and reaching behaviour (Thelen et al 2001; Smith & Thelen 2003); robotics and artificial intelligence (Beer 1995); human coordination (Haken et al 1985; Mechsner
et al 2001); and cellular genetics (Huang et al 2005). At the heart of these models are differential equations which model the often nonlinear and highly complex
relationships between those variables.
The Haken–Kelso–Bunz (HKB) (Haken et al 1985) model of bimanual coordination is a frequently invoked example of a dynamical model (Kelso 1995; Stepp et al
2011; Chemero 2011; Lamb & Chemero 2014; Kaplan 2015). The HKB model is a
dynamical model that attempts to describe the phenomenon of bimanual coordination. Bimanual oscillations (“wagging” the index fingers of both hands at the same
time) can be conducted in either in–phase or anti–phase conditions.
The differential equation used in the HKB model:

Here φ is relative phase, having a value of either 0 degrees or 180 degrees (representing in– and anti–phase conditions respectively) and b/a is the coupling ratio
inversely related to the frequency of oscillations.
The variables in the HKB equation track abstract mathematical features of
a system, and show how the system would behave over time given certain input
values. In practice, the HKB model and other dynamical models are often highly
accurate descriptors and predictors of the modelled system’s behaviour (Chemero
& Silberstein 2008; Chemero 2011; Silberstein & Chemero 2013).
Using the HKB model as an exemplary case, this section will examine two properties ascribed to dynamical models: that they provide covering–law explanations,
and that their predictive power is indicative of explanatory power.

1.3.2

Covering–law explanation

Many dynamicists have claimed that dynamical models like the HKB model can be
more than merely descriptive, and can provide genuinely explanatory accounts of
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phenomena (Kelso 1995; Van Gelder 1995, 1998; Bressler & Kelso 2001; Chemero
& Silberstein 2008; Walmsley 2008; Stepp et al 2011; Silberstein & Chemero 2013;
Lamb & Chemero 2014).7
One common claim is that dynamical models produce something like lawful
statements about systems:
...the brain is fundamentally a pattern forming self–organized system
governed by potentially discoverable, nonlinear dynamical laws. (Kelso
1995, pg. 257)
The same sentiment is echoed in Bressler & Kelso (2001), who argue that the
HKB model “exemplifies a law of coordination that has been found to be independent
of the specifics of system structure” (pg. 28).
These dynamicists are invoking a long–standing conception of explanation as
being based on laws of nature. An influential account of how laws explain comes
in the form of the covering–law model of explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948;
Hempel 1962a; 1965). The covering–law model suggests that:
An explanatory account may be regarded as an argument to the effect that the
event to be explained...was to be expected by reason of certain explanatory facts.
These may be divided into two groups: (i) particular facts and (ii) uniformities
expressed by general laws. (Hempel 1962a, pg. 10; quoted in Salmon 1984, pg. 19).
Hence a covering–law explanation ought to provide a set of facts governed by a
law, and show how a logical necessity holds between these facts and the governing
law. For instance, the orbit of a planet is governed by Kepler’s first law:
L1. The orbit of a planet is an ellipse with the Sun at one of the two foci.
We can combine the antecedent facts (the location, velocity and acceleration
of the planet as well as the location of the Sun) with Kepler’s first law and show
that the planet’s orbit was to be expected based on these facts. This set of facts
combined with this law would qualify as an explanation of the planet’s orbit under
the D–N model.
Walmsley (2008) attempts to fit dynamical accounts into this covering–law mode
of explanation:
...the explanatory goal of dynamical cognitive scientists is to provide
covering–law explanations whereby a cognitive phenomenon is explained
by way of citing the laws (qua differential equations) that govern the
system that produces it. (pg. 344).
7

Though the nature of the distinction between description and explanation is contentious, the
existence of a distinction is generally accepted. Advocates of both mechanistic (Craver & Kaplan 2011; Kaplan & Bechtel 2011; Kaplan & Craver 2011) and dynamical approaches (Chemero
& Silberstein 2008; Silberstein & Chemero 2013) agree that there is a difference between mere
description and explanation of a phenomenon.
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The central claim from Walmsley is that the equations used in dynamical modelling can become explanatory within the context of a covering–law explanation.
Dynamical equations such as those used above can act as governing laws for the
system they represent, and they describe a logical necessity operating between the
antecedent conditions and the equation much as laws of nature do in Hempel’s
account.
Depending on our interests, then, we can insert the values we know into
the equation, and solve the equation in order to find the values we do not
know. Finding the values for a, b, and φ when d/dt is 0 would constitute
to an explanation of why d/dt takes the value it does...(Walmsley 2008,
pg. 341).
An explanation produced using this method would have explanatory power because it can tell us how, based on the logical necessity operating between the values
of the variables b/a and φ that the result was to be expected.

1.3.3

Prediction

In addition to claims about covering–law explanation and dynamical models, some
dynamicists have claimed a direct connection exists between the predictive powers
of dynamical models like the HKB model and their capacity to explain phenomena. The HKB model accurately predicts several important outcomes of bimanual
coordination, namely that there will exist two stable basins of attraction at low frequencies (in– and anti–phase), as well as phase switching at certain critical values
of k (Kelso 1995; Walmsley 2008). Chemero & Silberstein (2008) argue that this
predictive power is an indicator of a deeper explanatory power:
If models are accurate enough to describe observed phenomena and to
predict what would have happened had circumstances been different,
they are sufficient as explanations. (pg. 12).
This claim also appears in Walmsley’s account, where he attributes explanatory
power to predictive models like the HKB model. This is justified by a quirk of the
covering–law account:
...the only difference between a prediction and a covering–law explanation is whether or not the state of affairs described in the explanandum
is known to have obtained. It is therefore solely a pragmatic differenceprediction and explanation have an identical logical structure, but differ
in terms of what one knows and what one wants to know. (Walmsley
2008, pg. 340).
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In the same vein, Stepp et al (2011) also claim that “...dynamical explanations
show that particular phenomena could have been predicted, given local conditions
and some law–like general principles...” (pg. 432). They also note the significance of the counter–factual supporting nature of the model, since “we can use the
mathematical model to make predictions of the activity of the slave system with
so–far–unobserved activity in the master system.” (pg. 432). In their view, this
combination of prediction and counterfactual support is explanatory within the context of a covering–law explanation.
What follows in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are three lines of criticism presented by
mechanist philosophers who are critical of the possibility of dynamical explanations
that appeal to the covering–law model.

1.4
1.4.1

Causal Relevance
The causal relevance concern

The causal relevance concern regards the apparent inability for dynamical explanations to establish causal relevance, and is a development of long standing criticism
of covering–law explanations. While an interventionist approach allows mechanistic explanations to determine causal relevance, covering–law explanations have no
comparable technique. Covering–law explanations are therefore at risk of excluding causally relevant variables, and including causally irrelevant variables—there is
effectively no way of knowing which variables are relevant to the explanation and
which are not. They cannot tell us about the causal structure that produced a
phenomenon (Salmon 1984).
Without an account of causal relevance, we cannot give a causal account of why
a phenomenon occurred, since “...the line that demarcates explanations from merely
empirically adequate models seems to correspond to whether the model describes
the relevant causal structures that produce, underlie, or maintain the explanandum
phenomenon.” (Craver & Kaplan 2011, pg. 602). Dynamical models do not by
themselves tell us anything about causal structure, and so according to this critique
they remain in the category of descriptive models, without explanatory power.
Craver & Kaplan (2011) claim that this flaw in covering–law explanation is
generally accepted and long standing, stemming from critics of the covering–law
approach like Salmon (1984, 1989). Their rejoinder to dynamicists on causal relevance is a “reminder from the past 6 decades of philosophical work on scientific
explanation” (pg. 602) that explanations need to provide an account of the causes
of a phenomenon, not just describe it. Since causal relevance remains a problem for
covering–law explanation:
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...there is no currently available and philosophically tenable sense of ‘explanation’ according to which such models explain even when they fail
to reveal the causal structures that produce, underlie, or maintain the
explanandum phenomenon. (Craver & Kaplan 2011, pg. 602)
Hence dynamical explanations would be at best merely descriptive pseudo–
explanations, which fail to identify the causal relationships among variables.

1.4.2

Intervening on dynamical models

I argue contrary to Craver & Kaplan (2011) that dynamical models can in fact
provide facts about causal relationships, and ultimately explain. There are no
grounds on which to assume that dynamical models cannot also utilize Woodwardian
interventionism to establish causal relevance. While mechanist philosophers consider
mechanisms to be the best subject for the interventionist framework, Woodward’s
account is shown here to also be useful to a non–mechanistic and dynamical account
of explanation.
For mechanists who are proponents of Woodwardian interventionism, causal
relationships are those relationships that can be exposed via ideal interventions.
Mechanisms are essentially bundles of causal relationships, and experimental interventions are necessary to show how a component is causally relevant to the mechanism, and thereby reveal those causal relationships. Describing these relationships
is the basis of explanatory power.
By applying this same Woodwardian notion of ideal interventions to dynamical
models, the causal relevance concern can be countered. If we can intervene on the
values of variables in a dynamical model, and see changes in the value of another
variable, then (on the interventionist account) we have exposed a causal relationship.
I am not arguing for any modification to Woodwardian interventionism—rather, I
am arguing for its application outside of just mechanistic models and explanations,
something which Woodward’s account is perfectly capable of doing.8
8

Another related question is the possibility of macro-to-micro level causation (Baumgartner
2009, 2010; Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015). In the case of HKB, this would mean that b/a and
φ being macro-level variables of the dynamical system that they supervene on, are not capable of
causation independent of their micro-level supervenience base. If one cannot intervene on φ without
also simultaneously intervening on the micro details which form the supervenience base for φ then
supposedly there cannot be causation from the macro-level down to the micro-level. Woodward
(2015) offers a solution by adding a clause to his requirements for interventions specifying that
non-causal relations (like constitutive or supervenience relations) do not need to be controlled for
during interventions on macro variables, which means macro variables are not prone to systematic
overdetermination of effects or becoming epiphenomena. While Baumgartner & Gebharter (2015)
argue that this adjustment undermines Cravers account of constitutive relationships (and take this
as a motive to find an alternative) my purpose here is not to defend mechanistic explanation, and
hence whatever violence is done to mechanistic constitution relations is not for me a good reason
to reject Woodwards amendments.
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Test case I: The HKB model

In order to test out this argument, I will consider empirical studies of the HKB model
and determine whether they represent successful interventions that exposed causal
relationships within the model. In order to establish these causal relationships,
there needs to be an intervention on the value of the variables concerned, in this
case relative phase (φ and frequency (b/a).
For b/a to have a causal relationship with φ it would need to be shown that:
(M) b/a causes φ if and only if there are background circumstances B
such that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of b/a (and
no other variable) were to occur in B, then φ would change.
Scholz & Kelso (1989) increased and decreased the frequency of queues which
subjects were instructed to match the frequency of their oscillations to. This represents an intervention on to an intervention on b/a. The results were in line with
the HKB model’s predictions, showing that when oscillation frequency is slow (b/a
>0.25) there are two stable attractors in both in–phase and anti–phase conditions.
As frequency increases (b/a =<0.25) the anti–phase attractor disappears, and the
system is liable to fall towards the in–phase attractor.
This satisfies (M) so far. The coupling ratio, b/a, is intervened on by increasing
or decreasing the frequency of oscillations. Interventions on the value of b/a result in
regular changes in relative phase, φ. Hence, the relationship from b/a to φ is a causal
relationship. Under the scheme of Woodwardian interventionism, the relationship
described by the HKB model between b/a to φ appears to meet the criteria for being
“difference–making” or causal. This example shows how the interventionist solution
to the problem of causal relevance can be applied to non–mechanistic, dynamical
models just as well as it can to mechanistic models.

1.4.4

Test case II: Dynamical field model

My second test case is the dynamical field model of infant perseverative reaching
developed by Thelen et al (2001), and discussed also by Zednik (2011). Thelen et
al (2001) model the reaching behaviours of infants in an A–not–B error task. The
A–not–B error occurs when infants are induced to repeatedly reach for a desirable
object (a toy) which is hidden in one of two locations—location A or location B.
When the infant witnesses the toy being repeatedly hidden at A, they are prone to
erroneously continue reaching for A even if in subsequent trials the toy is clearly
shown being hidden under B (hence it is called the A–not–B error).
The model investigates the variables that can influence this tendency to reach
for either A or B. The dynamical field model relates the values of variables at each
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point (x ) on a field overlaid onto the task environment—for instance, x A and x B
will be the locations on the field where the hiding spots A and B are located. Each
location has an activation value (u) and when u reaches a critical value, reaching is
likely to occur towards that location. Several variables play a role in determining
how activation changes over time, as the model demonstrates:

Where activation level (u̇) of every point (x ) on the field changes over time (t) as
a function of the field’s previous activation (u), an input vector (S ), a cooperativity
parameter (g), and a temporal decay constant (τ ). I will investigate the effect of S
on u. S has, according to the model, some kind of effect on the value of u—what
I aim to establish is whether or not interventions on S do in fact reveal a causal
relationship with u.
According to Thelen et al (2001) there is considerable experimental evidence
for the causal relationship from S to u. S represents several concurrent inputs—
task, specific, and memory. Interventions on the task input such as changing the
distinctiveness or desirability of the toy increases or decreases activation at the
chosen location (x A or x B) (Diedrich et al 2001). Specific input can be intervened
on by giving cues to reach (the experimenter tapping or gesturing to a particular
location) which similarly influences u at that x A and x B (Smith & Thelen 2003).
The effect of memory input is that of these previous inputs, which continue to
influence u.
Like the HKB model, I think that the dynamical field model of infant perseverative reaching is therefore also a good example of a dynamical model that can be
treated in interventionist terms to establish causal relationships. The input variable
is a cause of changes in the value of activation, and is a difference–maker to the
outcomes of the system. Whether or not the infant reaches for A or B is controlled
by inputs to S, and this relationship satisfies Woodward’s requirement (M).9
9

(M) also requires that the relationship be between b/a to φand excluding other confounding
variables. This is a sensible requirement since we would like to know that b/a is the cause of φ and
not some other hidden variable or a combination of b/a and some other variable. Much like for
non-dynamical or mechanistic models, identifying and controlling for confounding variables is done
on a case-by-case basis, with a view to (at least) conceptually disentangling confounding variables
and controlling for them (Woodward 2003). In the case of the dynamical field model, it would be
important, per Woodward (2003), to correct for the influence of (for example) the cooperativity
input g when determining the causal role of S on u. While in practice it may be impossible to
set up a scenario where g does not also influence u, we only need to be able to imagine an ideal
scenario where the influence of g was removed.
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Genuine Laws
The genuine laws concern

The genuine laws concern regards the use of dynamical equations as laws of nature
in a covering–law explanation, as proposed by Walmsley (2008). The core of this
concern is the uncertainty around what constitutes a genuine law of nature. There
is considerable disagreement over what makes a law a law, a criticism that has been
directed at law–based explanations for decades (see for example Salmon 1984, 1989).
The nature of laws continues to be a live topic of debate and it suffices to say that
there is no uncontroversial position on laws. As such, this makes it hard to see
how dynamicists like Walmsley (2008) can state with any confidence what makes
a dynamical equation a law, given the lack of reliable criteria to judge them by.
There is simply no widely agreed upon framework for determining what kinds of
generalisations should be accepted as laws (Kaplan 2015).
Despite this disagreement, a common intuition within the literature on laws is
that they ought to be exceptionless and universal in scope (Woodward 2003; Kaplan
2015), neither of which seem to apply to dynamical models. Dynamical models might
apply to a wide range of phenomena, but they are not exceptionless—for instance,
the HKB model does not apply to all examples of coordination such as gait switching
from walking to running in humans.
In addition, it is debateable whether laws of nature are applicable within certain
scientific domains. For instance, while laws of nature are not uncommon within
physics and chemistry, they rarely figure in the explanations produced by biologists,
neuroscientists and cognitive scientists (Woodward 2003; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2011).
This is coupled with an absence of laws in these domains: “uncontroversial examples
of laws are less easy to find in sciences like biology and geology and harder still to
find in the social and behavioural sciences.” (Woodward 2003, pg. 183). Appealing
to laws, then, might not be suitable outside the “hard sciences” of chemistry and
physics.
These uncertainties create a problem for advocates of covering–law explanations since they require nomic expectability (Salmon 1984) – that the law can be
expected to reliably describe a set of relations between variables. Both the D–N
and I–S models which comprise the covering–law mode of explanation depend upon
either determinate or highly probable relationships between variables, upon which
deductive or inductive arguments can be made. In the case of accidental, non–lawful
generalisations there can be no nomic expectability since there is no way of knowing
whether the relations between variables it describes will continue to hold in that
way. Certainty that a set of relationships is lawful (and as a result dependable and
stable) is therefore very important for covering–law explanation.
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The follow–up of the genuine laws concern regards the avenues dynamicists
can possibly take to remedy the situation, granted the uncertainty surrounding
laws. Kaplan (2015) claims that there are two equally undesirable paths open to
dynamicists—either they can claim that dynamical equations are ceteris paribus
laws, or they can attempt to produce some set of criteria for what a law of nature
needs to be. The ceteris paribus option leads into another thicket of uncertainty
(Woodward 2002), and the latter option could be a very difficult and long–term task,
in light of ongoing debate surrounding such a set of criteria for laws. According to
Kaplan (2015), dynamicists are better off conceding that covering–law explanation
is not viable at present.

1.5.2

Using invariance in place of laws

When mechanists claim that laws of nature are rarely encountered or applicable
outside of physics and chemistry, I agree entirely. However, laws are not the only
kind of explanation–worthy generalisation available for a dynamical mode of explanation. Woodward himself argues that lawfulness is the wrong criterion to gauge
the explanatory value of a generalisation by. Instead of being concerned about
how exceptionless, universal in scope (or some other criteria) a generalisation is, we
should look for how invariant the generalisation is in showing how different variables
causally relate to one another:
...generalizations in the special sciences can be used to explain, as long
as they are invariant in the right way, whether or not they are regarded
as laws. (Woodward 2003, pg. 183).
Whether a set of relationships are covered by a law of nature is not important.
What matters is how invariant they are, and as a result how reliable they are for
the purposes of describing stable and robust patterns of causal and counterfactual
relations. Non–lawful generalisations directed towards psychological, biological, and
cognitive phenomena (and any other phenomena within a “special science”) are not
precluded from being explanatory so long as they are shown to be invariant.
At this point I am diverging from the covering–law view proposed by Walmsley
(2008), derived directly from Hempel (1965), and at which much mechanist ire
has been directed. Instead I propose that Walmsley, while generally correct in
his assessment of the explanatory power of dynamical models, need not rely on
a covering–law account (a direction of development he himself acknowledges). The
covering–law account does, however, point us in the right direction in some respects:
In its emphasis on the role played by generalizations, including those
taking a mathematical form, in explanation and causal analysis, the in-
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terventionist account has some affinities with the DN model. (Woodward
2017, pg. 7)
So, the intuitions of dynamicists like Walmsley are more or less correct. Dynamical models provide useful generalisations, and show dependencies between antecedent facts and this generalisation—a valid approach under both the covering–law
and interventionist approaches. Woodward however provides a less problematic
alternative to laws of nature in the form of invariant generalisations. Instead of
talking about laws of nature dynamicists can talk about invariant generalisations.
The general form of dynamical explanation, in shifting from a covering–law to an
interventionist approach, changes surprisingly little.
While Walmsley (2008) specifies a kind of explanation derived from antecedent
facts and laws of nature, using dynamical equations in the place of laws, here I
suggest that a more robust account of dynamical explanation would replace laws
with invariant generalisations, and thereby entirely avoid the genuine laws concern.
My goal is not to rule out the possibility of the existence of laws, or to argue that they
have no role in providing explanations. Instead I am bracketing the issue entirely,
and showing how according to the interventionist framework dynamical models can
figure in explanatory accounts.

1.5.3

Test case I: The HKB model

We can start to form a picture of a mode of non–mechanistic explanation where
dynamical equations are explanatorily useful based on their invariance, using the
HKB model. The critical question is: can the HKB equation meet the requirements
of invariance? An invariant generalisation fulfils two important criteria:
(i). The relationships described in the generalisation are causally efficacious or “difference–making”.
(ii). The generalisation is stable under a range of interventions.
The arguments presented in Section 4 already provide an answer to (i): the
relationships described in the HKB model can be intervened upon to show how they
are causally efficacious, and the model therefore meets this criterion.
An answer to (ii) requires us to determine how stable, under a range of interventions, these causal relationships are. If the model remains descriptive of bimanual
coordination under a narrow range of conditions, then its explanatory “depth” will
be very limited. This latter criterion (ii) is a sliding scale, compared to the binary
condition (i). How invariant a generalisation is depends upon the interests of the
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investigator—invariance is greater when the generalisation continues to hold over a
greater range of values of variables we are interested in.
In the case of the HKB model, if our interests are in explaining bimanual coordination in humans, then the model ought to cover the range of values that humans
are capable of. A sufficiently invariant generalisation ought to cover all the scenarios
we will encounter when trying to explain this phenomenon, while a less invariant
generalisation would only hold across a portion of them. For instance, if the HKB
model only held in conditions of low frequency, where b/a >0.25, then it would have
a limited invariance.
In view of the experimental results, the HKB model appears to be stable across
a sufficiently broad range of interventions—there is no observed frequency, high or
low, at which the model ceases to describe the relationship between b/a and φ.
For the purposes of empirical research on human subjects (i.e. Scholtz & Kelso
1987) the model is stable. We could imagine circumstances where the model might
break down—for instance if the frequency became too rapid for human subjects
to maintain. However, invariance does not require universal scope, and admits
of degrees. For the purposes of explaining bimanual coordination in humans, the
HKB model appears to be sufficiently stable and hence invariant (Kaplan 2015) also
discusses this scenario at length).
The dynamical equation at the heart of the HKB model qualifies as an invariant
generalisation, fit for the purposes of explanation, filling a similar role to laws of
nature in the covering–law mode of explanation. The relationship between b/a
and φ described in the HKB model meets Woodward’s criteria for an invariant
generalisation, and it is therefore explanatorily useful.

1.5.4

Test case II: Dynamical field model

Like the HKB model, the dynamical field model equation meets the criterion (i) for
invariance—the target variable S, when intervened upon, reveals causal relationships
between itself and the effect variable, u. The model describes the underlying causal
structure of infant perseverative reaching and the A–not–B error.
The model can also meet criterion (ii), demonstrating sufficient stability to be
an invariant generalisation and fit for explanation. The model is stable enough
that constructing experimental scenarios based on the model across a wide variety
of circumstances—even in extreme scenarios, like where no toy or cue from the
experimenter is presented at all, representing a null value for the task and specific
inputs elements of S (Thelen et al 2001)—the model continues to accurately describe
and predict the infant reaching behaviour (Smith & Thelen 2003).
Under these kinds of circumstances that we might want to investigate in order
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to explain infant perseverative reaching, the dynamical field model remains stable
under intervention. Hence, I think the dynamical field model is sufficiently stable
to meet criterion (ii), and subsequently qualifies as an invariant generalisation.

1.6
1.6.1

Prediction
Predictivism

The third criticism of dynamical explanation is what some mechanists have called
predictivism (Kaplan & Craver 2011), the position attributed to dynamicists who
hold that prediction is sufficient as explanation. As we have seen, dynamicists like
Chemero & Silberstein (2008) consider the predictive powers of dynamical modelling
to be indicative of some deeper, explanatory power on the part of those dynamical
models.
Mechanists have responded by pointing out the insufficiency of prediction for
explanation. One frequently invoked example is that of a barometer (Salmon 1989;
Kaplan & Craver 2011; Kaplan 2015). A barometer, which measures air pressure,
is excellent at predicting rainy weather. A sudden drop in air pressure is correlated
with a change in the barometer’s readings, which is in turn correlated with imminent
rain. However, it would be false to claim that as a result of these readings, the
barometer is the cause of the rain, or that the barometer readings somehow explain
the phenomenon of rain.
This criticism alleges that what dynamicists are doing is conflating prediction
(which can be purely correlational) with genuine causal explanation. Hence claiming
that the predictive powers of dynamical models make them explanatory is misguided,
since there is no justification for suggesting that any amount of predictive power will
grant explanatory power to a model.

1.6.2

Crude and invariant prediction

In their use of the barometer example, mechanists like Kaplan & Craver (2011) are
referring to an example of what I will call crude prediction. Crude prediction refers
to merely correlational, non–invariant relations between variables. A correlation
exists between the barometer reading and the imminence of rain, where the reading
is a useful predictor of rain, but there is no causal relationship at work between these
two variables. This kind of crude prediction is rightly to be thought of as accidental
and with little to no explanatory value.
I argue that another kind of prediction, which I will call invariant prediction, can
provide explanatory power. While predictions made on the basis of correlations (like
the barometer) are evidently not indicators of explanatory power, not all predictions
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are made on this basis. What I am pointing to here is a combination of counterfactual
support and prediction, where a model is capable of showing what would happen if
circumstances were different on the basis of an invariant generalisation.
Invariant prediction is made on the basis of the counterfactual–supporting abilities of an invariant generalisation – and these predictions are the kind of counterfactual dependencies that Woodward–style explanations are built on. Counterfactual
dependency, as a point of clarification, is distinct from mere non–causal description
in that it shows how one or more causal relationships connect to one another. It does
this in a sense that is more than just establishing what is “barely true” by appealing
to certain “truth–makers” like invariant generalisations. (Woodward 2008, pg. 230)
Crude prediction does not result from knowledge of invariant generalisations and
as such is merely correlational and accidental. It is not indicative of explanatory
power. Invariant prediction is conversely made on the basis of knowledge of the
stable causal relations governing that system, and how that system will behave
under a range of different counterfactual scenarios. If explanation is a matter of
describing counterfactual–supporting invariant generalisations (Woodward 2003),
then the claim I am making here about invariant prediction and counterfactual
support seem largely in line with this explanatory goal. A model which can provide
invariant predictions based on the counterfactual dependencies it describes is an
explanatory model.
For instance, the dynamical field model can predict the outcomes of infant perseverative reaching based on knowledge of the causal relationships between variables,
within a sufficiently stable (and hence invariant) generalisation. Even without actually observing the outcomes associated with the input variable S holding a particular
value, the invariance of the equation means that we can entertain the counterfactual, and predict what the outcome would have been. These predictions, based as
they are on a sufficiently invariant generalisation, have the same kind of explanatory import as observations of particular outcomes. Whether or not the predicted
result actually obtains or not is not significant: if made on the basis of an invariant
generalisation then a prediction has explanatory power.
This approach to prediction and explanation comes close to resembling the
covering–law mode of explanation, but without its attendant flaws—the causal relevance concern and the genuine laws concern—which should not trouble the present
account since, as we have seen in Sections 4 and 5, it resolves them by integrating
Woodward’s notions of ideal interventions and invariant generalisations.
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Interventionist Criticism of the HKB Model

Recently, Woodward has been critical of the HKB model’s capacity to provide explanations. He argues that the HKB model is a “non–starter” (Woodward 2017, pg.
23) for explanation, on the grounds that the model fails to associate itself sufficiently
with features of the world, and is therefore not explanatory:
To the extent that the theory does not specify at all what structures
or relations in the world are supposed to correspond to the dependency
relationships postulated in the theory, then, according to the interventionist framework, it is not even a candidate for an explanatory theory.
(Woodward 2017, pg. 22).
Woodward’s requirement is something like a softer version of Kaplan & Craver’s
(2011) 3M requirement, where there must be a direct mapping of variables in a model
to components of the mechanism being modelled. This version is asking (without the
explicitly mechanistic requirements) for some sort of association between features
of the world and the model in question. The problem in its purest form seems to
be this: a model cannot explain anything if the model is not clearly associated with
an explanandum (features of the world). I take this to be a fairly uncontroversial
claim about explanation—explanations need to be about something, or they are
not explanations. If Woodward’s criticism hits the mark, then the HKB model
is not sufficient as an explanation of bimanual coordination because it does not
tell us enough about what features of the world the model is actually modelling,
and hence what the explanandum actually consists in. It is potentially “... just a
mathematical structure or an entirely uninterpreted set of equations relating certain
variables” (Woodward 2017, pg. 22). By extension, this could cause trouble for the
explanatory power of other dynamical models.
I think that this claim lacks force though, because Woodward’s mapping requirements are indistinct. What counts as sufficient grounding in features of the world
seems very open to interpretation. For instance, Woodward thinks that while the
HKB model is a non–starter for explanation, the dynamical model of the Hodgkin–
Huxley model of the action potential is explanatory, because it associates itself with
a physical system—it is about the neuronal action potential. However, I disagree
that there is a significant difference between Woodward’s chosen case of the HH
model, and the HKB model, or that Woodward has so far articulated some principled way to separate them. The HKB model is also about features of the world—it
is about the physical system which exhibits bimanual coordination. When experimenters conduct research on the HKB model and bimanual coordination they are
surely investigating some features of the world. The fact that experimentally testing
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the HKB model can be carried out at all seems to eliminate the possibility of the
model being so vague about its constituents as to be a non–starter.
Lacking a good account of how to determine whether a model is actually associated with a particular system (outside the account of mechanistic explanation
described in this paper, which does for appropriately mechanistic phenomena) is a
problem for non–mechanistic accounts of explanation. However, the account I offer
in this paper goes some way towards resolving this concern. Using interventionism
in concert with dynamical models, we can establish the closeness of fit between a
dynamical model and the causal structure of the features of the world it is modelling. The best models (and those that explain) will be those that describe that
causal structure accurately according to an interventionist account. Development
of the approach to dynamical explanation outlined in this paper may help further
assuage this concern.

1.7

Dynamical Explanation

Mechanist criticisms of dynamical explanation are not fatal to the enterprise, and
dynamical explanation is viable. By modifying the covering–law account proposed
by Walmsley (2008) to instead resemble Woodward’s (2003) account of explanation,
dynamical explanation can avoid potential problems of causal relevance, concerns
about the status of dynamical equations as laws of nature, and the use of prediction
as an indicator of predictive power.
So, what should an account of dynamical explanation look like? Firstly, dynamical models can provide causal explanations, so long as an ideal intervention can
expose the causal relationships between variables featured in the dynamical equations featured in the model. In addition, the covering–laws proposed by Walmsley
can be instead thought of as invariant generalisations, which operate in much the
same way as laws of nature but without the requirements of being universal in
scope or exceptionless. If dynamical equations meet Woodward’s requirements for
invariance, they are suitable as invariant generalisations. A combination of dynamical equations and ideal interventions on the variables features in those equations is
sufficient for explanation. These dynamical explanations also furnish invariant predictions of counterfactual scenarios, and these predictions contribute to explanatory
power.
The HKB model and the dynamic field model provide exemplary cases of dynamical explanation. Firstly, ideal interventions on the variables at work in these
models show how relative phase caused by the coupling ratio, and activation is
caused by task inputs respectively. Secondly, these equations are useful as invariant
generalisations, which possess sufficient stability and difference–making capacity to
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be used for the purposes of explanation. Finally, the ability of these models to predict counterfactual scenarios contribute to their explanatory power when coupled
with the invariance of the equations.

1.8

Conclusion

My claim is that mechanist criticisms of dynamical explanation can be overcome
by adopting an interventionist perspective on explanation, and applying it to dynamical models. I have shown how the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws
concern and the charge of predictivism do not deflate dynamical explanation, and
how dynamical models can meet the requirements of Woodward’s interventionist account of explanation. Once the account of dynamical explanation is adapted to rely
on invariant generalisations and the broader Woodwardian account of explanation it
avoids the problems mechanists have targeted. For mechanists to argue against the
explanatory power of dynamical models under an interventionist framework, they
would need to show either that dynamical models are for some reason not valid
candidates for invariant generalisation, or that interventionism itself is flawed. This
chapter shows that the former is not true—dynamical models can meet the criteria
for invariant generalisations. The latter approach would be equally damaging for
mechanistic explanations, since they also hinge upon interventionism. Through this
defence I have also outlined an account of how dynamical models can apply the
interventionist framework and demonstrate their explanatory power.

Chapter 2
Dynamical Causes
Mechanistic explanations are often said to explain because they reveal
the causal structure of the world. Conversely, dynamical models supposedly lack explanatory power because they do not describe causal
structure. I argue instead that dynamical models do reveal causal structure and consequently produce dynamical explanations. Taking the example of cell fates from systems biology, I show how dynamical models, and specifically the attractor landscapes they describe, identify finegrained causes of cell differentiation. These causes are irreducible and
inaccessible to mechanistic models. Dynamical models can therefore
provide explanations beyond the reach of mechanisms.

This chapter has been published as Meyer, R. (2020). Dynamical causes. Biology &
Philosophy.
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Introduction

The concept of causal structure of the world, or just causal structure, is a touchstone of modern Mechanism1 originating from Salmon’s (1984) causal-mechanical
approach to scientific explanation. The claim that a close relationship exists between
causal structure and explaining a phenomenon is outlined by Craver (2007):
There are perhaps many interesting things to be said about explanatory
texts, but one crucial aspect of their adequacy has to do with whether explanatory texts accurately characterize the causal structure of the world.
(Craver 2007, pg. 27)
A related and complementary claim made by mechanists is that scientific explanations should describe the causal relationships which comprise this causal structure:
In many areas of science, explanations are said to be adequate to the
extent, and only to the extent, that they describe the causal mechanisms
that maintain, produce, or underlie the phenomenon to be explained, the
explanandum phenomenon. (Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg. 601)
Putting these ideas together, I take causal structure to refer to the comprehensive web of causal relations that underlie or produce a phenomenon. Something
explanatory ought to follow on from having a description of causal structure—if you
understand all the relationships driving a phenomenon to occur, you have explained
it. In short, explanation is all about describing causal structure.
And as mechanists have argued, mechanisms have a special, if not unique, role
to play in this revelatory task:
Mechanisms explain the diverse aspects of the explanandum phenomenon,
and so unify them by relating them to an underlying causal structure(Craver
2007, pg. 49)
[Mechanistic] models...carry explanatory force to the extent, and only
to the extent, that they reveal (however dimly) aspects of the causal
structure of a mechanism.(Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg. 602)
This closely pairs the notion of causal structure to explanatory power, and
mechanisms link the two because, in many cases, a description of a mechanism is
necessary for describing causal structure. Driving the point home, these mechanists
argue that explanations necessarily capture the totality of causal relations producing
1

Following the convention proposed by Glennan & Illari (2018) I distinguish the philosophical
stance of Mechanism from the object called a mechanism via a capitalisation added to the former.
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a phenomenon, and that this totality—the causal structure—is in large part what
differentiates a loose bundle of descriptions from a genuine explanation (Craver 2006,
2007).
But not everyone is satisfied with this mechanistic arrangement. A movement
to articulate a mode of non–mechanistic, dynamical explanation based on dynamical models has been afoot for some time (Chemero & Silberstein 2008, Stepp et
al 2011). Dynamical models are a kind of mathematical model that employs the
tools of dynamical systems theory to capture the unfolding of variables over time
using differential and difference equations. These models have a track record of
impressive descriptive accuracy and predictive power when applied to various cognitive, neuroscientific and biological phenomena. By their very nature they do not
by themselves give much detail about the physical realisers or substrates of the variables they model (van Eck 2018). Proponents consider this advantageous—because
of this feature dynamical models can “zoom out” from these fine-grained details and
say new and interesting things about the dynamical features of a system.
Breaking with mechanist views on explanation, proponents of dynamicism reject
the necessity for mechanistic models as a prerequisite for explanation, and emphasise
accuracy in description and prediction as sufficient (Chemero & Silberstein 2008).
Dynamicists have mostly conceded that dynamical explanations need not adhere
to mechanist standards around explanation, specifically the requirement that they
ought to describe causal mechanisms (Stepp et al 2011).
The dynamicist account further departs from the mechanist orthodoxy by suggesting that dynamical explanations “need not respect the underlying causal structures that give rise to system-level dynamics.” (Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg. 602).
Mechanist philosophers have, as a result, been critical of claims that dynamical models are explanatory. After all, if mechanists are right that causal structure is core to
explanation, and mechanisms are crucial to getting at causal structure, then on two
counts dynamical models are a non-starter as standalone explanations. This general
concern, termed the causal relevance concern (Chapter 1) is the biggest hurdle for
getting dynamical explanation up and running.
According to mechanists, the solution to the causal relevance concern is straightforward: associating models with a mechanism in line with the model-to-mechanismmapping (3M) requirement (Kaplan 2015; Kaplan & Craver 2011). The idea behind
3M is that so long as the terms in a dynamical model can be associated with (mapped
onto) the mechanistic components underlying the model, then the dynamical model
can thereby describe causes:
(3M) A model of a target phenomenon explains that phenomenon to
the extent that (a) the variables in the model correspond to identifiable components, activities, and organizational features of the target

CHAPTER 2. DYNAMICAL CAUSES

32

mechanism that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and
(b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies posited among these (perhaps mathematical) variables in the model correspond to causal relations
among the components of the target mechanism.(Kaplan 2011, pg. 347)
By being grafted onto a mechanism, dynamical models do say something about
the causal structure underlying the phenomenon, namely the temporal and organisational features of the causal relations between mechanistic components, a view also
developed and endorsed by Bechtel & Abrahamsen (2010, 2013). Similarly, when
Craver & Kaplan (2018) claim that “[n]ot all dynamical models describe causal relations. Explanatory dynamical models do...” it means that properly mechanistic
models (with added dynamical details) are explanatory. The status of dynamical
models, according to mechanists, is therefore as descriptive tools in service to mechanistic explanations.
On their own, dynamical models do not describe causal (and hence explanatory)
relationships,2 but rather function as a useful tool for describing the temporal organisation of mechanisms (Kaplan 2015). Their utility acknowledged, dynamical models
are still in an asymmetrical relationship with mechanisms, “their explanatory value
can be seen as clearly depending on the presence of an associated account (however
incomplete) of the parts in the mechanism” (Kaplan 2015, pg. 760). There is no
causal story a dynamical model can provide that does not, ultimately, boil down to
a mechanistic model.
In this paper I will argue against this mechanist interpretation of dynamical
models, and provide a novel example of non–mechanistic, dynamical explanation at
work. First, I will contest the claim that dynamical models do not describe causal relations, appealing to an even-handed application of interventionist standards (Meyer
2018). This clears the immediate path to allow dynamical models to give descriptions of causal structure. Second, I will show how dynamical models of cell fates,
an example borrowed from systems biology, uncover the causal structure underlying
this phenomenon. The attractor landscape described by this model, I will argue,
reveals the causes of cell differentiation without reference to mechanisms. Thirdly,
following from this positive account, I use Woodward’s (2010, 2018) and Waters’
(2007) notions of specificity and proportionality to further illustrate how attractors
are the best candidate difference-makers for cell fate outcomes, and best describe
the causal structure of the phenomenon. Finally, I dispute that the causal structure
identified by dynamical models of cell fates can or ought to map onto mechanistic
models, per the 3M requirement.
2

It should be mentioned here that there are ongoing discussions regarding the feasibility of noncausal dynamical explanations (e.g. Ross 2015; Chirimuuta 2017). I will however focus specifically
on the case for causal dynamical explanations, and bracket the non-causal option.
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Causal Structure and Dynamical Models

Recently several arguments have been made targeting the causal relevance concern
generated by the foregoing mechanist picture of explanation (Meyer 2018; van Eck
2018). These authors have claimed that dynamical models can in fact describe causal
relations and thereby explain non–mechanistically, while retaining the mechanist’s
own interventionist framework to make their case.
The main strains of Mechanism all appeal to Woodward’s interventionism to
support the notion that mechanisms describe causes. However, interventionism itself does not privilege mechanisms as the only possible source of causal relations
(Woodward 2003). All that is required to establish causal relations is variables,
which dynamical models provide. Therefore, if dynamical models can meet Woodward’s criteria for establishing causal relations, then they ought to be considered
causal (Meyer 2018).
What are Woodward’s criteria for a relation between variables to be considered
causal? Woodward supplies (M):
(M) X causes Y if and only if there are background circumstances B such
that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of X (and no
other variable) were to occur in B, then Y would change. (Woodward
2008f, pg. 222).
(M) specifies how ideal interventions can be used to establish causal relevance
of variables. These interventions establish the relationship between the value of a
variable, X, and the value of a variable Y. Changes in Y which are the direct result
of changes in X demonstrate a causal relationship. X is causally relevant to Y if (M)
is satisfied. Hence if a variable in a dynamical model can meet the requirements of
(M), then it ought to be considered a cause.
Meyer (2018) uses the example of the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) (Haken et al
1985) model of bimanual coordination to demonstrate how dynamical models can
describe causes. Bimanual coordination is the phenomenon whereby synchronised
movements on either hand (in this case moving index fingers from side to side)
can be coordinated to move either in-phase, or anti-phase (where φ =0 and 180
respectively). To accomplish this, the HKB model uses a differential equation to
map the system’s evolution over time:

Where φ represents relative phase, ranging between 0 degrees and 180 degrees
(in- and anti-phase conditions respectively); and b/a relates the frequency of oscillations.
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of bimanual coordination, where (a) represents inphase coordination, and (b) represents anti-phase coordination. Reproduced from
Mechsner et al (2001).

In order for the relation from b/a and φ to be causal, the following would need
to hold:
(M) b/a causes φ if and only if there are background circumstances B
such that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of b/a (and
noother variable) were to occur in B, then φ would change.
Experimental interventions into this system involve changing the frequency of
oscillations (b/a) in order to observe their effect on relative phase (φ. Subjects
are tasked with attempting to maintain bimanual coordination in either the in- or
anti-phase conditions, and also match their frequency of their movements to cues
given by the experimenters. This paradigm was used in Scholz & Kelso (1989),
who intervened to increase and decrease the frequency of the cues provided to the
subjects. Several predictions of the HKB model were validated in the results of these
experiments: when oscillation frequency is slow (b/a >0.25) both in-phase and antiphase patterns of coordination are quite stable—subjects are able to maintain these
movements without altering phase. But at higher frequencies (b/a =<0.25) the
anti-phase pattern (φ = 0) becomes difficult to maintain, and subjects tend to slip
into an in-phase pattern (φ = 180).
The key point here is that the relationship between b/a and φ is not merely a correlation. There is a direction established by this experimental intervention from b/a
to φ from cause to effect. Further these interventions produce regular, function-like
changes in the value of φ. The variable b/a is the difference-maker to φ—while other
variables may provide necessary background conditions (B), it is b/a that causes φ
to change in value. So in this case, (M) should be satisfied as a straightforward
example of a causal relation—the variables in the HKB model describe causes. In
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Woodwardian terms, they describe difference-makers, the systematic relationships
from cause to effect.3

2.3

Cell Fates

Having outlined the basic framework for causal, dynamical explanation, I now turn
to the novel case of cell fates, a topic of significant interest in contemporary systems biology and cell genetics. An almost ubiquitous feature of animal cells is their
capacity for differentiating into cell fates—alternate, stable phenotypes expressing
new traits. Frequently one kind of primogenitor (undifferentiated) cell can differentiate into several distinct cell fates, each exhibiting a different phenotype. Some
stem cells, for instance, are bi- or multi-potent, meaning they have the potential to
transition into two or more stable phenotypes respectively.
These fates are interesting for a few reasons. Firstly, they tend to be stable and
the transitions into them reliably one-directional under normal circumstances. Once
differentiated, cells do not tend to “un-differentiate” backwards into progenitor cells
or switch over into a different fate. Secondly, cells tend to transition through a
series of phenotypes in between the progenitor phenotype and cell fate phenotype in
a very directed fashion—even if external perturbations disrupt this typical course,
they still find their way to a stable fate.
One story invoked to explain these features of cell fates is a kind of genetic
pre-destination. Each phenotype, on this interpretation, must contain some kind of
instruction for how to progress to the next phenotype, and that phenotype to the
next, and so on down the line. Alternatively, the cell may receive external signals
that help direct and drive these transitions and maintain them.
These conceptions have proven too coarse-grained in many situations (Huang
2012). More recent developments in cell genetics and systems biology suggest that
differentiations are driven not in a step-by-step or externally controlled fashion,
but in a self-organised process driven by networks of thousands of genes engaged
in extremely complex interdependent relationships, with all kinds of endogenous
activity determining the transitions between fates, as well as their relative stability.
The need to make sense of these complex relationships is in part responsible for
3

I acknowledge here the significant debates around higher-level interventions in the mechanist literature, particularly the problem of fat-handedness: intervening on a higher-level variable
necessitates simultaneously intervening on its supervenience base, and hence violating the interventionist requirement for isolating a single variable for intervention (see Baumgartner & Gebharter
2017, Krickel 2017). I bracket this substantial discussion by adhering to Woodwards (2015) clarification to (M). Woodward specifies that non-causal supervenience relations between micro- and
macro-levels need not be held steady in the same fashion as causal relations, so that “properties
that supervene on but that are not identical with realizing properties can be causally efficacious.”
(Woodward 2015, pg. 303)
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the development of gene regulatory networks (GRNs) as a modelling tool. A GRN
is a network map of the relationships between the many genes that make up the
genotype of a given cell, a series of “layers of molecular regulatory networks and
cell-cell communication networks - a web of interactions through which genomic
information must percolate to produce the macroscopic phenotype” (Huang 2012,
pg. 153). These “interactions” consist of each gene’s expression behaviour, namely
what proteins it instructs a cell to transcribe, and how this influences the activities
of other genes. How these expressions promote, inhibit, and otherwise interfere with
the expressions of other genes is what makes up the architecture of a GRN.
Unsurprisingly given the number of interconnected transcription processes involved, what GRNs help illustrate is that there is no fixed set of genetic tracks
that determines a cell’s transitions. While some interactions can be identified as
important in particular transitions, what decides the cell fate of a given cell is a
highly complex, high-dimensional network involving thousands of interconnected
genes (Huang et al 2005). What GRNs can show is which phenotypes are stable or
unstable relative to their neighbours, and how these differences can drive transitions
to new phenotypes.
GRNs are the first tool used in developing an explanation of cell fates. The
second is Waddington’s (1957) notion of epigenetic landscapes. Waddington’s metaphor has proven particularly durable and appealing to many biologists concerned
with cell fate phenomena, and the metaphor appears frequently in this scientific
literature (e.g. Enver et al 2009; Davila-Velderrain et al 2015; Moris et al 2016).
Adherents to this line of thinking equate progress through stable and unstable phenotypes to progress through the peaks and valleys of epigenetic landscapes, with the
phenotype represented by a ball rolling through this terrain, like in Waddington’s
famous illustration.
This is where dynamical models enter the picture. In order to put Waddington’s
ideas about the epigenetic landscape into practice, researchers appeal to dynamical
models as a way of capturing the trajectory of a cell through the many possible
phenotypes it could express. The resulting models and attractor landscapes bear
a striking resemblance to Waddington’s landscape, which has as a result has been
reconsidered from merely illustrative metaphor to something potentially more revealing about the workings of GRNs (Jaeger & Monk 2014).
Attractor landscapes are a frequently used visualisation of dynamical models,
and are virtually ubiquitous in models of cell fates. To produce a 3D model that
illustrates a cell’s trajectory through different states (phenotypes), modellers reduce
the many dimensions (genes) involved, of which there may be thousands, into a
plane. Each point on that plane represents a possible state for the system to inhabit,
and nearby states represent similar states. The relative height or depth of any given
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Figure 2.2: Waddingtons illustration of the epigenetic landscape. The ball
(phenotype) runs down through the landscape and is canalised into different phenotypic outcomes. Reproduced from Waddington (1957).
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Figure 2.3: An attractor landscape. The green ball represents the phenotype,
which has settled into one of several available basins of attraction. From Enver
et al (2009).

point indicates its stability or lack thereof.
In dynamical systems theory an attractor is a point in this landscape that represents a stable solution to the equations that make up the model. Over time, the
system will converge towards an attractor if it enters its basin of attraction. A basin
of attraction is the set of points that “feed into” a given attractor. The convergence
on an attractor might be stable, where the system settles right on the attractor
point—or it may oscillate around that point (“circling the drain”) for some time or
even indefinitely.
In the attractor landscape these features are visualised as the troughs and valleys
that Waddington’s “ball rolling down the hill” follow and settle into. These attractor
landscapes will, later in this section, be shown to provide the causal detail needed
to describe and explain cell fates.
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Biologically, the attractor point itself corresponds to a stable phenotype—a cell
fate.
Extrapolating from Waddington, different cell types may be seen as
stable solutions of transcription factor networksor attractors’which occupy the basins of Waddington’s landscape.(Graf & Enver 2009, pg. 590)
Figure 2.4 illustrates a toy example characteristic of many GRNs. There are
two proteins being transcribed, a and b, each of which inhibits the transcription
of the other—mutual inhibition—and encourage transcription of themselves in a
positive feedback loop—auto-stimulation. These processes of mutual inhibition and
auto-stimulation are common features of cells that are multi-stable.
There are also three attractors present. The first, a/b, is the stable starting
point—the undifferentiated, progenitor phenotype where neither a nor b is transcribed at a high rate, and from which the system is unlikely to budge. If left
undisturbed, the effects of mutual inhibition and auto-stimulation will generally
ensure that transcription of a and b remains roughly even. Attractors a and b represent two “downhill” cell fates the perturbed system may end up in –if a/b were
destabilised, the system will bifurcate, and converge on either a or b.
Graduating from a toy model, I turn now to a real-world example: Huang
et al’s (2007) model of FDCP-mix cells, a kind of bone-marrow cell. An FDCPmix cell is capable of differentiating into two distinct cell fates called erythroids
and myeloids. Differentiation into erythroid/myeloid is influenced heavily by two
transcription factors, GATA1 & PU.1 respectively. GATA1 & PU.1 are both autostimulating, and mutually inhibiting. The following model describes the activation
and regulation of GATA1 and PU.1:

Where x1 represents GATA1 activity, x2 represents PU.1 activity, and a1 &
a2 , b1 & b2 , k1 & k2 , and ∅, all represent control parameters. Parameters a1 /a2
represent the relative strength of auto-stimulation of GATA1 and PU.1 respectively;
b1 /b2 describe the rate of mutual inhibition of GATA1 and PU.1; k1 /k2 represent
the rate of deactivation of GATA1 and PU.1; and ∅ represents the strength of the
regulatory interaction. Much like the previous toy model, this real-world system
exhibits tristability—C, the progenitor state, as well as A and B, the differentiated
erythroid and myeloid cell fates.
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Figure 2.4: The attractor landscape of the toy cell fate system. The system
is depicted bifurcating from a/b, the progenitor fate, into either the a or b fate.
From Enver et al (2009).
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By intervening on these parameters, Huang et al (2007) were able to alter the
features of the attractor landscape. This is analogous to reshaping Waddington’s
landscape, where a change in the topography of that landscape—which states are
stable and unstable relative to their neighbours—can induce a previously stable
system to differentiate, and in this instance bifurcate into new “downhill” cell fates,
an arrangement referred to as a “transition via a bifurcation” (Huang et al 2007,
pg. 701).
Huang et al (2007) focus on the a, b and k parameters since these collectively
represent the various regulatory influences on x1 and x2 . The effects of mutual
inhibition, auto-stimulation and deactivation over time of GATA1 and PU.1 are
thought to maintain the stability of the system in its progenitor fate, C. Disturbing
these variables, then, has the potential to destabilise C and induce differentiation
into either A or B.
The model predicts that reducing the rate of auto-stimulation (a1 & a2 ) and
deactivation (k1 & k2 ) will destabilise C and induce differentiation. The model also
considers an alternative scenario where—due to different initial values in control
parameters—the only attractor present in the model is C, the basin of which covers
the entire phase space. In this scenario, reducing the value of b1 & b2 destabilises
C, and also leads to the appearance of the A and B attractors. In either situation,
C is converted from a stable state into an unstable “hill-top”, from which any small
stochastic variation in GRN activity is enough to induce a differentiation event. The
system is compelled to leave C, and converge towards either A or B, the erythroid
and myeloid cell fates respectively.
After this initial differentiation event where C can no longer be occupied by the
system, the decision to converge on A versus B cell fates becomes available for the
cell. Assuming absolute symmetry in the system (A and B are equally accessible
from the now destabilised C) then minor variations in initial starting position, and
random fluctuations in expression, will be responsible for pushing the system towards
A or B. However, asymmetries in the attractor landscape can make one of A or B
more accessible than the other and bias the system towards a particular cell fate
despite the stochastic nature of the system’s trajectory. For instance, a greater value
of x1 versus x2 will bias the system towards settle into the myeloid state versus the
erythroid fate, and vice versa. Huang et al (2007) describe this as “tilting the
watershed” in order to “harness and bias the stochastic processes.” (pg. 710)
Having considered the phenomenon described by Huang et al’s (2007) model
(initial differentiation followed by cell fate selection) the question of interest is:
how or why do FDCP cells differentiate into erythroid or myeloid cell fates? Put
into interventionist speak, we are interested in the what–if–things–had–been–different
question, or w–question about cell fates: counterfactually, under what conditions
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would we have observed a different result (the selected fate)?
In interpreting this model, I argue that what makes the difference to the outcome, and what answers the w-question, is the attractor landscape. Specifically, I
argue the presence or absence of particular attractors is decisive to the outcome for
a cell in the process of selecting a fate.
As mentioned earlier, the initial destabilisation event occurs only once C has
been intervened upon. If C is present (with sufficiently high ridges to prevent
stochastic fluctuations from pushing the cell out of C) then the cell will not undergo a differentiation event. This is ultimately what answers the w-question: a
different result would have been obtained depending on the presence or absence of
the stable progenitor attractor state C. While the destabilisation of C can be induced
via different stimuli (changes to the rate of auto-stimulation, mutual inhibition, and
deactivation of GATA1 and PU.1) what makes the difference is C. An investigator
intervenes on C through these control parameters. Further, no control parameter
stands out as the singular cause of differentiation. In fact, most of the control parameters are, if intervened upon, capable of destabilising the stable attractor C under
the right background conditions.
After the initial destabilisation of C, the cell needs to select a new cell fate to
differentiate towards from this new unstable position:
Metaphorically, the destabilization and disappearance of the progenitor
attractor can be viewed as S being placed on a “watershed” region in
Waddington’s epigenetic landscape (Waddington, 1957) where it can easily be “tipped” into either side to the now easily accessible attractors of
the two prospective lineages by small, deterministic perturbations or by
random fluctuations in molecular activities, to reliably produce distinct
and specific outcomes. This near-symmetric bifurcation model thus is
consistent with the ample evidence for the observed stochasticity in fate
determination...(Huang et al 2007, pg. 709-710)
Huang et al (2007) are here comparing Waddington’s metaphor with their observed results: a symmetrical destabilisation event leaves the cell equally likely (all
other things being equal) to differentiate towards A or B. The general stochastic
variation in gene expression is enough to push the cell towards either one, as well as
all manner of incidental factors:
...the “watershed” metaphor explains the observation that many unspecific (hence, non-instructive) signals, such as solvents or mechanical
forces, can cause differentiation in many cell systems: they may do so by
“tipping” cells into a predefined program. (Huang et al 2007, pg. 710)
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From a position of high instability, it takes very little, up to and including
incidental mechanical forces acting on the cell, to trigger differentiation. Small
variations in initial conditions also have an influence, according to the model, on
whether A or B is ultimately selected.
But what makes the difference outside this inherent stochasticity in the system
is, as mentioned earlier, the biasing of these processes by shaping the attractor
landscape. By intervening on control parameters, the investigators were able to
“tilt the watershed”, making A or B occupy more or less of the phase space with
their basin of attraction. This is achieved through an asymmetrical intervention on
the control parameters such that x1 is greater than x2 (or vice versa). This effectively
makes one cell fate—myeloid or erythroid—more accessible from the cell’s present
state than the other.
The takeaway from this part of Huang et al’s (2007) discussion is that there are
many events than can induce the initial differentiation event (the destabilisation of
C) and many events than can determine whether A or B is selected subsequently,
ranging from the various control parameters to external forces. Whatever stimulus
is involved, what makes the difference to the outcome is the specifics of the attractor
landscape. How accessible a fate is from the cell’s present state is what makes the
outcome more likely amidst a barrage of stochastic fluctuations, and what makes a
fate accessible are the dimensions of the associated attractor.

2.4

Dynamical Causes

An objection to the foregoing interpretation would be to question the role of attractors (and really any dynamical feature of a system) as the cause of differentiation
in favour of a mechanistic interpretation. If we assume the initial destabilisation
event has occurred in a cell, and the system is poised to differentiate to a myeloid or
erythroid, perhaps differentiation can simply be explained by the levels of different
transcription factors present. For instance, in Huang et al’s model, one might prefer
a mechanistic interpretation wherein intervening on levels of GATA1 and PU.1 in
a cell leads to different outcomes. Higher levels of GATA1 and PU.1 in a cell do
indeed predict a higher likelihood of those cells differentiating into erythroids and
myeloids respectively (Huang et al 2007). On this reading it seems like the cause of
differentiation is decidedly mechanistic. If this were the case, it would of course be
fatal to the account being built here.
To air out this criticism, I will consider two possible readings: the mechanist
one spelled out above, and the dynamical interpretation I advanced in the previous
section, and place them into Woodward’s (M) criterion:
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(M1) GATA1 transcription level causes erythroid differentiation if and
only if there are background circumstances B such that if some (single)
intervention that changes the value of GATA1 transcription level (and no
other variable) were to occur in B, then erythroid differentiation would
change.
(M2) Presence of erythroid attractor causes erythroid differentiation if
and only if there are background circumstances ]emphB such that if some
(single) intervention that changes the value of presence of erythroid attractor (and no other variable) were to occur in B then erythroid differentiation would change.
(M1) represents a 3M-compliant interpretation, where the causal relations in
the dynamical model map to the underlying mechanistic model. (M2) advances
the dynamicist argument—that the causal relations identified by the dynamical
model are indeed genuine causes. Selecting which of these scenarios is the better
interpretation requires some grappling with how exactly we might select between
different potential causes.
Fortunately, Woodward (2010, 2018) has elaborated some criteria designed to
clarify situations where the role of difference-maker is ambiguous. The ambiguity
arises because not all potential causes are created equal—they “...can differ in the
extent to which they satisfy other conditions relevant to their use in explanatory
theorizing” (Woodward 2018, pg. 1). Two of these conditions developed by Woodward are I think particularly relevant to the current discussion—these are specificity,
and proportionality.
Taking these conditions one at a time, I want to consider (M1) and (M2) first in
terms of specificity. Specificity refers to “a kind of fine-grained and specific control”
(Woodward 2010, pg. 306) that a cause has over the outcomes for some effect
variable. To motivate the importance of this condition, Woodward draws on an
example offered by Waters (2007) who discusses the synthesis of RNA molecules by
DNA.
In this case, DNA provides genetic information to RNA polymerase, which then
produce RNA molecules. The question is over whether DNA or the RNA polymerase
is the cause of RNA molecule output:
DNA is a specific difference maker in the sense that different changes in
the sequence of nucleotides in DNA would change the linear sequence
in RNA molecules in many different and very specific ways. RNA polymerase does not have this specificity...it is not the case that many different kinds of interventions on RNA polymerase would change the linear
sequence in RNA molecules in many different and very specific ways.
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This shows that DNA is a causally specific potential difference maker.
The fact that many such differences in DNA do actually exist and these
differences actually explain the specific differences among RNA molecules
indicates that DNA is the causally specific actual difference maker...
(Waters 2007, pg. 574-575)
Of the two possible causes, RNA polymerase is the least specific. It does not
provide a fine-grained description of the dependency between different states of the
cause, and different states of the effect. Either the polymerase is doing its job, or
it is not. This is comparatively coarse-grained when we want to understand the
specifics of these dependencies.
On the other hand, DNA seems a far more satisfactory candidate cause. There
is a fine-grained dependency between the different states of the DNA (what genetic
information it inputs) and what RNA molecule is produced. Hence DNA is more
specific and is the better candidate for the genuine cause of RNA molecule output.
Specificity requires that states of a cause map uniquely to states of an effect. The
less “overlap” or lack of uniqueness in these mappings, the better. This mapping
should describe exploitable counterfactual relationships between cause and effect
in this fine-grained way. When selecting between candidate causes, especially in
biology, the more specific a cause-effect mapping the more we should be inclined to
select it as the genuine cause.
With specificity in mind, let us consider the viability of (M1). Does transcription
of GATA1 exercise a fine grained and specific control over the outcome of cell differentiation? GATA1 does increase the probability that a destabilised cell will end up
as an erythroid, so it exercises that much control. But that relationship does not tell
us why a certain threshold of perturbation is required to initiate differentiation. Nor
does it tell us why certain states of the system will differentiate into erythroids, and
why others won’t. Consequently, there is a considerable amount of overlap between
many different values of differentiation and the consequent states of the cell fate.
Consequently, the description here is fairly coarse-grained and non-specific.
On the contrary if we accept (M2), then we are delivered far more explanatorily
relevant, fine-grained dependencies. The threshold required to initiate differentiation
into an erythroid is now explained—it is due to specific stabilities of phenotypes
compared to their neighbours, as described by the dynamical model. The fact that
some states converge on the erythroid fate and not others is due to the dimensions
of the basin of attraction corresponding to that fate.
The second condition to be examined, proportionality, “has to do with the
extent to which a causal claim fully captures conditions under which variations in
some phenomenon of interest occur.” (Woodward 2018, pg. 1). Woodward provides
an illustrative example: imagine I train a pigeon to peck at a red stimulus via
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classical conditioning. I present a new stimulus to the pigeon, and it pecks at it.
Two possible causal claims can be introduced to describe what has just happened:
1. The presence of a scarlet stimulus caused the pigeon to peck.
2. The presence of a red stimulus caused the pigeon to peck.
1 is not untrue. Scarlet is a type of red, and on this basis, one could fairly
claim that a scarlet stimulus caused the pigeon to peck. However there seems to be
something off about this interpretation. Woodward identifies the flaw in that the
“scarletness” of the stimulus is not what induced the pigeon’s pecking, but rather
its “redness”. 2 is a more appropriate statement of cause and effect, since it is the
redness or non-redness of the stimulus which is, based on the variety of conditions we
could submit the pigeon to, the real “difference-maker”. There are situations where
the stimulus is not scarlet, yet the pigeon does indeed peck—when the stimulus is
another shade of red.
Selecting the correct causal claim can be approached by the application of the
notion of proportionality: causes should be proportional to their effects, meaning
that a statement of a cause should not contain excessive detail, nor omit necessary
detail (Woodward is here drawing on Yablo (1992)):
(P) There is a pattern of systematic counterfactual dependence (with
the dependence understood along interventionists lines) between different possible states of the cause and the different possible states of the
effect, where this pattern of dependence at least approximates to the following ideal: the dependence (and the associated characterization of the
cause) should be such that (a) it explicitly or implicitly conveys accurate
information about the conditions under which alternative states of the
effect will be realized and (b) it conveys only such information—that is,
the cause is not characterized in such a way that alternative states of it
fail to be associated with changes in the effect.
(Woodward 2010, pg. 298, emphasis in original).
So, the possible states of scarletness (scarlet or non-scarlet) are not depended
upon by the possible states of pecking (pecking or not pecking). Conversely, possible states of the pigeon’s pecking do depend on the possible states of the stimulus’
redness. Example 2 provides the required “accurate information about the conditions under which alternative states of the effect will be realised”. It also excludes
scarletness since this does not provide said accurate information (also fulfilling (b)).
Hence redness fulfils the criterion (P), while scarletness does not. This provides a
good guide to the formulation of statements of causal relevance—example 2 is much
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preferred to 1, since it identifies cause and effect better by eliminating those details
which violate (P).
Once again, I argue that (M2) comes out on top over (M1) when it comes to
satisfying proportionality. The attractor landscape “displays or exhibits a pattern
of dependence” (Woodward 2018, pg. 3, emphasis in original) between causes and
effects in the way that a mechanistic story does not. The dynamical model displays
and exhibits how the cell’s phenotype depends on the stability of its current state,
as well as previous and potential future states. The canalisation and perturbation of
this dynamical system is therefore proportionate to changes in the cell’s phenotype.
Meanwhile (M1) does not relay us accurate information on why certain states
of the proposed cause—GATA1 transcription—lead to certain states of the system.
Indeed there are a variety of situations where GATA1 transcription will not induce
the erythroid fate and situations where (under the same background conditions)
other events will induce the erythroid fate. The perturbation may be insufficient,
the ridges surrounding the progenitor state too high, and so on.
On both counts—specificity and proportionality—it seems the best candidate
cause is described by (M2). Indeed, this is exactly the kind of interpretation that
seems prevalent in the scientific literature and a natural way of speaking about
dynamical models of cell fates. For instance, Ferrell (2012) in a review of the role
of Waddington’s model in cell differentiation emphasises the ultimate role of the
attractor landscape in determining fates:
Although it was natural to assume that the induction stimulus acts by
increasing the value of [a transcription factor] I could have alternatively
made the stimulus act through any of the other parameters...Would this
alter the conclusion that cell-fate commitment occurs as a result of the
disappearance of a valley at a saddle-node bifurcation? The answer is
no. No matter how I choose to have the inductive stimulus affect the
model, the result is the same. (Ferrel 2012, pg. R461)
Whichever parameter one intervenes on—changing rates of auto-stimulation or
mutual inhibition, of transcription levels, etc.—the causal import nevertheless lies
with the dynamics of the system, with the attractor landscape. Conspicuous by its
absence in these scientific discussions is much concern about how to render the causal
story described by these dynamical models down into an underlying mechanism.
Rather, in theoretical discussions cell fates are equated with attractors, such that
changes to these attractors correspond to changes in cell fate phenomena (Enver et
al 2009; Davila-Velderrain et al 2015; Huang 2012; Moris et al 2016). My point here
is that the interpretation I offer fits comfortably with the way scientists talk about
models of cell fates.
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This is not to say that scientific talk, which naturally does not always map
directly onto how philosophers of science or biology talk, is decisive to how we should
formulate a mode of explanation. On the contrary, I wish to pre-empt the claim
sometimes advanced by mechanists, apparently originating with Craver (2007), that
the mechanistic mode of explanation most closely reflects how scientists think about
nature and experiment on it, and hence has some especially pragmatic justification.
A dynamicist account evidently aligns just as well with the scientific literature at
least as far as cell fates are concerned.

2.5

The 3M Response

The anticipated response from mechanists is that even if attractors meet the interventionist criteria, no such model of cell fates can stand alone as a causal explanation.
This is because—according to the 3M requirement—the dynamical model ought to
be mapped to an underlying mechanistic model, which is what really provides the
causal power and describes the causal structure of cell fates. In other words, 3M
is a claim about reduction—causal claims about dynamical models reduce down
to causal claims about the underlying mechanistic details. Claims about attractors acting as difference-makers are (if we accept 3M) reducible to claims about
difference-makers within the GRN architecture.
However, Kaplan & Craver (2011) stress that 3M is not intended to be rigidly
applied, and accordingly set up 3M inclusive of an assumption that the requirement
can be defeated, with some caveats:
Like all default stances, 3M is defeasible. However, those who would
defease it must articulate why mechanistic styles of explanation are inappropriate, what non–mechanistic form of explanation is to replace it,
and the standards by which such explanations are to be judged.(Kaplan
& Craver 2011, pg. 603)
In taking up this challenge, the first point is likely to be the most contentious.
Given the breadth of its application and ambitions, putting a hard limit on the reach
of Mechanism is a difficult proposition. However, one uncontroversial starting point
is this: Mechanism ends where it is unable to provide explanations. As we have
seen, comprehensively uncovering the causal structure underlying a phenomenon
(or at least, being in the process of doing so) is a requirement for explanation for
mechanists. As a consequence, if mechanistic models can’t get at causal structure,
it follows that this would indicate a situation where mechanistic explanation is
inappropriate.
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Cell fates are an example of the causal structure underlying a phenomenon being
accessible to dynamical models. On the other hand, it is inaccessible to mechanistic
models. This is because the difference maker is part of the system’s dynamics—
an attractor—that can only be described in the context of a dynamical model.
For example, the progenitor cell fate which makes the difference to the initiation of
differentiation “...is “dynamically” defined, namely, as a metastable state in between
two neighboring attractors of the prospective differentiated states...” (Huang et
al 2007, pg. 699). Hence a description of the mechanism underlying cell fates
(the proteins involved, the GRN architecture, etc.) will not get at the difference
maker to the cell fate, and consequently there is no clear mechanistic analogue of
this attractor, no entity or collection of entities that corresponds coherently to this
dynamical feature.
To entertain the notion, persisting with 3M in this case would presumably involve trying to locate the physical components that underlie abstract dynamical features like attractors. This seems like a difficult proposition, since these features don’t
appear to have a direct relationship to any component of the system—attractors and
basins of attraction result from a network of dynamical activity involving many thousands of working parts. To pursue this option necessitates a description of a brute
amalgamation of all the physical components associated with these features of the
dynamical model—the thousands of genes, the transcription of proteins, etc.
But in this scenario all of the explanatory work would still be done by the dynamical model, since it provides the relevant details about causal relations/difference
makers. Identifying physical features associated with a model doesn’t entail those
features or components are necessarily providing causal detail. It’s hard to see how
a model like this could be anything other than a bona fide dynamical explanation,
since all the explanatory work would be done by the dynamical model.
If anything, the idea of adding in excess mechanistic detail seems to run directly
against mechanist’s own standards of explanation, as well as the general rationale
for these standards. Craver & Kaplan (2018) for instance discuss the notion of completeness as a benchmark of good causal explanation, where a description includes
all the causally and constitutively relevant features of the world. Equally critical is
the exclusion of irrelevant detail, keeping out those features of the world that are
neither causally nor constitutively relevant to the phenomenon.
It is, on the mechanist account, counter to the purposes of a good causal explanation to include features of the world that do not contribute to the unveiling of causal
structure. Hence if the addition of further mechanistic detail contributes nothing to
understanding the causal structure of cell fates, then it seems that by mechanists’
own standards of explanatory completeness 3M is, in this case, counterproductive.
The second requirement for defeating 3M—articulating a non–mechanistic ac-
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count of explanation—can be dispensed with here more easily. Both Meyer (2018)
and van Eck (2018) provide interventionist-based accounts of dynamical explanation—
the former outlined earlier in Section 2—that share many (if not most) of the assumptions about explanation that motivate the mechanist account. This kind of
explanation follows the interventionist method of locating difference-makers and developing counterfactual-supporting invariant generalisations. Further details require
significant fleshing out, but these accounts at least offer a foundation to build on.
The third point—what kind of standards would dynamical explanation be judged
by—provides the most scope for interpretation. I take this reference to standards
to mean, roughly, what is required for a mere description to transition into an explanation. Much like mechanistic explanation, the development of counterfactualsupporting invariant generalisations is the basis of providing causal explanations.
Similarly, an appeal to the accounts of dynamical explanation offered by Meyer
(2018) and van Eck (2018) ought to be considered at least a good starting point for
this project.
An important aside here concerns the relationship between mechanistic and
dynamical explanations. So far this paper has not grappled with problems of integration or compatibility explicitly. I would argue that the specific characterisation
of the phenomenon—the explanatory question being asked—will play a large role
in how these modes of explanation hang together. A question specifically about the
difference-maker to cell fates appears to require what van Eck (2018) calls a “pure
dynamical model”, one that is non–mechanistic. We are really only interested in
the dynamics causing one outcome to obtain over another, and include mechanistic
details (the GRN) only as background conditions. All the relevant causal detail is
contained in the dynamical model.
I leave open the question of a combination of the two, which seems a substantial
discussion requiring its own treatment. I have only discussed one example from one
subgenre of science, and hence it is plausible that some questions require a different
model or combination of models to fully encompass the phenomenon.

2.6

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that non–mechanistic, causal dynamical explanations
are viable. I have provided reasons, rooted in Woodward’s interventionist account,
for thinking that dynamical models do in fact describe the causal structure of the
world independently of mechanisms, using the example of cell fates. I have argued
that dynamical models can describe more specific and proportional causes than
mechanistic models of the same phenomena, and hence are the better descriptors
of causal structure in these cases. I have also defended against the 3M criterion,

CHAPTER 2. DYNAMICAL CAUSES
showing how in the case of cell fates, 3M need not be observed.

51

Chapter 3
Does Mechanism Come to Bury
E–Cognition, Or to Integrate It?
This chapter evaluates the possible integration of E–cognition and traditional cognitive science via Mechanism. I focus on Milkowski et al’s
(2018) account, which claims that all existing theories of cognition are
trapped in insoluble theoretical quagmires. They propose jettisoning
theories from cognitive science and reviving them as heuristics to guide
mechanistic explanations. Under this mechanistic–heuristic account, they
argue that enactivist and cognitivist accounts are fully integrated. I
address some serious problems with this account. First, this characterisation of theoretical quagmires is not reflected in the cognitive science
literature, undermining the supposed benefits of integration. Second, differing theories of cognition demonstrate ongoing empirical significance.
Third, Milkowski et al’s (2018) notion of heuristic is ambiguously defined,
and unevenly applied. Fourth, their integration fails to address the contradictory commitments of enactivists and cognitivists, instead avoiding
or misrepresenting theoretical differences. Finally, I criticise the authors’
attempts to head off dynamical explanation via an excessively permissive
redefinition of the notion of a mechanism. I conclude that Milkowski et
al’s (2018) mechanistic–heuristic account does not genuinely integrate
traditional cognitive science and enactivism, better resembling an attempt to bury enactivism alive and clear the way for an unreconstructed
cognitivism.
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Introduction

So far in this thesis I have argued that dynamical explanations are genuinely explanatory. The motivation for making this argument, and showing how it applies
across the special sciences, comes in part from the consequences this debate about
explanation has for the stocks of competing accounts of cognition. Some consider
mechanistic explanations to offer some kind of integrative solution to different theoretical commitments: mechanistic explanations, with their toolkit of interventions
and mutual manipulability can perhaps neutrally cut through some of the expository differences that are held to by those on either side of various theoretical schisms
(Kaplan 2012). Mechanism might be able to get traditional cognitivism and the
still–emerging E–cognition accounts to speak the same mechanistic language; to explain by describing mechanisms, regardless of the overarching theory motivating an
investigation.
In the eyes of mainstream cognitive science, explanation is the soft underbelly
of E–cognition accounts. In this realm, cognitivist accounts are generally seen to
occupy the stronger position versus their radically embodied rivals. This is primarily because of the congruence and good working relationship between cognitivism
and mechanism (Bechtel 2008). Mechanism is both well–established as a mode of
explanation, and is also seen to have a close relationship with a computational and
representational account of the mind since “...questions at the computational level
can be construed as questions about what a mechanism is doing and why...Questions
at the algorithmic level...are questions about how a mechanism does what it does...”
(Zednik 2018, pg. 390, emphases original). The whats, whys and hows of cognitivism
are mutually intelligible with those of mechanism, making them natural allies.
Meanwhile enactivists, arguably the least cognitivist–friendly variety of E–cognition,
see explanation of cognitive phenomena as often involving an escape from these
mechanistic details. In addition, enactivists explicitly deny the necessity of invoking representations and computation when explaining cognition (Varela et al 1991;
Chemero 2009; Di Paolo et al 2017). Explanations should appeal to patterns of engagement between organism and environment, with internal, brain–based activity no
longer serving as the only locus of many explanations. This proposal can be investigated in a variety of ways—dynamical systems theory is one go–to method, coupled
with a non–mechanistic perspective on explanation (Stepp et al 2011; Silberstein &
Chemero 2013).
And so scientific explanation has become the location of a proxy argument
backed by cognitivist–aligned philosophers of cognitive science on the one side, and
various E–cognition advocates and dynamicists on the other. The hope is that
by getting purchase on the coveted status of explanation (perhaps even exclusive
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access), either cognitivism or E–cognition will have a powerful argument in their
own favour that will undermine their opponents: our account explains cognition
better.
On the other hand, there remains the possibility of integration in place of competition. If cognitivist and E–accounts could be combined into one overarching,
unified account of cognition, then the entire disagreement would be resolved. The
result would hopefully be an account that does justice to both traditional cognitive
science while integrating insights from E–cognition. The task does not seem easy,
considering the often diametrically opposed positions some E– theorists and cognitivists hold regarding the explanatory role of representations and computations, and
the constitutive role of the body in cognition. Wading into this situation, Milkowski
et al (2018) (from here on referred to as M) nevertheless make a bold proposal for
just such an integration. M claim that the problem of duelling theories can indeed
be put to bed, not least because in their view “the controversies over these wide
perspectives have become outdated” (pg. 1). Overly concerned with squabbles over
theory, E–accounts and traditional cognitivism have, according to M, missed a trick:
integration via a common mode of explanation. solution is a fully unified cognitive
science guided by an overarching explanatory framework that cuts through existing
theoretical disagreements.
To this end M recommend that mechanistic explanation take up the mantle of
unifier. Through Mechanism, M argue, we can build the one integrated approach to
cognition to supersede them all. Their formulation is what I label the mechanistic–
heuristic account. This solution involves first of all a blanket rejection of all existing
theories of cognition. Instead of developing and testing theories, researchers should
aim towards integrating elements of E– and cognitivist theories of cognition as helpful heuristics for mechanistic explanations. Mechanistic explanation serves as the
integrative force, an explanatory framework that will cut down to the real facts of
the matter behind the theoretical gloss. Mechanism helps accounts of cognition to
produce grander, better explanations in the face of a disunified schism.
However, I will argue in this chapter that M’s efforts do not succeed in making
the case for integration, nor do they spell the end of an un–integrated E–cognition.
Focussing on enactivism as the most illustrative case, I show how M’s account its
not successful in delivering integration. Their account, I will show, tries to produce
integration by variously avoiding or misrepresenting the substantial roadblock to
integration: the incompatible commitments of enactive versus cognitivist accounts.
Section 2 outlines M’s proposal for a mechanistic–heuristic approach to cognitive
science, and its account of integration. In section 3 I take issue with M’s characterisation of inter– and intra–theoretical debates as counterproductive, showing how
theory in cognitive science heavily influences the formulation of explanations. Sec-
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tion 4 grapples with the notion of heuristic deployed by M comparing it to Bechtel
& Richardson’s (1993) heuristics of decomposition and localisation, arguing that the
authors instead define heuristics such that only cognitivism alone retains its theoretical import. Section 5 evaluates M’s vision of integration. I compare Segundo–Ortin
et al’s (2018) resolution of theoretical disagreements between enactivism and ecological psychology, permitting integration. I argue that M instead misrepresent the
commitments of enactivism through their uneven interpretation of heuristics, and
therefore only succeed in integrating a straw version of enactivism. Finally, section 6 criticises M’s redefinition of the concept of a mechanism in order to head off
non–mechanistic, dynamical explanations, showing how it is overly permissive.

3.2
3.2.1

The Mechanistic–Heuristic Account
Theoretical Quagmires

M initially motivate their account by pointing out what they see as a broad and
pervasive issue in cognitive science that they aim to resolve: the intractability of
questions about cognition that lead to disputes over abstract dichotomies. They
have two kinds of dispute in mind, which I will call inter–theoretic—between theories
of cognition i.e. cognitivism versus enactivism—and intra–theoretic—within those
theories of cognition. Both, they think, are trouble.
M first list some intra–theoretic disputes that early cognitive psychology has
previously been embroiled in: “nature vs. nurture, continuous vs. all–or–none
learning, serial vs. parallel processing, analog vs. digital, conscious vs. unconscious,
grammars vs. associations for language, etc.” (pg. 2) Ultimately these debates, M
claim, are a dead–end. M’s reasoning here is that questions like “nature vs. nurture”
are too abstract to properly guide, or really be decided by empirical observations; if
anything, these dichotomies hamper attempts to build unified theories of cognition
because they redirect effort to useless investigation: “[g]rand issues in the study of
cognition cannot be fruitfully understood in terms of a series of simple dichotomies.”
(pg. 2) Based on these historical cases, they suppose that similar debates must also
be ultimately fruitless at building unity.
They go on to accuse E–theorists of also being stuck in intra–theoretic disputes,
and portend a dead–end for E–cognition where “at least some researchers attempt
to win the debate by showing that the bodily, the environmental, or the interactive
aspect is most essential in cognitive functioning” (pg. 2). Here M attempt to draw
a close analogy between historical intra–cognitivist debates, and modern intra–E
debates, characterising them both as futile.
Inter–theoretic disputes between cognitivism and enactivism are similarly char-
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acterised as theoretical quagmires. Enactivists and cognitivists have long been embroiled in the so–called “representation wars” over the status and necessity of internal, content–bearing representational states for explanations of cognition. This
sharp divide between proponents of an enactive anti–representationalism (i.e. Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013), and a pro–representation cognitivism continues to
be contentious. The efforts of enactive cognitive science have often centred on the
goal of building models and explanations of cognition without appealing to internal
representations and processing thereof (i.e. Di Paolo et al 2017).
But in M’s view, while enactivists do propose a significantly different sounding theory of cognition, the differences are in their view essentially expository.
Whichever way the argument turns out—for instance, the necessity of representations for explanations of cognition—M think it won’t change anything meaningful
about how we actually investigate cognition. Moreover, the problem of quagmires
strikes again: “theoretical presentations of these approaches remain fairly abstract
and focused on deciding yes-no questions rather than building unified models of
cognitive phenomena.” (pg. 2)
Through this framing M suggest a couple of important things about differing
theories of cognition. First, they suppose intra–theoretic and inter–theoretic disputes are intractable. Second, they propose that these disputes are not meaningful
or worthwhile because they only work to conceal a deeper, more desirable unity of
approaches.

3.2.2

Mechanistic explanation to the rescue

The solution to these perceived theoretical doldrums, M argue, is mechanistic explanation (Machamer et al 2000; Craver 2007; Glennan 2017). Mechanistic explanations are capable of unifying cognitive science behind a single mode of explanation
and in doing so provide it with a way out of theoretical quagmires, getting beyond theory–squabbling. Embracing mechanism rather than some other approach is
desirable for several reasons in M’s view.
First, mechanisms span both “wide” and internal components. On this reading
of enactivism, the brain–body–environment relationships proposed to be constitutive
of cognition by enactivists can be cashed out simply as spatially distributed mechanisms (an avenue also explored by Abramova & Slors (2019) and discussed at length
in Chapter 4). They are therefore just as tractable to mechanistic modelling as more
traditional mechanistic components. Mechanism thereby manages to straddle cognitivism at one extreme and enactivism at the other—it can produce explanations
integrating internal and external components, and hence covers more ground than
any of those accounts alone.
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Second, the mechanist account is very accommodating to the empirical efforts
of both cognitivist and E–approaches, since it is “extremely lean”, leaving it open
to describing both wide and narrow mechanisms. The accommodating features of
mechanistic explanations allow them to “...offer an integrated view on cognition...”
(pg. 2) and work to unify disparate lines of research, like mainstream cognitivism
and E–cognition.
Third, mechanism’s framework for identifying causal relationships is useful for
avoiding theoretical disputes. Since we can intervene on variables to find those that
are causally and constitutively relevant to the phenomenon (Craver 2007), we can
just establish what items are causally efficacious rather than speculate. Concerns
over what items should figure in our explanations—representations and computations being two salient cases—become irrelevant once we can use interventions to
find causal relations.
Having established their case for Mechanism as a solution to inter– and intra–
theoretic debates, M now put it to work as a replacement for theories of cognition.
M’s strategy is to first smooth over the disputes between the various theories of
cognition. To this end they claim that “[d]ifferences between approaches matter only
for expository purposes but not really for their practice, which involves mechanistic
modeling of cognition” (pg. 4). Perched on the heights of Mechanism, one can, M
think, see how cognitivism and enactivism are unified in a more cohesive mechanistic
picture of cognition, even when the gloss on the phenomenon might be different from
either perspective.
Further, enactivism can’t hope to compete with mechanistic explanation, because individual theories of cognition “...are not poised to be complete and exclusive accounts of cognition. They are not theories in the sense of providing complete
predictions or explanations of phenomena in question. For this, they are too abstract.” (pg. 4) M do not specify the boundary of abstract and too abstract, or
what sorts of features a spectrum of abstractness might take into account. We can
however infer from their statements regarding prediction and explanation, as well
as hypothesis generation, that M believe that genuine theories are concrete (versus
abstract) enough when they generate testable hypotheses. E–account are all meant
to fail in meeting this criterion because they “offer mainly abstract heuristics that
cannot do much explanatory work in isolation” (pg. 1).
These claims culminate in the position that mechanistic explanation supersedes
the need for theories of cognition. Mechanisms span wide phenomena and are a guide
to discovery of causal relations. Empirical success trumps theory, and so mechanism
can simultaneously explain broadly across cognitive science and supersede existing
theories. Mechanistic explanation supersedes said theories (which fail to even be
proper theories) functioning as a unifying or integrating force for explanations of
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cognition.

3.2.3

Heuristics & Integration

As it stands, there is potentially a large theory–shaped gap in M’s account. While
mechanistic explanation is meant to fill in this gap, M are rightly concerned about
losing the insights gained by traditional cognitive science and E–cognition, despite
their perceived inadequacies as standalone theories. Accordingly, M offer an additional component to get their account off the ground: they suggest that bringing
theories of cognitive science back as heuristics will provide an additional guide for
good mechanistic explanation.
But how are heuristics different to theories and what kind of work can they do
for cognitive science and explanation? M think the answer is already in front of us
in the practices of cognitive science. They claim that in the case of E–accounts,
“[r]esearchers appeal to wide factors merely as discovery heuristics.” (pg. 13) Likewise over on the cognitivist side, traditional computationalism in the vein of Marr
(1982) for example only provides us with:
...certain guiding heuristics. A proponent of traditional computational
modeling would ask what the overall task is and why solving it is appropriate; what the algorithms and representations involved are; and how
they are physically implemented.(pg. 4, emphasis added)
Both E–accounts (including enactivism) and cognitivism are already, M think,
used merely as heuristics for mechanistic explanations by researchers. This mechanistic–
heuristic account is what M think ought to fill in the gap left by theories, and avoid
theoretical quagmires. To illustrate their proposal in action, they provide the example of the operation of an aircraft by a pair of pilots taken from Hutchins (1995).
The idea is that the operations by the pilots in the cockpit of a large passenger
aircraft involve more than just the internal cognitive resources of the individual
pilots, but also distributed technological and socio–cultural features of the entire
cockpit system (Hutchins 1995); the situation is, for M, ripe for a heuristic division
of labour:
The process is distributed and includes two pilots as its component submechanisms...But the distributed approach may well appeal to heuristics preferred by other wide approaches to the study of cognition...the
enactive perspective will stress the importance of dynamic coordination
between pilots and consider how the environment is structured in terms
of various affordances. At the same time, the distributed approach does
not screen off the study of representational devices... (pg. 7)
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The idea is that, by their powers combined, the various accounts of cognition—
now working as guiding heuristics—will remind researchers of important considerations. Enactivism, for instance, functions within a mechanistic–heuristic account as
a rejoinder to scientists not to forget about the interactions between the pilots. It
guides the mechanistic explanation more efficiently towards locating all the relevant causal parts. Cognitivism reminds investigators to look for the computational
and representational features of the system. Thus, a complementary process: mechanism gives us a framework for finding causally relevant features of the world for
the explanandum phenomenon, while heuristics guide investigations towards likely
candidate causes. Integration is thereby achieved.

3.3

Theories

Much is made in the above account by M of the inadequacy of theories of cognition
for doing the real work of guiding cognitive science. They make three main claims
about theories of cognition to this effect: that they are stuck in quagmires which
hinder research and undermine unity; that theories merely serve as a gloss that fail
to influence research anyway; that mechanistic explanation can take over the role of
theories anyway. I will present some criticism of each claim in turn.

3.3.1

Theoretical quagmires?

M claim that theories are trouble: where there are theories, there are intractable
debates. One of their targets are inter–theoretic debates between cognitivists and
enactivists, though I will argue their characterisation is misleading. I contend that
inter–theoretic debates are arguably quite productive, especially in terms of developing alternative theories of cognition that aim to solve ongoing theoretical issues
plaguing mainstream cognitive science. Enactive accounts have historically been
largely motivated by what they see as serious deficiencies in the mainstream view
of cognition:
Cognitivists struggled to model or explain the flexible, context–sensitive
and domain–general intelligence that is characteristic of human cognition. Intuitively basic cognitive capacities like motor control and perceptual recognition seemed particularly resistant to cognitivist efforts.”
(Ward et al 2017, pg. 366)
Early autonomous robotics research (Brooks 1990, Beer 1991) demonstrated
these difficulties in action, especially the inadequacies of a strict symbol–manipulating
intelligence for dealing with the complexities of real–world bodily interactions in
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coordination with a changing environment. Further, the reliance on computation
and representation as core to understanding cognition invites “...the problems of
homuncularity, the absence of the body, and the threatening infinite regress of perspectives that are rule–based at the pragmatic level and therefore can never account
for meaning–generating processes.” (De Jaeger & Di Paolo 2007, pg. 486). These
concerns are certainly not new, harking back to criticisms levelled by Dreyfus and
Searle, suggesting that even a completed cognitivist account of cognition would not
get us beyond a how–possibly model alienated from actual cognition; “how a cognitive problem should be solved if it was in the hands of a clever computer programmer.”
(Di Paolo et al 2017, emphasis original)
Accordingly enactivists frequently present their account in terms of its opposition to the cognitivist mainstream, as “a move from an abstract conception of mental
activity toward more concrete and situated, action–based practices and capabilities”
(Di Paolo et al 2017), which is intended to be a productive step forward; at the very
least a spirited attempt to explore and flesh out theoretical alternatives that escape
the above difficulties. Enactivism services the “need to develop theories that can
overcome well known problems encountered when attempting to understand and
model the fluid and plastic nature of cognition” (Hutto & Myin 2017, pg. 1) In
short, enactivism has been geared since its inception towards formulating different
questions about cognition in the hope of making the intractable tractable.
Quite the opposite, then, to M’s picture of a stagnant and intractable dispute, at
least as far as enactivists themselves are concerned. Even some cognitivist–oriented
philosophers (or at least those who wish to preserve some version of representationalism) who are critical of the more radical proposals associated with enactive and
other E–accounts have been compelled to give credit where it is due. It is now the
case that “E is the letter, if not the word, in today’s sciences of the mind” and these
E–approaches “are now a staple feature of the cognitive science landscape” (Hutto
& Myin 2017, pg. 1). This assessment is supported by the recent profusion of E–
oriented empirical and theoretical work, and an embodied perspective on cognition
is, minimally, seen as worth looking into (Goldman 2012, Aizawa 2015).
It seems at least equally plausible, then, to say that the back–and–forth between
mainstream cognitivists and their enactivist adversaries has been productive, rather
than a problem for cognitive science. Unless one’s goal is the triumph of an unreconstructed cognitivism at all costs, exploring alternative theories of cognition hardly
seems threatening. Off the back of these supposedly intractable debates enactivists and other E–cognition theorists have managed to build alternative accounts of
cognition that attempt to solve entrenched problems. Since enactive theory has
manifestly worked as a catalyst for the development and finessing of theories of
cognition, it would be misguided to conflate ongoing disagreement with stagnation.
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M also target intra–theoretic debates within E–cognition. However, they provide
no examples of this effect within the E–cognition research tradition despite asserting
their existence. So, to provide a hard target on M’s behalf, I will discuss two debates:
first, the intra–E debate over the core notion of embodiment (Kiverstein 2012), and
then intra–enactivist debates over the explanatory role of representations. As I will
demonstrate, turf wars—M’s characterisation—are not the sticking point. Intra–E
disputes are almost uniformly about how to move away from the aforementioned
intractable cognitivist problems.
Embodiment can be seen as a bone of contention between different strands of
E–cognition. Kiverstein (2012) distinguishes between enactive accounts of embodiment, and the more conservative “body functionalism” (corresponding roughly to
extended/weak embodied accounts of cognition). The latter, originating with Clark
(1997), preserves the central role of computation, representation and similar cognitivist staples in its attempts to explain cognition generally while admitting a functional role for embodiment. In this way it attempts to fix some of the aforementioned
problems with cognitivism, getting the body and its meaning–generating capacities
into the explanatory picture while also maintaining some of the commitments of an
internalist account.
Enactivism, by contrast, is happy to mostly shed these commitments and produce new alternatives without the cognitivist baggage. What differentiates these
accounts is not, as M claim, an intractable dichotomy about which slice of the pie
chart belongs to body, environment and interaction respectively, or even whether
cognition is at all embodied or not. It is about the willingness of E–approaches to
reappraise and avoid questions that lead to intractability, and how much is to be
salvaged: should we embrace “root–and–branches reform of the cognitive sciences”
or “out–and–out revolution”? (Kiverstein 2012, pg. 742) Enactivists generally prefer
the latter:
The alternatives range from conservative models that remain close to
cognitivist conceptions of the mind, to more moderate and radical camps
that argue we need to rethink our basic assumptions about the way the
brain and the mind work. Most recent debates have been focused on the
pragmatic and action–oriented perspectives of ecological, enactive and
extended conceptions, which either minimize reliance on the notion of
representation or eschew it altogether...” (Gallagher 2018, pg. 354)
These are difficult questions to answer, so it is not shocking that different theorists argue for different, often competing, positions. But the upshot is that the
different strands of E–cognition are in large part differentiated from one another by
how much they distance themselves from high cognitivism. Enactivism sits on the
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extreme end of the spectrum, rejecting most commitments and arguing for a fresh
start, while “weak” E–cognition retains much of the cognitivist framework.
Likewise, when enactivists of different schools of thought come to a disagreement
the substantial differences concern a thoroughgoing clean–up of cognitivist artefacts.
For instance, some iterations of sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan & Noë 2001) have
appealed to a notion of “knowledge” to explain how agents guide their perception
and actions. For analytic enactivists (Hutto 2005) the invocation of knowledge seems
too close to a representational conception of perception and agency; an example of
“conservative thinking.” (Hutto 2005, pg. 389)
Although their account is advertised as decidedly skill–based’, on close
inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to
reduce it to a rules–and–representations approach. To remain properly
enactivist it must be purged of such commitments.(Hutto 2005, pg. 389,
emphasis added)
Far from being stuck in pointless intra–theoretical quagmires, enactivism is evidently committed to fixing problems by producing genuine alternatives. The charge
that these debates are counterproductive somehow therefore doesn’t ring true nor
does the analogy drawn between the stagnation of cognitivist and enactive theory.
M’s characterisation of these sorts of discussions as turf wars seriously misrepresents
them, and their argument relies on drawing a flimsy analogy between cognitivism and
enactivism, such that a failure of cognitivism to resolve internal problems equates
to a failure of enactivism to do the same.
The second point M make, that a deeper unity is concealed by these debates, I
will return to in section 5.

3.3.2

Do theories matter?

So far, the notion of a theory has been bandied about quite a bit. At the core
of M’s mechanistic approach is the rejection of all existing theories of cognition as
theories, cognitivist and enactive alike. They have argued that so–called theories
of cognition fail to qualify as such. In addition, theories are meant to be trouble
because they just lead to debates that go nowhere. Whatever job they were doing
before, mechanistic explanation can safely take over the reins.
Responding to these claims requires some consideration of the role of theories in
cognitive science, and whether M’s characterisation really tracks this role. What is
meant by theory on the part of M is somewhat vague, and hence why they think a
given account succeeds or fails as a theory is equally vague. To provide some clarity
on the matter, M’s fellow mechanist Craver (2008) has this to say about scientific
theories:
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A central aim of science is to develop theories that exhibit patterns in
a domain of phenomena. Scientists use theories to control, describe,
design, explain, explore, organize, and predict the items in that domain.
Mastering a field of science requires understanding its theories, and many
contributions to science are evaluated by their implications for constructing, testing, and revising theories. Understanding scientific theories is
prerequisite for understanding science.(Craver 2008, pg. 55, emphases
added)
If we take Craver’s view into account, then it seems uncontroversial to say theories are a fairly important feature of good science, cognitive or otherwise. Theories
make sense of empirical data and generate further hypotheses that can be put to
the test empirically. Hence to develop an idea of what empirical work to do—what
variables to intervene on, which items to appeal to in hypothesising and explaining
– there need to be theories of cognition.
In contrast to Craver’s (2002) conception, M claim that theories of cognition fail
to provide more than expository gloss for cognitive science. Bechtel (2016) discusses
this exact claim at length. Some critics argue, much like M, that representationalism is a mere gloss within neuroscience—the real business of science can easily do
with or without representational nomenclature without losing anything of empirical
consequence. This is more or less M’s position on all theoretical posits on both sides
of the aisle, cognitivist and enactivist alike. Bechtel however begs to differ, arguing
that representations are important for the development of theory, advancement of
hypotheses and the conduct of research.
To this end Bechtel (2016) discusses the example of place cells, neurons that
are hypothesised to play a role in allowing organisms to navigate their environment. Bechtel traces the extensive empirical research that has been investigating
this phenomenon for decades, and finds a tight fit between the mutual development
of empirical work and the role of representations in theory:
Characterizing neural processes as representations is not viewed as just
a convenient way of talking about brain processes. The research is predicated on these processes being representations; the explanatory tasks
they devote themselves to are identifying those neural processes that are
representations, figuring out what their content is, and how these representations are then used in controlling behavior.” (Bechtel 2016, pg.
1293)
The revision of theory, and the development and proposal of new hypotheses to
guide empirical research similarly depends on this understanding of representations
as a central explanans of how place cells figure in behaviour:

CHAPTER 3. MECHANISTIC BURIAL OR INTEGRATION?

64

...such additional inquiry is inspired and guided by the initial attributions of representational content and directed at fleshing out the account.
The attribution of content is a first step in articulating an account of a
mechanism for processing information. Without this initial assignment of
representational content, researchers would not be able to formulate the
hypotheses that guide subsequent research.” (Bechtel 2016, pg. 1291)
Bechtel’s (2016) puts paid to M’s idea that theory in cognitive science is already
defunct. And over in the enactivist camp, there is agreement on the significance of
theoretical posits like representations for empirical work and explanation:
[Bechtel] makes a compelling case that it is only because these scientists
conceive of their quarry in representational terms that they have been
able to get such a seemingly powerful and impressive grip on what appear
to be the working parts of an important mechanism of cognition.” (Hutto
& Myin 2017, pg. 242)
In fact, the significance of theory for empirical work is written into the very fabric of the cognitivist project. Marr’s Vision (1982), arguably the cornerstone of the
cognitivist outlook on cognition, sets up an overarching theory of visual perception
that specifies how empirical work ought to investigate three distinct but interrelated layers or levels of cognition. These are the computational level, the level of
representation and algorithm, and the implementation level. The computational
level investigates the computational processes underlying cognition, their goals and
appropriateness to the task; the representational/algorithmic level concerns how this
computation would be implemented to process representational inputs and outputs;
and the implementation level concerns how the physical processes of the nervous
system actually realise the former levels.
Marr’s account importantly lays out the stable of items in the field of cognition
that descriptions and explanations ought to appeal to: computations, representations, algorithms, and the neural realisers thereof. Marr, like Bechtel (2016), puts
a great emphasis on the central role of representations in producing explanations of
cognitive phenomena:
...if we are capable of knowing what is where in the world, our brains
must somehow be capable of representing this information...The study
of vision must therefore include...an inquiry into the nature of the internal representations by which we capture this information and thus
make it available as a basis for decisions about our thoughts and actions. This...will profoundly shape our investigation of the particular
problems posed by vision.” (Marr 1982, pg. 3, emphases added)

CHAPTER 3. MECHANISTIC BURIAL OR INTEGRATION?

65

For Marr, the notion of representation is decisive to how we investigate cognition. Cognitive scientists adhering to Marr’s theory (or modern iterations of it)
are not poking around in the dark: evidently the explanations cognitive scientists
will look for if they subscribe to Marr are characterised by looking for certain items
(representations and processing thereof) in certain places (the central nervous system). They will hypothesise about the role of these items and not others in order
to explain phenomena.
In fact, Milkowski (2013) provides just such an instance of Marr’s guidance while
discussing the course of an explanation for a navigational task performed by a rat:
We begin by describing in appropriate detail the rat’s navigational task
(level 1), specify, among other things, that the only source of information available to the rat is its own movements...Yet we also look for
constraints at the implementational level (the neural level) to discover
the regularities at the level of representations and algorithm. Already
the bottom level contains representations, but Marr does not disallow
that.(Milkowski 2013, pg. 116)
We can see how Milkowski’s (2013) characterisation of how the rat goes about
completing the task is explicitly inspired by Marr’s theory. Aside from the obvious inclusion of Marr’s levels of investigation and cognitivist items like representations, what Marr allows and disallows in terms of hypotheses seems important for
Milkowski’s (2013) sketch of an explanation. It guides where he looks, and what he
looks for. This in turn influences the explanation Milkowski is ultimately able to
provide—naturally, one that adheres to Marr’s levels of analysis in providing a story
about how computational processes and representations operate in the hardware of
the nervous system.
Contrast this with an enactive alternative that eschews these theoretical commitments in place of its own (Di Paolo et al 2017). For one, Di Paolo et al’s (2017)
sensorimotor enactive view explicitly excludes computation and representation as
items relevant to an explanation of cognition. In place of Marrian levels “enactivists
see agents as making sense of their environment by coupling precarious processes of
self– individuation (at different levels) with environmental dynamics” (pg. 26), such
that “...cognitive activity does not depend on vehicles storing information, but on
the coordination of dynamic processes at various scales by an autonomous agent.”
(pg. 27)
Accordingly, enactivists attempt to propose their own set of descriptive and explanatory items that depart from the cognitivist mould in order to investigate this
(admittedly sometimes vague) notion that cognition consists in dynamical coupling
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and coordination between organism and environment. Sensorimotor enactivists propose the notion of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) to explain basic capacities of
organisms to navigate and recognise features of their environment without appealing to representations at this level of explanation, where SMCs are “...regularities in
the sensorimotor field: predictable or “lawful” co– variations of sensory stimulation,
neural, and motor activity.” (O’Regan & Noë 2001). Di Paolo et al (2017) provide
an example:
...the projection of a horizontal line onto the retina changes from a
straight line to a curved arc as one shifts the eye’s fixation point from
the line itself to points above or below it. In contrast, if the focus is
moved along the line, no such transformation takes place. The geometry
of the viewed object, the morphology of the retina, and the particular
movement pattern employed all determine these regularities in the sensory stimulation pattern (O’Regan and Noë 2001, p. 941). (Di Paolo et
al 2017, pg.34)
These tight relationships between sense and motor behaviour lead enactivists
like Di Paolo et al (2017) to consider the constitutive “sensorimotor” whole to be
the object of inquiry: in other words, a SMC. SMCs have consequently been used
generate hypotheses and guide lines of empirical inquiry that differ in their output
to the cognitivist mode of inquiry: they have guided the generation of hypotheses
about the nature of habit (Egbert & Barandiaran 2014), perceptual learning (Di
Paolo et al 2014), and social cognition and participatory sense–making (De Jaegher
et al 2010; Froese et al 2015, 2018).
Hence in line with Bechtel (2016) I argue that theories of cognition are decisive
to explanations that research produces. They are no mere expository gloss as M
claim but a pervasive influence on how cognitive science is done. Just as representationalism influences how neuroscientists think about explanations of place cells, and
how cognitivists try to explain perception and action, I think it is equally plausible
that taking a sensorimotor enactive perspective influences the kinds of empirical
work to be done, and hence the explanations that are produced. 3.2.

3.3.3

Abandoning theories for mechanisms; or, science with
a blindfold

M propose that we should set aside questions of theory and focus instead on building
models of cognitive mechanism: we will make a transition from cognitive science
guided by theory, in favour of mechanistic explanation as a guide. But is mechanistic
explanation equipped to serve this role?
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M seem to assume that mechanistic explanations will cut through the thicket
of competing theory to find the correct description or explanation of a cognitive
phenomenon. In part this seems to arise from the notion that ontic mechanistic
explanations, being objective explanations (Craver 2007, 2014) are able to discern
correct from incorrect hypotheses by simply revealing the actual causal structure of
nature. I discuss this notion of objective explanation at length in Chapter 5, and so
I bracket it for now.
In any case, it is hard to see how Mechanism is a fill–in for having a theory
of cognition. Theories are required to formulate hypotheses as part of a line of
investigation, and to outline the items that can figure in that investigation. By
contrast mechanistic explanation is not a theory, but a set of explanatory standards
and strategies. It may be closely associated with some theories, like cognitivism,
but it is not itself a theory. Mechanism can provide a clear set of requirements on
what counts as a description or explanation of a phenomenon. But if it is pushed
into taking over theory’s role—proposing items of investigation, developing hypotheses, and so on—then it will fail because it is simply the wrong thing for the job.
M’s rejoinder to cognitive scientists to simply look for the “entities and activities
that are jointly responsible for their phenomena of interest” (pg. 4) in pursuit of
an integrated cognitive science neglects that investigators still need to develop hypotheses and theories about what kinds of entities and activities they are looking
for. Should a given explanation hypothesise and test the role of representations,
entelechies, Cartesian animal spirits, or something else? Here is where theories are
instructive and decisive, and the mechanistic interest in entities and activities offers
little guidance.
Without theories, all cognitive science is left with is the interventionist method
(Woodward 2003) provided by Mechanism to take their place. It is difficult to
imagine a science so impoverished, but hypothetically it would involve wandering
around intervening on bits of the world in the hope that they will be relevant to
the phenomenon scientists are interested in. To realistically perform the tasks of
science, researchers need theories which can direct and shape their interpretations of
data into existing research, and to guide the development and testing of hypotheses.
It is not clear from M’s account how Mechanism fills this role.

3.4

Heuristics

To buttress their account, M introduce the notion of heuristics as guides for research
in cognitive science. They claim that heuristics, when paired up with mechanistic
explanation, can take over the job of theory. We have already seen how Mechanism
by itself is unable to accomplish this task—here I will argue that the addition of

CHAPTER 3. MECHANISTIC BURIAL OR INTEGRATION?

68

heuristics does not remedy the situation.

3.4.1

Depends what you mean by heuristic

If we accepted M’s premise that theories of cognition are no longer viable, they
would need to show how heuristics take their place in concert with mechanistic
explanations. This proposal seems to hinge almost entirely on what M mean by
heuristic—and they are not entirely clear on the point.
For instance, when M claim that a computational heuristic leads investigators
to ask “what the algorithms and representations involved are; and how they are
physically implemented” (pg.4) the line between heuristic and theory in this statement is made blurry, by contrast with their earlier characterisation of heuristics as
gentle “reminders”. The proposal of a stable of entities and activities—algorithms
and representations implemented in the brain—seems a fairly substantial proposal
more in line with a theory, a cataloguing of the “items in that domain” in Craver’s
(2002) terms. If this is what M mean by heuristic, and heuristics are, for all intents
and purposes, theories, then the nature of the heuristic/theory distinction seems
uncertain.
Contrast this notion of heuristic with how other mechanists use it. Bechtel &
Richardson (1993) advanced the influential dual heuristics of decomposition and
localization as guides to discovery for mechanistic science. They characterise their
heuristics as “fallible research strategies” (Bechtel & Richardson 1993, pg. xxx) not
specific proposals for what kinds of items can figure in cognitive explanations. Using
Bechtel & Richardson’s (1993) notion of heuristics, a clearer distinction from theories
can be made. Heuristics are different to theories is that they do not make claims
about the possible items of explanation, nor are they linked to notions of falsification.
A theory can both propose features of nature (representations, computations) and
be wrong about those proposals. Heuristics, on the other hand, do not propose
the existence of things, instead providing guidance about how to proceed with a
scientific investigation (likely within the parameters of possible items of explanations
as provided by theories). Similarly, heuristics will not be dismissed if they prove to
be fallible during the course of investigation, unlike theories. If a particular system
proves to be non–decomposable, for instance, Bechtel & Richardson (1993) would
consider this perfectly acceptable—heuristics are only meant to be fallible strategies,
after all.
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Smuggling cognitivism; Or, some heuristics are more
equal than others

M seem to somewhat adhere to this characterisation of heuristics, but also blur the
lines of this heuristic/theory distinction when it is enactivism under consideration
versus cognitivism. Unlike cognitivism which gets to retain its capacity to propose
entities and activities at work in cognition one made into a heuristic, enactivism
is stripped of this kind of consequence. This is done via progressively weaker and
less accurate definitions of enactivism and its goals. M start with a description of
enactivism that many of its proponents would probably agree with:
The enactive approach to cognition recognizes a crucial inter–dependency
between an autonomous agent and the world it inhabits. Cognitive activity is wholly determined neither by the agents nor by their environment,
but rather it emerges from the inter–dependency between the two.(pg.
3)
Compare this with the very similar first commitment of enactivism according to
Gallagher (2017):
Cognition is not simply a brain event. It emerges from processes distributed across brain–body–environment...From a third–person perspective
the organism–environment is taken as the explanatory unit (pg. 6)
But later when building their mechanistic–heuristic account, M change their
description dramatically:
...the enactive perspective (at least in its non–classical version) points
to participatory negotiation of how the activity is perceived by various
agents involved...(pg. 4)
...the enactive perspective will stress the importance of dynamic coordination between pilots and consider how the environment is structured in
terms of various affordances.(pg. 7)
In the former set of descriptions, cognition emerges from interaction. The agent
and its environment are interdependent. Cognition is not internal but depends on
an agent interacting with an environment. These interdependencies are items of
explanation in their own right. But without warning, this enactivism is transformed
almost unrecognisably. The stronger language of emergence and interdependence
(with the potentially deeper ontological or metaphysical connotations these terms
carry) becomes quite weak and merely suggestive instead. Enactivism as a heuristic
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points to interaction; it stresses its importance for explanation. Something has
happened in between these two sets of descriptions, and M do not say what.
M may intend for these weaker descriptions to represent the heuristic version of
enactivism, and hence consider the weakening to be justified. But their conversion
of theories into heuristics was justified originally by the claim that enactivism made
no substantial proposals in the first place—conversion to heuristic was supposed to
be a lossless process. So–called theories were really just heuristics all along, were
already used as such, and their differing claims were in practice just expository
differences. So, M upset their own case by tinkering with enactivism’s claims. If
the deformation of enactivism is necessary for conversion into a heuristic, then (if
we follow M’s reasoning behind redeploying enactivism as a heuristic) there was no
rationale for converting enactivism into a heuristic in the first place.
This difference in standards boils down to a strategically inconsistent notion
of heuristic. When it benefits the maintenance of a traditional cognitive science,
heuristic means an account is stripped of its meatier theoretical implications and
turned into a reminder for good conduct of mechanistic explanations. However, when
computationalism and representationalism are turned into heuristics they retain
their full import, able to function as theories, proposing and constraining the possible
items of explanation. To make the contrast in treatment clearer, enactive proposals
like SMCs are not given this benefit of the doubt—they are not assumed to be a
necessary item of explanation in cognitive science unless proven otherwise.
One can certainly treat enactivism as merely a set of suggestions or reminders to
look for inter–agential causal relations when mechanistically explaining some cognitive phenomenon. The defeat of a straw enactivism however has few implications for
living, breathing enactivism as a theory of cognition: while a truncated enactivism
suits M’s proposal it is not an enactivism anyone actually endorses.

3.5

Integration

M, as we have seen, consider the notion of integration a powerful motivating force
for their criticism of existing theories of cognition , and for developing their own
replacement account. They suggest that integrating disparate theories—“wide” and
cognitivist—will make for a better cognitive science. One way they motivate this
is by suggesting that intractable theoretical dichotomies (discussed in Section 3)
can be dissolved via integration—the new unified synthesis of both halves of the
dichotomy will lead to a better cognitive science. I agree that it is a proposal worth
investigating.
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Conditions for integration

If we grant for the sake of argument that theoretical quagmires and dichotomies are
a problem, this raises the question of how integration will resolve that problem. Not
all dichotomies are best revolved through integration. It would not, for instance,
seem like a good idea to integrate heliocentrism with geocentrism simply because
they are theories that sit on either side of a theoretical dichotomy. This raises the
possibility that the opponent theories of enactivism and cognitivism are not, much
like helio– and geocentrism, theories that we would want to (or even could) integrate.
Contradictory proposals—the sun orbits the Earth; the Earth orbits the sun—do
not seem integrable without one account or the other turning out to be false, which
would prevent integration. On the other hand, we may find theories in opposition,
but where genuine integration is possible. Segundo–Ortin et al (2018) for instance
discuss the apparent incompatibility between enactivism and ecological psychology
(Gibson 1979). Enactivism and ecological psychology agree on many fronts: both
argue that representations are unnecessary for perception, that perception is an
embodied affair, and that explanations of perception can be dynamical. However,
some enactivists have claimed that the two accounts are at odds, targeting what
they perceive as an excessively representation–friendly notion of information on the
part of ecological psychology (Myin 2016).
Information is a sticking point because, as Segundo–Ortin et al (2018) relate,
enactivists and ecological psychologists seem to be understanding the concept in two
different ways. Ecological psychologists claim that perception involves the picking
up of information in the environment by an organism. Enactivists worry that ecological psychologists therefore think that “this information specifies or is about the
environment...” (Segundo–Ortin et al 2018, pg. 5, emphases original), which sounds
dangerously close to the view that information is a kind of contentful representation
of the environment for perception.
But for ecological psychologists the terminology carries a different meaning: to
pick up or specify features of the environment does not mean producing a representation of the outside world for internal processing, but rather using the environment
as structured by the organism’s body and its movements:
Consider...the example of optic flow...an individual’s movements in her
environment lawfully produce invariant patterns in her sensory array.
For instance, as any animal moves toward an object, the image this
object projects in her retina lawfully expands, causing the object to
expand in her visual field...(Segundo–Ortin et al 2018, pg. 12)
Due to the interaction between the light and the objects in the room...the
optic array gets structured, and insofar as this structure corresponds to
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the structure of the surroundings, the former can be said to specify or
“contain” information about the latter. (Segundo–Ortin et al 2018, pg.
8)
So understood, information specifies invariant relationships between the incoming light from the organism’s surroundings, the sensory organs and the organism’s
movement. Hence specification is not contentful or representational (providing a
replica of the environment for internal uptake, processing and so on) but simply
a form of lawful covariation between organism and environment, which organisms
thereby pick up directly via action. It thereby does not imply contentful representations as core to perception. This clears up this expository difference between
enactivists and ecological psychologists, and Segundo–Ortin et al (2018) clear the
path for genuine integration.
A few key observations can be made here. Both accounts agree on most features
of cognition—that it is embodied, nonrepresentational, and dynamically explicable,
for instance. The apparent incompatibility between the two (the ecological notion of
information) proves to be resolvable to their mutual satisfaction. The critical back
and forth between the enactive and ecological approaches opens up the possibility
of genuine rapprochement, and ultimately integration.

3.5.2

Unity or conquest?

Does M’s proposal resemble this kind of integrative work? There are, similarly,
differences in commitments between cognitivists and enactivist. Though perhaps—
following Segundo–Ortin et al’s (2018) example—these differences can be shown
to have a mutually satisfactory resolution. And M do present their account as a
pluralistic view on cognitive science, committed to getting on with the real business of explaining cognition and setting aside intractable expository differences via
integration.
The problem is that unlike Segundo–Ortin et al (2018), M do not engage with
actually existing enactivism to find a path to integration. Instead, a straw enactivism
that is only committed to reminding cognitive scientists to look for inter–agent
interactions is incorporated into cognitivism. This hardly seems a case of genuine
integration: if there are deep disagreements between accounts, then they bar the way
for integration (for instance, one cannot hold that representations are both required
for explanation and unnecessary for explanation simultaneously). Their strategy
of weakening enactivist claims means that enactivism and cognitivism never get
the opportunity to settle their score. The anti–representationalism of enactivism,
for instance, is simply not addressed. Cognitivism, on the other hand, gets to
retain its representational commitments, and hence does not have to face any critical
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perspectives. M are attempting integration, but they do not attempt to show how
fundamental disagreements between cognitivism and enactivism can be resolved to
allow it.
I suggest that M’s account does not genuine integrate differing theories of cognition, because it fails to engage with the substantive disagreements that stand it
its way. Their manoeuvre has been a multifaceted avoidance of this problem; by
pressing Mechanism into service as a replacement for theories, so as to avoid theoretical disagreements; by misrepresenting enactive cognitive science to avoid theoretical
disagreements; by converting enactive theory into a straw–version heuristic.
On the other hand, it may simply be M’s intention to bury enactivism alive:
to perceive that it is a living, breathing account of cognition but nevertheless put
together a unificatory story that buries it as an independent research tradition, turning it into a mere heuristic for Mechanism instead. In this latter case, this intention
shouldn’t be presented as an even–handed treatment of the theories populating cognitive science. This winds up being counterproductive—if it is an end to enactive
cognitive science that M want, then their case should presented as such, and not
under the guide of unity. Otherwise any such argument will fail to achieve its goal:
enactivists will likely not buy into this uneven story and accept integration. To
put an end to opponent E–cognitive accounts, traditional cognitive science ought
to show how they fail to do the job of theory; that they are somehow wrong or
misguided in their explanations of phenomena.

3.6

Heading off the Non–mechanistic Option

Having established their mechanistic–heuristic account for cognitive science, M make
a case to undermine a potential dynamical alternative. We have already seen how
cognitivism and mechanism share a close and harmonious relationship—enactivism
and mechanism, far less so . Traditionally, many enactivists appeal to dynamical models as their primary descriptive and explanatory tool (Chemero 2009). M
attempt to head off this explanatory alternative by attacking the possibility of dynamical explanation—though I will show how the move also fails. Their first charge
is a reiteration of the causal relevance concern. I will not labour the point, and
simply respond that the interventionist account of dynamical explanation proposed
by in Chapter 1 goes some way to providing a solution here. However, M have one
further, more novel criticism of dynamical explanations.
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Vacuous mechanisms

To head off dynamical explanation, M move to expand the definition of a mechanism
to include all causal relations. The authors initially propose a familiar and fleshed–
out definition of mechanisms:
A mechanism is an organized spatiotemporal structure responsible for
the occurrence of at least one phenomenon to be explained. The orchestrated causal interaction of the mechanism’s component parts and
operations explains the phenomenon at hand.” (pg. 5)
Both mechanists and dynamicists would likely agree to this definition. Immediately afterwards this is truncated to the claim that mechanisms “are only causally
organized spatiotemporal structures.” (pg. 5) This truncation is not a harmless
summary, because it quietly broadens the definition of mechanisms to make it, as I
will show, excessively permissive.
If we accept M’s definition of a mechanism for a moment, the consequences are
worth considering. Even if dynamical models appeared to provide us with causal
explanations, we would always turn out to be misled. Since any “causally organized
spatiotemporal structure” is by definition a mechanism, even a single relationship
of cause and effect might count as a “causally organized spatiotemporal structure”
and therefore be counted as a mechanism. One might consider this reading unfair,
but this does seem to be the intended meaning on the part of M, since they claim a
direct equivalence between the causal explanations identified by dynamical models,
and their mechanistic counterpart:
It is extremely difficult to find dynamical explanations that do not appeal
to causally organized systems; and this is what makes purported dynamical explanations equivalent to mechanistic explanations. (pg. 12)
Ultimately “causally organized spatiotemporal structure” is condensed to “causally organized system”, which functions identically to “cause” in their account.
While M may not intend this outcome, it seems any cause is now a mechanism.
This is somewhat of a departure from the more measured 3M requirement (Kaplan
& Craver 2011) which suggests that dynamical causes can be reduced to mechanistic
causes; 3M denies that dynamical causes are actually causes. Here M are saying that
dynamical causes just are mechanistic causes, since a sufficiently broad definition of
mechanism can include any causal story dynamicists can come up with.
A likely sticking point here is the discord between this and existing definitions
of mechanisms. For instance, Bechtel & Abrahamsen’s (2005) influential definition
describes a mechanism as a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization” (pg. 423). Craver
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(2007) defines mechanisms as “a set of entities and activities organized such that
they exhibit the phenomenon to be explained.” (pg. 5) Some other definitions
of mechanisms are more restricted, specifying that even organised parts or entities
engaged in causal activities is not precise enough and that they must have extra
features like fine–tunedness of organisation and modularity (Woodward 2013). The
classic Machamer et al (2000) definition included the requirement of start and finish
conditions to a mechanism’s operations. There is generally more meat on the bones,
then, than just causally organised spatiotemporal structures.
At the core of the notion of mechanism is the important requirement that they
possess discrete physical parts which interact with one another causally (or at least
have the potential to). The interactions of these discrete physical parts are of explanatory interest; showing how they produce the phenomenon is the business of
mechanistic explanation and what individuates it from other modes of explanation.
To accept M’s definition would be to reduce Mechanism to barebones interventionism
(Woodward 2003). Broadening the definition of mechanisms to this extent simply
detonates the mechanist project as something distinct from interventionism.
It seems unlikely that most mechanists would be pleased with this scorched–
earth tactic, nor the ultimate outcome, since M’s definition allows any and all causal
relations to count as genuinely explanatory mechanisms without actually referring
to any entities or activities—core components of any mechanistic explanation.

3.7

Conclusion

Milkowski et al (2018) touches on several discussions around the possibility of integrating E–cognition and cognitivism. It attempts to provide a unifying account
for cognitive science based upon mechanistic explanation. However, I see their integrative strategy as unsuccessful. Milkowski et al (2018) recommend setting aside
theories of cognition and replacing them with heuristics wedded to mechanistic explanation. This alternative, what I call the mechanistic–heuristic account, fails to
provide a credible replacement for theories of cognition, and misrepresents enactivism in order to integrate accounts, thereby failing to actually resolve theoretical
disagreements between these accounts. Additionally, their attempts to head off
the possibility of dynamical explanations rely on an overly permissive definition of
mechanisms that renders them vacuous.

Chapter 4
Explanatory Chimeras
Integration of dynamical and mechanistic explanation under enactive
cognitive science has recently received several treatments. Two separate proposals (Abramova & Slors 2019; Walmsley 2019) have argued
that mechanistic explanations can be integrated into existing dynamical
explanations, and thereby serve the goals of enactive cognitive science.
Abramova & Slors’ (2019) account claims that dynamical models only
describe at the what–level, not the properly explanatory how–level, and
so enactive cognitive science requires augmenting with mechanistic models to properly explain. I argue this move defers unnecessarily to the
explanatory goals of traditional cognitive science, and results in the subsumption of dynamical explanations into their mechanistic counterpart.
Walmsley (2019) proposes that strategic mechanisms (Levy 2013) can
be used to help improve understanding of phenomena even when that
system is not especially mechanistic. I agree with Walmsley (2019) that
this limited, strategic type of mechanism is useful, but I also consider
this an instance of subsumption in the other direction—here mechanism
is subsumed into dynamical explanation, rather than being genuinely
integrated. As a result, a genuine integration is still not forthcoming.
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Introduction

How should we characterise the relationship between dynamical and mechanistic
explanations? Competition, compatibility, or something else? So far in this thesis
I have tried to make the case that non–mechanistic explanations are able to stand
alone, drawing on the same interventionist justification as mechanistic accounts
(Chapters 1 & 2). Of course, one might ask the question: why go it alone? Why not
somehow unify or combine these mechanistic and dynamical explanations together
to yield a multifaceted, and overall more informative, explanation of a phenomenon?
At least as far as cognition is concerned, however, this view runs into some apparent problems. This occurs because dynamicism has long been wedded, within
the cognitive sciences, to E–cognition approaches, particularly of the radically embodied or enactive variety (Chemero 2009, Chemero & Silberstein 2008, Di Paolo
et al 2017) while mechanism has a similarly robust connection to traditional cognitivism (Milkowski 2013, Zednik 2018). This does raise the question of whether
these apparently strict allegiances can be broken out of. After all when (as I showed
in Chapter 3) there are substantial and non-trivial differences in theories that consequently propose very different items of explanation, and relate very different lines
of investigation.
The manoeuvre I examined in Chapter 3 was Milkowski et al’s (2018) attempt
to sweep aside this these theoretical debates. They argued that mechanistic explanation can supercede theoretical differences between classic cognitivist accounts and
E–cognition; sweeping them aside to get at the best overarching explanation. Here
instead I will look at another attempt at integration: this time the unification of different model explanations (dynamical and mechanistic) under the same theoretical
framework for cognition.

4.1.1

Compatibility & Integration

Mechanists have long held that compatibility between dynamical and mechanistic
explanation is possible and often desirable (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010, 2013), although with the caveat that a dynamical model is only explanatory insofar as it
illuminates a mechanism (Kaplan & Craver 2011). Dynamicists have been leerier
of the prospect, arguing that the decomposition and localisation required by mechanistic explanation is inimical to the goals of dynamical explanations paired with
E–cognition accounts (Stepp et al 2011; Silberstein & Chemero 2013). In Chapters
1 and 2 I also argued, from an interventionist perspective, that dynamical models
can be causally explanatory in their own right and so do not necessarily require
subsumption into mechanistic explanations.
One point of confusion in this existing discussion stems from the sort of com-
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patibility under discussion. Mechanists generally claim that dynamical explanations
aren’t explanations in the first place, but merely descriptive models. Hence whenever
compatibility is on the table, it is not the compatibility of two equal modes of explanation being discussed but rather the compatibility of purely descriptive dynamical
models with genuine mechanistic explanations. This ends up resembling subsumption more than true compatibility—the explanation is still ultimately a mechanistic
one, serving mechanistic explanatory goals, but utilising dynamical models as part
of its descriptive toolbox (Kaplan 2015).
What I focus on here is instead the possibility of genuinely integrating the two
explanatory strategies. For clarity, I therefore distinguish compatibility (which I
suggest entails subsumption; with making one or the other type of explanation fit
into the other) from integration. I wish to find whether both models can meet their
explanatory targets in their own terms, without stepping on one another’s toes:
in the dynamical mechanistic explanations mentioned above, dynamical models are
curtailed by claiming they are not responsible for the explanatory power of the
explanation. Making such a distinction is helpful for discussing the relationship
between dynamical and mechanistic explanations with a focus on a genuine and
even-handed integration.

4.1.2

The virtues of integration: hybrid vigour?

Much of this discussion around mechanisms and dynamical models concerns the
notion of model explanations, where explanatory power results from the successful
exhibition of some pattern observed in nature by a model (Bokulich 2017). Mechanistic models, for instance, explain by showing how the causal events going on in a
mechanism exhibit a fine–grained control over the explanandum phenomenon; dynamical models (at least on the account presented in Chapter 1) explain similarly
by showing how the dynamical variables of a system causally influence its outcomes.
From a philosophy of science perspective, combining multiple models together is
seen to have potential benefits for a scientific investigation. Since models necessarily
leave out or abstract some details about the world, combining the insights of several
different kinds of models can help control for this idealisation somewhat (Levins
1966; Potochnik 2017). Integration is also perceived within cognitive science to have
the potential to bring together disparate theories of cognition, to find “a way to end
the representation wars” (Constant et al 2019, pg. 2) between E–cognition accounts
and mainstream cognitive science. If different camps can share and integrate their
explanatory resources, it might follow that little of substance outside expository
differences thereby distinguishes them. Proponents of active inference and predictive
processing models have for instance argued that a shared explanatory resource can
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integrate E–cognition and cognitivism (Clark 2015; Constant et al 2019) with the
aim of developing an overarching account that “accommodates a representationalist
and a dynamicist (a.k.a. non–representational) view of cognition.” (Constant et al
2019, pg. 2)
I will however focus not on these outside interventions into the dynamicism–
mechanism divide, nor the cognitivist–enactive divide, hoping to integrate the two
through a new overall framework for cognition. Instead I will investigate whether
dynamicism and Mechanism as forms of model explanation already possess the resources to fully integrate. In this chapter I will discuss two recent attempts to integrate dynamical and mechanistic explanations within the same theoretical framework: enactive cognitive science. The first is Abramova & Slors’ (2019) proposal of
a mechanistic explanation for enactive sociality, and the second is Walmsley’s (2019)
call for the integration of a strategic mechanism into enactive accounts of minimal
cognition. Both Abramova & Slors (2019) and Walmsley (2019) argue that the
combination of the two models—dynamical and mechanistic—will produce better
explanations than either mode alone (though they have rather different reasons for
thinking so, as I will show). These proposals both aim for a kind of hybrid vigour,
where a combined dynamical–mechanical account of a phenomenon will prove better
than either model alone.
But how to gauge whether these accounts succeed, and do so in a genuinely
integrative way? I suggest that the answer to this question lies in whether these
combinations of models genuinely contribute to the explanatory goals of the cognitive theory in question, which are often mutually antagonistic. I will show that
while these integrative cases are both partially successful, I do not think that either
account wholly succeeds in providing a roadmap to the genuine integration of dynamical and mechanistic model explanations under an enactive framework. I argue
that, due to the requirements inherent in the specific explanatory goals of enactive
cognitive science, these integrative attempts both result in one model explanation
being subsumed into the other. While they purport to integrate mechanisms into enactive cognitive science, they either result in mechanistic subsumption of dynamical
models (Abramova & Slors 2019), or dynamical subsumption of mechanism (Walmsley 2019). In both cases I think that accepting one or the other sets of mutually
incompatible explanatory goals—cognitivist in the first case, and enactive in the
latter—seems a difficult obstacle for genuine integration.

4.2

Explanatory goals

One feature central to both enactive and traditional cognitivist approaches to cognitive science is their interest in providing explanations of cognition. This is not
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surprising given explanation is a core goal of science (Bokulich 2017). In order to
be taken seriously, any account of cognition needs to be able to explain cognitive
phenomena. One difference between the enactive and cognitivist approaches is their
explanatory goals, which I argue stem from their characterisations of the explanandum phenomenon; “[r]esearchers in different research communities and with different
research projects often possess different explanatory goals” (Walmsley 2019, pg. 2).
These explanatory goals dictate the questions investigators ask about phenomena,
and consequently the kinds of answers considered suitable for explanation.
For instance, cognitivist accounts characterise cognition as a chiefly internal
affair, performed via the central nervous system; “the sequential processing of strings
of static symbols by means of some formal algorithm”(Slors et al 2015, pg. 241). To
take one relevant example, social cognition on this view should be understood as the
result of a specialised mindreading module, which processes incoming sensory input
(according to ingrained rules) to figure out what others are thinking (Carruthers
2016, 2017).
This characterisation at the what-level, the level of specifying the nature of the
phenomenon, frames the explanatory goals of cognitive science. So understood, we
now aim to understand how the symbol-processing and rule-following of a particular
mental module produces the phenomenon, the thing we have characterised already at
the what-level. Consequently the explanatory goals of traditional cognitive science
track these aims: to consider how a system might, in theory, be able to realise these
functions, and to find the actual realisers in the cognitive system and show how
these realisers produce the phenomenon in question.
This traditional perspective often coincides with an affinity for mechanistic explanations of these cognitive phenomena. At least in part this close relationship can
be understood as the cohesion of the explanatory goals of cognitivism, and the kinds
of model explanations Mechanism provides, as exemplified by Marr’s (1982) levels
of analysis (discussed in Chapter 3):
“The idea of algorithms governing the transformations of representations is familiar from computer science but, as we will see, is not limited to the sorts of representations and algorithms used in digital computers.Rather, it allows for the identification of the organization of the
mechanism that explains how representations are manipulated to generate the phenomenon.”(Bechtel & Shagrir 2015, pg. 313)
If an investigation is committed to the classic cognitivist picture of cognition
(here represented by Marr (1982)), then regardless of whether it is utilising mechanistic or dynamical models (or a combination thereof) “...there is reason to believe
that all of these research programs...aspire to discover and describe mechanisms.”
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(Zednik 2018, pg. 390). Once the explanatory goals of cognitivism have been accepted, it is a natural next step to appeal to mechanisms which align with the what-level
characterisation provided by cognitivism.
Mechanism is well–suited to addressing the explanatory goals of cognitivism
because it engages with both the what–level, which describes the phenomenon, and
the subsequent how–level which describes how the phenomenon was underlain by
the operations of an underlying causal mechanism (Abramova & Slors 2019). This
how–level provides the step that turns a mechanistic description/model into an
explanation. Hence mechanism both locates physical realisers and shows how they
realise, in synergy with the explanatory goals of cognitivism.
On the other end of the spectrum, enactivism (and related versions of radically
embodied cognitive science) entails very different explanatory goals. Consider Di
Paolo et al’s (2017) characterisation of the explanatory strategy of enactive cognitive
science, focussing on sensorimotor interaction as a core feature of cognition:
In contemporary terms the sensorimotor loop is manifested in the way in
which motor variations induce (via the environment) sensory variations,
and sensory changes induce (via internal processes) the agent to change
the way it moves. The regularities that emerge from recurrent sensorimotor cycles are constitutive both of action and perception. These are also
the regularities that the cognitive system is sensitive to and attempts to
manage.(Di Paolo et al 2017, pg. 17)
Analysis of the coupled agent–environment system, typically through dynamical systems techniques, is the prevalent research method for studying the emergent
regularities in closed sensorimotor loops.”(Di Paolo et al 2017, pg. 18) In enactive
cognitive science the explanatory goal is to find out how features of the world are
coupled dynamically such that they produced the phenomenon. This is because Di
Paolo et al’s (2017) characterisation of what cognition is—not the implementation
of computational processes, but the dynamical couplings the agent–environment
unit constitutes. From this we can sketch some explanatory goals. With cognition
so characterised, the explanatory goals of enactivism are the successful description of how couplings between relevant features of the world—brain, body, and
environment—produce different outcomes as those couplings unfold over time. Furthermore, this fits with an interventionist, counterfactual image of explanation—
showing how things would have been different had these couplings been different
(see Chapters 1 & 2). Hence dynamical models, which say little about physical realisation, and a lot about the unfolding of couplings over time, serve the explanatory
goals of enactive cognitive science well.
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The key point is that the characterisation at the what–level is what drives the
goals of a scientific investigation. Moreover, I argue against those in favour of subsuming dynamical explanations into mechanistic ones under a cognitivist framework
(i.e. Zednik 2018). Zednik (2018) points to the tight relationship between mechanism and cognitivsm and judges that due to their mutually supportive goals and
assumptions, this indicates an all-encompassing perspective which the dynamical
hypothesis unwittingly serves. But I see this as essentially a non-sequitur. It is true
that, so characterised, cognition is neatly explained via mechanisms. It is no surprise
that if we characterise cognition as a set of cognitive mechanisms, the explanatory
goals this generates will be served well by mechanistic explanation. But this does
not seem to say very much about the possibility of alternative characterisations of
cognition, and the explanatory tools they use. One can always characterise the phenomenon differently at the what-level, and so generate different explanatory goals.
These cannot be so easily subsumed.

4.3

Creating chimeras

Despite these differences in explanatory goals, there have been some recent attempts
to integrate mechanistic explanations into enactive cognitive science alongisde dynamical models. The first is Abramova & Slors (2019), who argue that mechanistic
explanation can augment an enactive account of social cognition. The second is
Walmsley’s (2019) case that the integration of mechanistic models alongside dynamical ones will lead to better explanations of minimal cognition.

4.3.1

Enactive social cognition

Abramova & Slors (2019) target discussions of enactive social cognition. Social cognition has traditionally been thought of as an act of mind–reading: simulating or
otherwise modelling the inner mental states of other agents, often performed by a
specialised internal mindreading component (Baron–Cohen 1995; Carruthers 2016,
2017). As part of their general criticism of traditional cognitive science, enactivists
have been highly critical of this characterisation of social cognition. As an alternative, they propose social cognition is done through direct perception, not figured out
at a distance by internal processes (Gallagher 2008). Social cognition should be considered not as an abstract, disembodied process of inference, but as the consequence
of inter–agential coupling:
Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the
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domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the
autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced).” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007, pg. 493; also quoted
in Abramova & Slors 2019)
Making this proposal more concrete, Di Paolo et al (2010) appeal to perceptual
crossing experiments (Auvray et al 2009; Auvray & Rohde 2012). These experiments attempt to show how quite simple, non–mindreading sensorimotor capacities
of agents are able to constitute basic social interaction. The experimental design
puts two participants in separate rooms, and given a computer mouse and a tactile
pad. What they cannot see is a shared virtual space, where both participants control
their own avatar. Each avatar is moved along a one–dimensional horizontal line, left
or right, when the participants move their mouse. If the avatars run into each other,
a tactile sensation is sent to both participant’s pads. They are able, thereby, to
feel the presence of the other participant’s avatar. There are also several stationary
objects which similarly induce a sensation if a participant touches the object with
their avatar. In addition, each avatar has a “shadow”, which stays a set distance
from their avatar but tracks its movements. Shadows can be interacted with by the
other participant’s avatar (the other will feel a tactile response), but the shadow’s
owner will feel nothing. Participants are instructed to look for the other participant,
and click the mouse when they felt they were “touching” the other person’s avatar,
and not when they think they’ve encountered a shadow or object.
The experiment presents three possibilities for interaction: avatar–avatar, avatar–
shadow, and avatar–object. The former kind is—according to Di Paolo et al (2010)—
special, a form of basic social interaction. By contrast the avatar–shadow condition
presents a situation where only one of the agents can sense the other, and sense
their interaction—it is hence only one–way, not a case of social interaction.
The results showed that participants were indeed able to find the each other’s
avatars the majority of the time, correctly indicating via mouse clicks that they were
interacting with the other person and not their shadow, or a stationary object. From
this, it is concluded that “[t]he situation of sensing the other’ while being sensed’
turns out to be more stable than sensing an insensitive shadow.” (Abramova & Slors
2019, pg. 410). Moreover, the task is not solved by highly involved mindreading
capacities, but only through very simple sensorimotor interactions—“from a supra–
personal perspective the task is solved by the fact that avatar–avatar interactions are
more stable, more self–perpetuating, than avatar–shadow interactions.” (Abramova
& Slors 2019 pg. 411).
Dynamical explanations of this phenomenon have been developed further by Di
Paolo et al (2008) and Froese & Di Paolo (2010). In these studies, the perceptual
crossing experiment was performed by neural network–controlled simulated agents.
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Despite being equipped with very simple resources (lacking explicit mindreading
systems), the continued interaction of the two agents was extremely stable, much
more so than the one–way avatar–shadow or avatar–object interactions. The stability of the avatar–avatar interaction is explanined dynamically, in terms of features
of “the dynamical landscape, attractors, perturbation and hysteriesis” (Abramova
& Slors 2019 pg. 412) much like the analysis of cell fate explanations I offered in
Chapter 2.
While this is counted as a successful dynamical description of a kind of minimal
social cognition, Abramova & Slors (2019) nevertheless do not consider it an explanatory success. They have three main criticisms of this dynamical explanation,
to which they think the solution is integrating mechanistic models.
Firstly, they worry that despite its successes, the relative lack of uptake of enactive cognitive science within the empirical mainstream is because “when it comes
to explanations, enactivists content themselves with precise, prediction–supporting
descriptions of the what–level” (Abramova & Slors 2019, pg. 411). They blame the
lack of popularity of enactive cognitive science on the fact that scientific commonsense seems to prefer mechanistic explanations. They propose that to improve this
situation, mechanistic explanations should be used to augment dynamical models.
This is less a concern over the actual explanatory power of dynamical models, and
more to do with popularity within a scientific community.
For the perceptual crossing example just discussed, they suggest that the extensive social interaction between the two agents can be recast as an extended mechanism, with components stretched out across both agents. While mechanistic explanations are indeed capable of explaining phenomena where the underlying mechanism
is spatially distributed, I consider this a mixed blessing for two reasons.
For one, the lack of immediate mainstream appeal seems a debatable reason to
throw in the towel on pursuing dynamical explanation. Dissenting voices within and
between scientific communities can drive scientific progress—sometimes dissenters
ultimately end up occupying the mainstream position (Kuhn 1962). In any case,
popularity is not necessarily concomitant with usefulness or correctness. Secondly,
without delving too far into the sociological dimension, I am not convinced the
failure of mainstream cognitive science to switch over to an enactive account can
be blamed solely on an absence of mechanistic explanations, nor that their addition
would change this state of affairs dramatically. Enactivism is a relatively young
approach to cognition research and has the unenviable task of forging a path within a
discipline that already possesses a well–established and venerable research paradigm.
The minority status of enactivism is not cause to abandon core principles of the
account.
The second criticism resembles the causal relevance concern (Chapter 1). Ab-
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ramova & Slors (2019) suggest that while dynamical models of social interaction
answer questions at the what–level of the phenomenon, they fail to provide an answer at the how–level. They argue that enactive sociality is missing a justificatory
step: it fails to be explanatory because it is missing a description at the how–level
of cognition. But this absence can, they think, be filled by a mechanistic model.
In this way enactive cognitive science is “compatible with a mechanistic how–level
focus of traditional cognitive science.” (Abramova & Slors 2019, pg. 407) and the
two model explanations are happily integrated.
But I think Abramova & Slors (2019) make two errors here. Firstly, I suggest
that they miss the close connection between the what–level characterisation and the
explanatory goals of enactive cognitive science. If the phenomenon is characterised
as the stable social interactivity unfolding in a system, then providing a mechanistic
story seems to miss the point. Namely, it is not clear what reconceiving the agents
as mechanistic components in the cognitive system adds to an explanation. Froese &
Di Paolo’s (2010) model already explains this phenomenon in a way that matches the
what-level as construed by enactivism—the stability of the interaction is a dynamical
feature of the system, and it is explained dynamically.
One can, of course, argue that this characterisation of cognition as extensively
constituted is wrong (i.e. Adams & Aizawa 2001). But this is ultimately tangential:
the question is not who is correct about the nature of cognition, but how one’s
characterisation of cognition constrains the kinds of how-level explanations that can
possibly serve the explanatory goals that go along with that specific characterisation.
Second, Abramova & Slors assume that this additional how–level description
of enactive sociality must be mechanistic. Consider the way in which mechanistic
explanations are supposed to describe the how–level. Mechanistic explanations are
given “in terms of the structural nature of (causal) interactions between particular
elements that comprise the phenomenon. This is known as identifying a mechanism...” (Abramova & Slors 2019 pg. 412). The “structural nature” of causal
interactions is characterised in interventionist terms—as a series of invariant generalisations that describe how the system would have behaved across all manner of
counterfactual scenarios. Once we have this comprehensive counterfactual story, we
have a description at the how–level (and hence an explanation).
But as I argued in Chapter 1, there are good reasons to think that dynamical
models can provide causal explanations along interventionist lines, and hence get at
the how–level. If the how–level is construed just in these interventionist terms—as
posing and answering one of Woodward’s (2003) what–if–things–had–been–different
questions—then dynamical explanations are perfectly capable of filling in the how–
level. While Abramova & Slors (2018) argue dynamical models alone can’t make
this justificatory step, I disagree that mechanistic details are always and everywhere

CHAPTER 4. EXPLANATORY CHIMERAS

86

required for a how–level description of cognition.
As a final point, I return to the notion of subsumption versus integration. Abramova & Slors (2019) suggest that dynamical models require the deeper how–level
story of a mechanism in order to be explanatory. Looking at the end result of this
manoeuvre, it seems that we no longer get genuine dynamical explanations. This
is because the justificatory step, the detail that provides the explanatory power to
the model, is for this account mechanistic. This closely resembles the existing story
about dynamical models and mechanistic explanation advocated for by mechanists
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2010, 2013; Kaplan & Craver 2011; Kaplan 2015). Taking
this route leads not to genuine integration, but to subsumption.
Their third concern has two parts. If the dynamical explanation offered by
Froese & Di Paolo (2010) for instance is an idealisation and abstraction from actual
human cognition, how can it be said to explain it? Further, they argue that “there
seems to be no simple way to relate the structures and processes that generate
[stable interactions] in the simulated agents versus the ones operational in humans.”
(Abramova & Slors 2019, pg. 412). There are really two concerns here, one about
abstraction/idealisation, and the other about how to show a dynamical explanation
targets some feature of the world absent a mechanistic model to ground it.
The first part can be answered without too much trouble. It is typical of model
explanations to idealise and abstract away features of the target phenomenon—this
is not necessarily detrimental to the explanatory power of said models, is typical of
them, and in fact can enhance their explanatory power (Potochnik 2015). Science
is generally packed full of idealisations and abstractions that permit explanation
and understanding.The fact that dynamical explanations abstract and idealise is
not therefore in itself a problem.
The second part requires unpacking the hidden assumption motivating this
worry. Abramova & Slors (2019) seem to hold that a mechanistic model more
capable of grounding an explanation in some real–world, physical system. But why
should dynamical models be less capable in this regard? Granted, the simulated perceptual crossing model does not necessarily describe human cognition. This really
leaves open several possible interpretations of this state of affairs, though. On the
one hand, we might think this represents a fundamental issue with the dynamical
approach to explanation, since dynamical models fail to get to grips with actual
physical systems.
On the other hand, this could be seen as simply reflecting the development of
a line of investigation from minimal to more complex and specific models that will
provide insight into real–world cognition. And indeed, some dynamical models like
Thelen et al’s (2001) model of infant perseverative reaching do describe in a precise
and reliable fashion the behaviour of real human infants (Chapter 1). Likewise the
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HKB model (also see Chapter 1), while somewhat abstracted in its original form,
has been expanded to integrate neural dynamics in the motor cortex that do tell
us something about human and animal cognition (Lamb & Chemero 2014). If this
is what is meant by “relating” a dynamical model to a real world system, it seems
adequate. If, on the other hand, some deeper ontological grounding is required,
then some argument to the effect that mechanisms are a better foundation than the
dynamical features of a system would be required.

4.3.2

Minimal cognition & the slime mould

The second case for mechanistic integration into enactivism is Walmsley’s (2019)
discussion of minimal cognition and the slime mould. Walmsley (2019) is sensitive
to the fact that enactivists use explanatory strategies and models that will best
serve their particular goals. The kinds of models and explanations that can be used
in service of this goal is necessarily constrained—for instance, models that appeal
to computation and representation are more or less out of the picture (Walmsley
2019).
Nevertheless, this leaves quite a scope for different kinds of models to be used in
service of enactivist explanations, and leaves open the door for explanatory pluralism
about cognition, insofar as explanation is model–based. He also dismisses Hutto &
Myin’s (2017) claim that enactivism is capable of providing the best explanation
for cognitive phenomena, on the basis that explanatory pluralism is generally a
better strategy than monism. I would add to this criticism that one’s definition
of best explanation depends largely on the account of cognition one subscribes to.
Leaving aside the question of whether there can be a singular best explanation of a
phenomenon, there seems to be no common conceptual ground that would allow a
cognitivist and enactivist (for instance) to agree on the best explanation of a given
cognitive phenomenon, since they fundamentally disagree about what cognition is,
and therefore what explanations of it look like.
To illustrate a potential coming together of dynamical and mechanistic models
under enactivism, Walmsley (2019) introduces the slime mould, a frequently used
model biological organism. The mould, also called Physarum, has a physiology combining a spongy type of cell that has muscle–like properties (Gel) with a plasmodium
(Sol) that takes up and transports nutrients around its body. Because of its bodily
structure, Physarum is capable of a range of interesting behaviours. It will roam
and search its environment in order to find food and avoid hazards, grow to reach
food sources, and do so with such cost–efficiency that the networks it creates as
solutions match that of real–world human–generated networks (Tero et al 2010).
An attempt at modelling Physarum’s behaviour can be found in Jones (2015).
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This model presents a quite abstracted and idealised version of the organism, where
its behaviour is modelled as particle agents (representing individual Gel and Sol
cells) which move towards a chemoattractant, while constrained and directed in
their movements by a lattice structure, where each space in this lattice can only
be occupied by one agent at a time. From the behaviour and interactions of these
agents arises an overall oscillatory, searching behaviour that closely resembles that
of the actual Physarum organism.
Schenz et al (2017) further investigate this behaviour by devising a dynamical
model that describes the dynamics of the roaming behaviour that allows Physarum
to search its environment. Physarum uses its own bodily growth as a primary means
of sensing its environment, since it lacks any additional sensory organs: “its growth
front is its sensory organ” (Schenz et al 2017, pg. 11). To continue powering this
growth, Physarum efficiently and adaptively lays down a vein structure, which traces
an efficient path through the organism’s body and transmits body mass from the
rest of its body to its leading edge–the tendrils of growth that spread to explore the
world around it. Hence the vein construction and flow of mass through these are
constantly adapting to match the expansion of its body at the leading edge.
The joint model of these behaviours devised by Schenz et al (2017) successfully
predicts and describes Physarum’s actual behaviour in an experimental setting. But
the model, according to its creators, goes beyond just a phenomenological description of Physarum’s structure: it predicts and describes “key characteristics of the
organism, first and foremost the centre-in-centre trajectory of the main vein, and
also the tree-like vein structure, the rough leading edge profile, or shuttle streaming
were successfully reproduced.” (Schenz et al 2017, pg. 11)
This apparently simple but highly adaptive and responsive behaviour is proposed
by Walmsley (2019) to be a good example of an organism possessing a kind of minimal cognition rooted in sensorimotor interactions with its environment. Enactivists
often claim that their account of cognition does better justice to this kind of “basic”
cognition than do the allegedly over–intellectualised cognitivist accounts (Hutto &
Myin 2017)—hence the slime mould should make excellent fodder for enactive cognitive science. And indeed the success of the dynamical modelling approach to
Physarum suggests a congruence with the dynamicism of enactive cognitive science.
Further, Walmsley (2019) argues that the slime mould’s behaviour is difficult
to characterise as being mechanistic. He introduces Skillings’ (2015) spectra of
isolability, sequentially, and organisation as markers of mechanistic explicability in
biological systems. The slime mould’s behaviour scores low on all three measures.
Its behaviours involve extensive environmental features and so are not easily isolable,
it behaves in a non–sequential fashion, and its activities are not finely organised. Its
“cognition is thoroughly dynamical, involving not only dynamical coupling within
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the plasmodium itself, such as between the contracting granules described by Jones,
but a dynamical coupling with the environment.” (Walmsley 2019, pg. 8)
While this might seem to rule out mechanistic modelling of the slime mould,
Walmsley (2019) suggests instead that a strategic mechanism (Levy 2013) could be
useful in fleshing out the dynamical explanation. A strategically mechanistic approach is not supposed to contribute to an explanation by virtue of its ontologically
revelatory or epistemic virtues, but rather in how it assists in the cognitive process
of understanding a phenomenon, how it contributes strategically to an investigator’s understanding (Levy 2013). On this view, the system is not even necessarily
supposed to really be a mechanism—we can simply think of it as such pragmatically. In this iteration, a mechanistic model of the slime mould simply helps ground
our understanding Physarum by connecting the dynamical model with the physical
features of the mould.
So Walmsley presents an interesting combination of dynamical and mechanistic
models. He accepts that dynamical models can have causal–explanatory power at the
how–level (Chapter 1) and therefore do not require causal–mechanistic augmentation
for that purpose. Schenz et al’s (2017) model, which describes and predicts how
Physarum moves through its environment, and the physical structures that form as
Physarum moves, on this view doesn’t need extra mechanistic detail for it to explain
these features of Physarum’s behaviour. But in addition, Walmsley (2019) proposes
that we could introduce a strategic mechanistic sketch to bolster understanding of
the phenomenon:
...systems can be represented as more mechanistic than they are for the
sake of some epistemic payoff. This means that mechanistic models
compatible with [enactivism’s] view of cognition may still not support
straightforwardly mechanistic explanations of cognition, since mechanistic models may instead demonstrate that interaction between parts is
more explanatorily relevant than individual components and their special
properties. (Walmsley 2019, pg. 10)
But does this proposal produce genuine integration of two model explanations?
I think that, much like Abramova & Slors’ (2019) account, it resembles subsumption
more than integration—though in the opposite direction. In order for the models to
be integrated to serve enactive cognitive science, the offending parts of Mechanism
are removed. Commitments to decomposition, to finding the organised causal entities producing a phenomenon, are abandoned by an appeal to strategic mechanism.
In short, all the things that are supposed to make ontic or epistemic mechanistic
explanations explanatory are absent.
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Once again, I think explanatory goals are responsible for these difficulties. In order to achieve integration, the models concerned need to be able to meet the explanatory goals of the account of cognition in question—enactivism. Since, as Walmsley
(2019) acknowledges, mechanism tends to run contrary to the goals of enactive cognitive science, its integration alongside dynamical models is made difficult. Hence
the offending parts of mechanism—its ontological and epistemic requirements—need
to be stripped out, leaving only a pragmatic, strategic mechanism that doesn’t demand a mechanistic how–level be part of the explanation. While Walmsley’s (2019)
account succeeds, it does so in part by relinquishing mechanist commitments regarding the necessity of a causal–mechanistic description for explanation. As such,
most mechanists will regard this as subsumption, not integration, wherein the form
of explanation is fundamentally dynamical with some added mechanistic detail.

4.4

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that attempts to integrate dynamical and mechanistic models within enactive cognitive science are not successful integrations. This is
largely because of differing explanatory goals: mechanistic explanation is designed
to serve the explanatory goals of traditional cognitivism by providing a multi–level
story of how the physical substrates of cognitive phenomena can be functionally
(and causal–mechanically) decomposed and localised. Meanwhile, enactivism eschews decomposition and localisation in favour of dynamically explaining cognitive
phenomena by describing the unfolding of extensive, constitutive relations between
features of a system over time. Abramova & Slors’ (2019) integrative proposal ends
up in subsumption of dynamical models into mechanistic explanation, and hence is
not genuine integration. Walmsley (2019) on the other hand subsumes mechanism
into dynamical explanation, making a more enactive-friendly proposal but not one,
I argue, that results in genuine integration.

Chapter 5
An Explanatory Taste for
Mechanisms
Mechanistic explanations, according to some proponents, are objective
explanations (Craver 2007, 2014). Mechanistic standards of explanation are derived objectively from nature, and are thereby insulated from
the values of investigators, since explanation is an objectively defined
achievement grounded in the causal structure of the world (Craver 2014).
I call this position the closure of explanatory standards. I raise two problems with it. First, mechanists rely on several ontological claims which,
while plausible, fail to guarantee the objectivity of mechanistic explanatory standards to the degree of certainty required. Second, mechanists
themselves introduce a value–laden explanatory standard—the 3M requirement (Kaplan & Craver 2011)—which undermines the closure of
explanatory standards. I show how in practice the standards of mechanistic explanation are guided by explanatory taste, shorthand for background contextual values that influence our standards of explanation.
Ontic mechanists have a particular taste for control, and gerrymander
explanatory standards in order to obtain it. Instead of being derived from
nature, objectivity comes instead from intersubjective criticism, which
renders visible the contextual values of communities of investigators and
allows them to be controlled for (Longino 1990).
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Introduction

The goal of separating the explanatory wheat from the merely descriptive chaff is
a common feature of accounts of scientific explanation: what must a description do
to graduate to the status of explanation? More often than not this task involves
the codification of standards of explanation—the rules by which we judge explanatoriness. Historically, different accounts have required that explanations subsume
observations under laws of nature (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948), unify phenomena
(Kitcher 1989), or describe the underlying causal structure of the world that lead
to a phenomenon’s occurrence (Salmon 1984). Mechanism, my target in this paper,
fits into this last category.
Originating with Craver (2007) one of the more influential strands of Mechanism
argues that mechanistic models become explanations when they correctly and completely describe the mechanism responsible for a phenomenon. According to this
account –ontic mechanism, sometimes called mechanistic realism (Craver & Kaplan
2011)–descriptions become objective explanations when they correspond to the real
mechanisms that occupy nature (Craver 2007, 2014; Craver & Kaplan 2018). Explanations already exist in the world in the form of mechanisms; it is simply the
scientist’s job to describe them. Descriptive models therefore become explanations
by dint of how closely and completely they represent this mechanistic explanation–
in–the–world.
Craver (2014) extends this ontic picture by suggesting that by virtue of its objectivity, Mechanism is the guide to a cross–cultural, universal and objective means
of causally explaining phenomena, at least within the special sciences (Craver 2014).
There is consequently no possibility for explanatory standards to differ across times
and places, across sociocultural contexts and with respect to the values and goals
of investigators, other than as deviations from the correct mechanistic standards
(Craver 2014). I call this position the closure of explanatory standards.
This line of thinking appears to motivate Craver’s (2014) declaration of independence:
...my topic is independent of psychological questions about the kinds of
explanation that human cognitive agents tend to produce or tend to accept. Clearly, people often accept as explanations a great many things
that they should reject as such. And people in different cultures might
have different criteria for accepting or rejecting explanations. These facts
(if they are facts) would be fascinating to anthropologists, psychologists,
and sociologists. But they are not relevant to the philosophical problem
of stating when a scientific explanation ought to be accepted as such.
In the view defended here, scientific explanation is a distinctive kind of
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achievement that cultures and individuals have to learn to make. Individual explanatory judgments, or cultural trends in such, are not data
to be honored by a normative theory that seeks to specify when such
judgments go right and when they go wrong. (Craver 2014, pg. 29)
Mechanistic standards of scientific explanation, on this view, are insulated from
sociocultural, psychological and other influences traditionally viewed as non–scientific
otherwise known as contextual values (Longino 1990). These contextual values are
seen by ontic mechanism as an obstacle to the task of building an account of scientific
explanation. In Craver’s (2014) view, while the role of contextual values in science
may indicate interesting vectors of research regarding how scientific explanation is
done by value–driven investigators, and is potentially “fascinating to anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists” (Craver 2014, pg. 29) it tells us nothing about
what explanations actually are or how they ought to be done. Worse, by allowing
contextual values to influence our standards of explanation, we potentially corrupt
the hard–won independence of science from outside influences that are “not relevant
to the philosophical problem of stating when a scientific explanation ought to be
accepted as such” (Craver 2014, pg. 29).
With this ontic mechanistic account in mind, I pick out two potential lines of
criticism. First, I probe at the ontic mechanists‘ claim that mechanistic standards
of explanation are objective: does the underlying ontic argument support the claim,
and give us good reasons to believe that mechanistic explanations are objective?
Second, I test the closure of explanatory standards: do ontic mechanists provide
good reasons to believe that mechanism’s standards of explanation are thereby insulated from contextual values?
I argue on both counts there are substantial reasons to think not, at least based
on the arguments offered by the ontic mechanist camp so far. Their account depends on a sequence of metaphysical claims that provide not just plausibility, but a
guarantee that nature is mechanistic, and hence nature offers us objective mechanistic standards of explanation. Despite the centrality of this claim to the project of
mechanistic objectivity, there is surprisingly little argumentation for it on offer—and
while plausible, the existing arguments fail to provide the required guarantee. I also
argue that the model–to–mechanism–mapping (3M) requirement endorsed by ontic
mechanists as an additional explanatory standard (Kaplan & Craver 2011, Kaplan
2015) undermines the closure of explanatory standards, since in advancing 3M they
incorporate an explicitly normative, value–laden standard of explanation into ontic
mechanism.
This breakdown in the closure of explanatory standards reveals the value–laden
character of mechanistic standards of explanation, which are constituted at least in
part by contextual values. I propose that modes of explanation and their explan-
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atory standards, the means by which we formulate and select successful explanations, are entangled with our explanatory taste. Explanatory taste is the product
of the contextual values that impinge on our thinking about what the status of
explanation requires. The selection of standards of explanation is typically an act
of gerrymandering—the chosen standards allow us to elevate those descriptions we
favour to the status of explanations and exclude those sorts of descriptions we have
no taste for. Mechanism itself is a prime example of this explanatory taste at work,
valuing descriptions that offer control over phenomena via the standard of completeness. Overall, I wish to present a cautionary perspective regarding the scope
and limits of mechanistic explanation and suggest that its claims to objectivity and
exclusivity are less than certain.

5.2

Mechanist explanation and objectivity

Mechanistic explanation is a popular account of causal explanation, with a particular
focus on the cognitive and biological sciences. The basic explanatory unit in a mechanistic explanation is a mechanism, and its associated phenomenon. A mechanism
is defined as “...a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts,
component operations, and their organization.” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, pg.
423). It is this mechanism which produces, underlies or is otherwise responsible for
the phenomenon.
Core to mechanistic explanation is the notion that explanations ought to speak
to causes; they “must include reference to causal relationships if they are to distinguish good explanations from bad” (Craver 2007, pg. 8). Similarly important (and
almost universal) in the contemporary mechanist literature is its appeal to interventionism (Woodward 2003) as a means of locating these causal relations. In brief, if
an intervention on the value of X causes a change in the value of Y (all other things
remaining equal) then it describes a causal relationship. These variables can stand
in for various features of the world: the cell became cancerous because it mutated;
the ion channel opened because of a potential difference across the membrane, etc.
Describing these causal connections, which form the causal structure of the world,
is ultimately what describes a mechanism.

5.2.1

The ontic argument & the aetiology of objectivity

Why does a description of a mechanism become an explanation? Some explanatory
standards are required to answer that question. To that end, ontic mechanists
advance an account that purports to present an objectively derived set of explanatory
standards. They claim that Mechanism does not explain nature merely in the sense
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that its models are illuminating, enhance understanding or are useful to human
endeavours:
“Objective explanations are not texts; they are full–bodied things. They
are facts, not representations” (Craver 2007, p. 27)
Good mechanistic explanations are objectively explanatory; and mechanistic explanations are objective explanations (Craver 2007). These objective explanations are
meant to reveal the true mechanistic workings of nature that are waiting out there
to be discovered; they shed light on objective ontic structures (Craver 2014). Ontic
mechanists make a sequence of supporting claims to advance the notion that mechanisms provide objective explanations. These claims are ontological in nature; they
assert that nature is mechanistic, comprised of mechanisms, and our explanations
should track this mechanistic reality.
(1) Mechanisms are real
Mechanisms are real entities that really do produce or underlie the phenomena
we observe in nature. They are not merely useful fictions constructed as a part of
scientific investigation, but “things in the world” (Glennan & Illari 2018a, pg. 2).
The view that mechanisms are real, and that this is significant for their explanatory
potential, is broadly shared by prominent ontic mechanists, for instance Glennan &
Illari (2018b):
“...let us consider whether and in what sense these varieties of mechanisms are real. Our language has been realist. Mechanisms are things in
the world...” (pg. 99).
Glennan’s (2017) account of mechanism presents a similar view, where “...mechanisms and their constituents are things in the world that exist independently of
the models we make of them” (pg. 10). Talking about mechanisms in cognitive
science, Craver & Kaplan (2011) claim that ontic mechanists “expect to ground the
taxonomy of cognitive and neural phenomena in objective facts about the mechanistic structure of the brain. By learning which mechanisms are distinct from which
others, one can carve the mind–brain at its joints.” (pg. 276).
This claim is important because it functions as a lynchpin of objectivity—it
guarantees that mechanisms aren‘t merely forms of description, fictions or idealisations, but real things, and when we find them, we carve nature at its joints. This
also points to something of a schism within mechanism between the ontic mechanists, and the epistemic mechanists (Illari 2013). These subdivisions support similar
methods and explanatory standards, but provide different justifications for them.
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Epistemic mechanists (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel 2015) are more concerned with how mechanistic explanations enhance understanding of phenomena;
representing the ontic side, Craver (2007) is concerned with explaining by revealing the objectively existing causal structure of the world. The ontic mechanists
are strict realists about mechanisms, while epistemic mechanists do not consider
the ontological status of mechanisms to be important for articulating an account of
mechanistic explanation.
As a consequence epistemic mechanists are criticised precisely because this view
allegedly abandons anything except epistemic commitments, including objectivity
(Craver 2014; Kaiser 2018). Because epistemic mechanism doesn‘t claim to identify
real mechanisms, “it is too weak to serve as a guide to the norms that distinguish
good explanations from bad and complete explanations from incomplete.” (Craver
2007, pg. 28)
(2) Mechanisms are explanatorily obligatory
Following from (1), ontic mechanists also accept that mechanisms are not just
one kind of explanatorily relevant thing among many that inhabit the world. Mechanisms are (at least within the ‘’special sciences”) precisely what is relevant to
explaining phenomena in those domains. There may be other things that figure in a
mechanistic ontology, but the explanatorily relevant things are mechanisms (Craver
2014). Put another way, mechanisms are both necessary and sufficient for causal
explanation, at least as far as cognitive and biological sciences are concerned.
This position allows non–mechanistic models to be utilised towards this end of
describing mechanisms, since they are still ultimately means of getting at mechanisms (Kaplan 2015); on the other hand they fail at being explanatory if they are not
mapped or grafted to a mechanism in some way. Consequently I take ontic mechanists to hold the position that mechanisms are explanatorily obligatory: descriptions
of mechanisms, as well as supporting non–mechanistic models (like mathematical
models) that help elucidate features of mechanisms, are necessary and sufficient for
our objective explanatory purposes.
(3) Objective explanatory standards can be derived from nature.
If mechanisms really do produce or underlie phenomena, and descriptions thereof
are explanatorily adequate, this then affords mechanists a straightforward way of
obtaining standards of explanation. Mechanistic standards of explanation must be
geared towards revealing these explanations in the world:
The complete constitutive explanation for a given explanandum, in this
ontic sense, includes everything relevant (that is, everything that makes
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a difference) to the precise phenomenon in question.(Craver & Kaplan
2018, pg. 14)
Complete neuroscientific explanations are distinguished from incomplete
explanations...by the fact that complete explanations capture all of the
relevant causal relations among the components in a mechanism.” (Craver
2007 pg. 61–62)
A key mechanistic standard of explanation is completeness. Completeness, according to ontic mechanists, is not a subjective or pragmatic criterion but rather
a reference to a state of affairs in nature—what counts as complete is whatever
correctly represents the objective mechanism comprehensively. Whatever allows us
to get at the objective explanation waiting in the world, describe all the relevant
causal and constitutive relations, and exclude irrelevant relations, are consequently
the objective standards of explanation:
Good mechanistic explanatory texts...are good in part because they correctly represent objective explanations. Complete explanatory texts are
complete because they represent all and only the relevant portions of the
causal structure of the world.(Craver 2007, pg. 27)
This condition of relevance also demonstrates the connection between completeness and the aforementioned notion of carving nature at its joints that ontic mechanists subscribe to. When a feature of the world is ruled to be relevant to an explanation, this means it really is a part of the mechanism producing the phenomenon of
interest.
Hence completeness is the definitive mechanistic explanatory standard. Interventionism makes this standard achievable, since it permits investigators to find
what features are relevant—and hence required for a complete description of a
mechanism—and which features of the world are irrelevant. Completely describing (accurately) the causal structure of the world—a mechanism—underlying the
explanandum phenomenon is what graduates a description to an explanation.
(4) Mechanistic explanations are objective explanations.
If nature really is comprised of mechanisms, mechanisms are what we need to
describe in order to explain, and our ways of explaining them are derived from the
objective causal structure of nature, then mechanistic explanations ought to explain
objectively.
I group these claims (1)—(4) together as the ontic argument.
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Closure of explanatory standards, and a declaration

of independence One consequence of this account is the closure of explanatory standards. If explanatory standards are objectively derived from nature, then there is no
room for anything else to determine them. Other potentially explanatorily relevant features of a model are not necessary for explanation. In addition, contextual
values, goals, biases, background beliefs and so on simply have nowhere to get any
purchase. These standards are already determined by objective, universally available
facts about nature, whether we like it or not (Craver 2014).
Having established closure, Craver (2014) makes his declaration of independence, according to which the question of what explanations are (and what explanatory standards support them) is insulated from context. Contextual values are, in
Craver’s view, not relevant to how modes of explanations are formulated. Mechanisms are really out there producing phenomena and provide us with objective
standards of explanation for those phenomena. People may mistakenly believe that
context—the goals and values they want an account of explanation to support, for
instance—can be decisive to the shape explanations take, but if Craver is to be
believed, they are objectively wrong.
To make the position even starker, in Craver’s view no features of an investigator or community of investigators can have any bearing standards of explanation,
since mechanistic explanations and explanatory standards are stable across contexts.
Anyone interested in explaining nature (at least where nature is comprised of mechanisms) must, to do the job properly, locate certain timeless, universal truths about
mechanistic explanation in order to explain. Whether I am investigating the world
in prehistory before the written word, or tapping on a keyboard in the 21st century
the same standards apply; the only proper standards of explanation are mechanistic
ones. Including anything else inserted into our explanatory standards serves only to
muddy the waters.

5.3

Critique of mechanistic objectivity

This ontic mechanist argument raises some questions. First of all, Craver’s (2014)
claim about the closure of explanatory standards is phrased as a sort of guarantee.
What underpins this guarantee of closure is the ontic argument. So, to be certain
about the closure of explanatory standards, we need to be certain of the undergirding
ontic argument. If the ontic argument is taken to really reflect what is, distinct
from human pragmatic concerns, there must be some good reasons to believe the
constituent claims.
It is important here to reiterate the direction of the justification for closure. The
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ontic mechanist claim is not that the explanatory successes of mechanism should
make us confident of this mechanist ontology. The reasoning is the reverse: because
we are already so certain about the ontic argument, we can derive from it a set of explanatory standards that guarantee objectivity; “the norms of scientific explanation
fall out of a prior commitment on the part of scientific investigators to describe the
relevant ontic structures in the world.” (Craver 2014, pg. 41) The ontic argument
is the bedrock upon which his account of objective explanation is built, at least
according to Craver’s characterisation.
The immediate problem with this position is that it requires an assumption—
the ontic argument—to work as a guarantee. Assumptions are not guarantees, and
so this “prior commitment” to a mechanistic ontology fails to provide the necessary
guarantee of objectivity. But perhaps the ontic mechanistic account is able to offer
further reasons to believe that a mechanistic ontology falls out of a mechanistic
science.
Imagine the scenario that (1) were not known with certainty. If that were the
case, then it seems that the mechanist conclusion—that mechanistic explanations
are objective explanations—would be a little less certain. Unless we have good reasons to believe that nature is indeed made up of mechanisms, then there remains
the plausible case where nature is not made up of mechanisms. In other words, if
(1) were brought into doubt, the entire ontic argument undergirding the objectivity of mechanistic explanation would also be in trouble. If nature isn‘t really full
of mechanisms producing phenomena, then there is no guarantee that striving for
complete descriptions of mechanisms would lead us to an objective explanation. To
be clear, these claims may still be of some epistemic value if either were shown to
be uncertain on the ontic side of things. But critically they would not support (4).
I labour the point in order to make the stakes quite clear. The mechanist
project puts a large stock in its objectivity. This is because if it fails to be objective,
mechanism loses the edge it claims to have over other modes of explanation; it
ceases to be the exclusive account of causal explanation. Most importantly, (though
I leave this point for a later section) such a failure would undermine the closure of
explanatory standards.
With these stakes in mind, I will review the evidence for these supporting claims,
focusing mainly on (1). Let us also bear in mind the fairly high standards mechanists
have set for themselves here. It is not just supposed to be likely, possible, or even
just plausible that (for instance) mechanisms are real and explanatorily adequate.
Claims (1) through (4) are meant to be such a certainty that mechanism can lock
out all other considerations about explanatory standards.

CHAPTER 5. AN EXPLANATORY TASTE FOR MECHANISMS

5.3.1

100

The mechanist case

Craver (2007) holds to a straightforward realist argument in service of the ontological
argument, specifically (1)—if we can observe entities engaged in causal relationships
via ideal interventions, then we can take those things to be real. The obverse of this
claim is that if we cannot empirically observe something through an intervention, it
does not exist:
There is no evidence that souls or entelechies exist...We cannot intervene with predictable outcomes to change souls and entelechies...we are
justifiably suspicious of claims that such things exist. But none of these
reasonable criteria fails for higher–level items in neuroscience. Molecules,
neurons, brain regions, and brain systems all clearly satisfy these standards.(Craver 2007, pg. 15)
As Craver indicates here, interventionism is meant to allow the carving of nature
at its joints, and provide confidence about the existence of mechanisms, since it gives
us fairly clear criteria for when we have or have not observed entities engaged in a
causal relationship. Being able to describe nature in terms of fine–grained relationships between causally–linked variables ought to reveal to us the true underlying
structure of nature.
The ontic mechanist picture leans heavily on ideal interventions as a method that
allows us to “carve nature at its joints” and locate the real entities that underlie
phenomena. This also suggests that interventions and the causal relations they
reveal are an objective feature of the world—that interventions give us neutral,
observer–independent findings. But while interventionism is capable of doing plenty
of heavy lifting for mechanism, it is not clear that it can perform this role as well.

5.3.2

Underdetermination

One concern with this realist argument is the plausibility of interventions alone delivering a mechanistic ontology. Craver’s picture here seems to imagine interventions
as a net that can be cast out into the world, which will bring in neutral, objective
(and mechanistic) facts about nature, and which subsequently reinforce the idea
that the ontic structure of the world is mechanistic. But the interpretation of that
data gained via interventions as confirming or disconfirming a particular ontology,
be it of neurons and brain regions or souls and entelechies, is decidedly not neutral
in the way Craver requires.
Craver & Kaplan (2011) themselves raise this substantial problem with an
intervention–generated ontology within the domain of cognitive science. They note
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that pre–existing theory and assumptions are decisive to how investigators interpret incoming data. For instance, the interpretation of interventions in the form of
double dissociation experiments has permitted cognitive neuroscientists to localise
particular brain functions within distinct brain regions. However, these findings
depend on several assumptions, e.g. that the brain is functionally modular, and of
the validity of the standard taxonomy of mental functions. Craver & Kaplan (2011)
concede this potentially leads to a kind of circularity where “our ability to carve the
brain into distinct mechanisms requires some idea of what those mechanisms do,
and this requires some commitment about which capacities require explanations.”
(pg. 76)
This acknowledges the basic problem with Craver’s realist argument, which resembles Quine’s (1951, 1975) problem of underdetermination: data alone is not
enough to objectively determine which of many possible interpretations of that data
is correct. Any investigation of a phenomenon will bring with it pre–existing commitments that colour the interpretation of the results of any empirical test.
For instance, the ontic mechanist account assumes a necessary connection between
interventions and mechanisms. When ontic mechanisms talk about locating causal
relations, to them it necessarily follows that this relationship reveals (a portion of) a
mechanism. But while interventionism is amenable to describing causal mechanisms,
there is no necessary connection between the two. Woodward (2013a) specifies that
non–mechanistic explanations can be performed using interventions as well. Much
like Craver & Kaplan’s (2011) double dissociation example, pre–existing assumptions
are what binds together interventions and mechanisms. Although ontic mechanists
assume that any successful intervention indicates a successfully located mechanism,
“any use of interventions in science are epistemic and come only from a human recognizing the intervention as providing knowledge about a mechanism.” (Machamer
2004, pg. 28).
Hence by themselves, interventions are typically insufficient to confirm or disconfirm the existence of particular entities in an objective manner. Since we are
always entering into investigations of nature with hypotheses and theories that propose a certain state of affairs for testing (for instance, that nature is full of causal
mechanisms, or that the brain is modular), the interpretation of interventions is
always done through such a lens.
Consequently, a dependency on interventions to carve nature at its joints simply
results in circularity. None of this is to say that interventionism cannot be used to
investigate what kinds of entities might exist in the world, only that interventions
alone cannot provide us with objective causal facts which we can then add right into
the corpus of a mechanistic ontology.
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Non–mechanistic reification

Another related problem for this realist argument is that interventionism can find
causes without mechanisms, so long as one’s interpretation of intervention data is
non–mechanistic. Dynamical models, for instance, describe more abstract mathematical variables detached from mechanisms that can be intervened upon to establish
causal relations in precisely the same way as mechanistic models (Meyer 2018). If
the sole criterion of the ontic mechanist account to establish the existence of something is that a part of the world can be intervened upon, then the dynamics of a
system ought to be just as much a part of our ontology. This would mean that a
non–mechanistic part of the causal structure of the world can do explanatory work,
and would suggest that part holds equal ontic status alongside more traditional
mechanistic entities. Such an outcome does not square with a mechanistic ontology,
which holds that mechanisms are the only explanatorily relevant things out there in
nature.
Take for instance the oft–cited case of the Haken–Kelso–Bunz (HKB) model of
bimanual coordination (Haken et al 1985). This dynamical model describes and
predicts with great accuracy how bimanual coordination (in this instance, wagging
the index fingers on both hands simultaneously) falls into in–phase and anti–phase
patterns depending on the frequency of the oscillations. The model is described by
the following differential equation:

Where is relative phase, and the ratio b/a represents the inverse of the frequency
of bimanual oscillations. Intervening on b/a causes changes in φ and hence the
HKB model describes a causal dependency between these variables (Chapter 1).
Consequently, this causal relationship forms part of a causal, dynamical explanation
of bimanual coordination. Here we seem to meet Craver’s realist requirements: since
intervention data is all that is required to confirm that an entity belongs in our
ontology, then these dynamical variables should be granted the same ontic status
as, say, the opening or closing of ion channels during the neuronal action potential.
However, this would surely be counted as an unwanted reification of merely
mathematical variables from the ontic mechanist perspective. An ontic mechanist
might wish to reply by either suggesting that there is something more metaphysically
fundamental or real about mechanistic components as opposed to a dynamical property of a system; or by adding new criteria to ensure that only canonical mechanistic
entities can be granted this ontological status via interventions.
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The former response has quite a challenge ahead of it. Mechanists hewing to
this line of argument have to show how objects like neurons and brain regions are
“more real” than dynamical features of a system without appealing to the outcomes
of interventions. The latter response has proven the more popular one, defended in
the form of the 3M requirement, which I will address later in Section 4.

5.3.4

Consequences for mechanistic objectivity

With the certainty of mechanistic objectivity in question, Craver’s (2014) declaration of independence seems to be on shakier foundations. Now that the claims
undergirding the objectivity of mechanism are shown to be more a set of assumptions than ontological certainties upon which an objective mode of explanation can
hang, the closure of explanatory standards can be broken open.

5.4

The 3M requirement

I have just raised a few concerns with the guarantee (or lack thereof) of ontic mechanism’s undergirding assumptions. In this section, I will raise another distinct problem
with the account. So far, I have dealt with that ontic account’s reliance on uncertain
ontological claims for objectivity. Here I investigate how the ontic mechanist account
undermines its own claim to objectivity by incorporating a normative explanatory
standard—the 3M requirement.

5.4.1

The requirement

The model–to–mechanism–mapping (3M) requirement grew out of debates surrounding the explanatory power of non–mechanistic, dynamical models in the cognitive sciences. Dynamicists claimed that the descriptive and predictive successes of
dynamical models elevated them to the status of genuine explanations (Stepp et al
2011, Chemero & Silberstein 2008). Dynamicists appealed to various arguments to
this effect, including the equivalence of prediction with explanation, and adherence
to a covering–law model of scientific explanation (Walmsley 2008). More recently I
have used the very same interventionist method core to mechanistic explanation as
an argument for causal dynamical explanations (Chapter 1).
In response to the encroachment of the increasingly popular notion of dynamical
explanations into cognitive science, mechanists (Kaplan 2011, Kaplan & Craver
2011) devised 3M. It requires that, in order to be an explanation, any model must
show how its features (for instance, the variables in a dynamical model) “map onto”
the components of an underlying mechanism. The assumption expressed here is
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that any causal relationship in a dynamical model actually reduces down to a causal
relation present in the underlying mechanism:
(3M) A model of a target phenomenon explains that phenomenon to the
extent that (a) the variables in the model correspond to identifiable components, activities, and organizational features of the target mechanism
that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies posited among these (perhaps mathematical) variables in the model correspond to causal relations among
the components of the target mechanism.” (Kaplan 2011, pg. 347)
By introducing 3M, Kaplan & Craver (2011) create an additional explanatory
standard that works to exclude potential dynamical (or otherwise non–mechanistic)
explanations that meet the existing interventionist requirements to be a causal explanation. No non–mechanistic model, at least within certain domains of science,
can provide us with genuine causal explanations along interventionist lines if 3M
is to be believed. This presents a serious challenge to the possibility of causal yet
non–mechanistic explanations. If any apparent dynamical explanation necessarily
reduces down to a mechanistic explanation, then dynamical explanations are not an
explanatory alternative and are subsumed under mechanism.
However, 3M is interesting in that Kaplan & Craver (2011) explicitly acknowledge its normative character. They claim that 3M “is justified in part because it
makes sense of scientific–commonsense judgments about the norms of explanation”
(Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg. 602):
The 3M constraint is the mechanist’s gauntlet: a default assumption
that the phenomena of cognitive and systems neuroscience have mechanistic explanations, like so many other phenomena in the special sciences,
and that cognitive and systems neuroscientists ought to (and often do)
demand that explanations reveal the mechanisms underlying the phenomena they seek to explain. (Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg. 603–604)
Their case against the dynamicists, they claim, is justified because dynamicists
who defy or reject 3M fail to meet the ‘’scientific commonsense” judgement that
good explanations “correctly identify features of the causal structures that produce,
underlie, or maintain the explanandum phenomena.” (Kaplan & Craver 2011, pg.
607). It is this appeal to the normative, the “commonsense”, that comes back to bite
the ontic mechanist account by undermining the closure of explanatory standards.
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The problem of 3M

Recall the reasoning behind the closure of explanatory standards: because of their
objective character, mechanistic standards of explanation are immune to all sociocultural and otherwise normative judgements. These kinds of judgements only
reflect the contextual values of investigators and cannot be admitted to the genuinely
objective set of explanatory standards.
Yet, 3M is explicitly just this kind of thing. It is a mechanistic explanatory
standard, advanced as part of the ontic mechanist project, yet it is explicitly normative in character. Its justification is decidedly contextual—as Kaplan & Craver
(2011) point out when they suggest that 3M is justified as an additional explanatory standard because it represents the judgements or expectations of a community
of scientists and philosophers of science; it helps exclude potential explanations that
do not suit their values or goals.
It seems difficult, then, to reconcile Craver’s (2014) declaration of independence
with the actual explanatory standards ontic mechanists abide by and endorse. On
the one hand, he claims that mechanistic standards of explanation are objectively
derived from nature, immune to normative criteria. On the other, Craver and Kaplan are happy to include a normative criterion with the same ability to determine
explanatory power (or lack thereof) as the existing explanatory standards. Even if
there were strong reasons to believe that mechanistic standards of explanation were
objective, the inclusion of 3M serves to undermine confidence in that claim.

5.5

Explanatory taste

The ontic mechanist claim that objectivity is a bulwark against the intrusion of
contextual values into their standards of explanation is not well–founded. Their use
of uncertain ontic claims to guarantee the certainty of the closure of explanatory
standards, coupled with the normative character of 3M, undermines the ontic mechanist guarantee that mechanistic explanations are objective explanations, outside of
time and place.
How to understand these mechanistic explanatory standards, then, if not as
spawned straight from objectivity? To that end, I introduce the notion of explanatory taste. The term refers to the taste—emphasising its contextual nature—of
investigators both scientific and philosophical for certain sorts of explanation. To
this end, philosophers of science habitually gerrymander explanatory standards in
order to include into canon those things they see as proper explanations, and exclude
those they do not.
To understand what is considered explanatory versus non–explanatory—what
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investigators have a taste for and what they do not—it becomes necessary to look
at the uses investigators have in mind for explanations. The demarcation line for
explanations is typically drawn via explanatory standards along pragmatic lines,
namely the perceived end goal of a given mode of inquiry into nature. To return
to a historical case, Hempel’s (1965) account of covering law explanations was engineered to provide the desired understanding of phenomena, where understanding
was equated with having shown how events in nature were to be expected, where
that expectation is provided by a deductive or inductive argument. Logical positivists or empiricists like Hempel had a particular explanatory taste that reflected the
broader goals of their project: understanding nature in terms of a series of verifiable
statements.

5.5.1

The contextual values of mechanism

Ontic mechanists, similarly, are concerned with explanations that serve particular
purposes, though theirs differ from those motivating the covering law model. They
are interested not with arguments that provide understanding, but with explanations
that yield practical control in the biomedical sciences and better our ability to control
biology and cognition. 3M reveals explicitly the “commonsense judgements” that
motivate the gerrymandering of explanatory standards. Dynamical explanations
are judged the wrong sort of thing to be genuinely explanatory. They are not
to mechanist tastes, and 3M is therefore summoned to bar the gates against a
dynamical encroachment on explanation.
In this section I argue, quite to the contrary of the ontic mechanist refrain, that
mechanism is heavily influenced by the contextual values of investigators. In fact,
the centrality of various contextual values to mechanistic explanation is a pervasive
theme. Consider a few exemplary quotes from Craver’s (2007) canonical account of
ontic mechanism:
One way to justify the norms that I discuss is by assessing the extent to
which those norms produce explanations that are potentially useful for
intervention and control. While this is not the only touchstone that one
might use, it is nonetheless one, and it is objective.” (Craver 2007 pg.
x, emphasis added)
...I develop a view of explanation that does justice to the exemplars of
explanation in neuroscience and to the standards by which these explanations are evaluated.” (Craver 2007, pg. 1–2)
If neuroscience succeeds in this...goal, it will open medical possibilities
that now seem like science fiction, and it will provide human beings
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(for good or ill) with new and powerful forms of control over the human
condition.” (Craver 2007, pg. 2, emphasis added)
...unlike some areas of fundamental physics, the search for neuroscientific
explanations is driven by goals of treating illnesses, improving brain function, preventing cognitive decline, and developing new ways to manipulate and record from the brain in the laboratory. Explanation is a tool
for determining how to intervene into the brain and manipulate it for
our various purposes.” (Craver 2007, pg. 38, emphasis added)
To repeat a central theme: causal relevance, explanation, and control
are intimately connected with one another. This is particularly true in
biomedical sciences, such as neuroscience, that are driven not merely by
intellectual curiosity about the structure of the world, but more fundamentally by the desire (and the funding) to cure diseases, to better the
human condition, and to make marketable products.” (Craver 2007, pg.
93)
There are clear themes running through Craver’s rationale for an account of
mechanistic explanation: concerns about human control over biomedical phenomena; pragmatic concerns about efficacy in medicine; the onerous matter of obtaining
funding; justification of certain hypotheses for pragmatic ends; a confidence in neuroscience and what neuroscientists consider to be canonical explanations.
Most telling is the way Craver speaks about explanation and the pragmatic
goal of control. Mechanistic explanation is, as Craver says above, not driven merely
by “intellectual curiosity” but by a need to control phenomena “for our various
purposes”; “[s]uch explanations are useful precisely because they identify loci in
a mechanism that can be commandeered for the purposes of control.” (Craver
2007 pg. 200). This notion of control, of explanation as an inspection that yields
various levers for the fine–grained manipulation of nature, is a mechanist contextual
value which finds itself reflected in mechanistic standards of explanation. Control is
valued—it is to the explanatory tastes of ontic mechanists—precisely because it is
perceived to serve these pragmatic ends.
I argue that the explanatory standard of completeness results from this taste
for control. Completeness is born of the contextual values of mechanist–oriented
investigators: specifically, the goal of control over a phenomenon. This connection
between the two notions has not gone unacknowledged:
The pragmatic import of developing norms of mechanistic completeness
links to the fact that mechanistic explanations often provide the rationale
for developing technologies for gaining control over phenomena, such as
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experimental techniques and medical treatments. (Baetu 2015, pg. 779–
780)
Ontic mechanists want explanations that afford control over certain phenomena
in certain ways—this is their explanatory taste. Mechanists themselves, as I have
illustrated, frequently stress the tight relationship between their pragmatic goal of
control, and the explanatory standard of completeness. To that end, they have
developed standards of explanation, specifically completeness, designed to equate
control over nature with explanation.
Ontic mechanists also conceptualise control a certain way, as mapping to a
certain picture of the world occupied by mechanistic entities and their activities.
Control is by definition achieved through interventions (or at least the possibly of
interventions) on these mechanisms. While dynamical models arguably offer similar levels of control over their target phenomena, the ontological commitments that
are foundational to the ontic mechanist project simply do not admit of this competition. Mechanists do not deny that dynamical models are capable of impressive
description and prediction of phenomena, but they certainly do deny their ontological import and hence their capacity to exhibit genuine control. To admit that
dynamical models afford control over phenomena is tantamount to denying a mechanistic ontology, which does not allow non–mechanistic features of the world to be
considered explanatory. If this were allowed, it would be the same as admitting that
mechanistic explanations do not uniquely capture an objective reality. Mechanistic
explanations would accordingly no longer be stable across contexts by dint of their
uniquely objective correspondence to nature and hence surrender their objectivity.

5.5.2

What becomes of objectivity?

I have given reasons to reject the notion that mechanistic explanations are objective
explanations, at least in the manner prescribed by ontic mechanists. In doing so
I have deferred to a standard view of objectivity, where the objectivity of science
means value–freedom, impartiality and the absence of perspective. Objectivity in
this sense “is bound up with questions about the truth and referential character of
scientific theories, that is, with scientific realism” (Longino 1990, pg. 62). Objectivity is achieved when science accurately reveals the real world, when “it is a correct
view of the objects to be found in the world and of their relations with each other.”
(Longino 1990, pg. 62); its criteria for theory selection and success are “nonarbitrary and nonsubjective” (Longino 1990, pg. 62). This is the notion of objectivity
preferred by the ontic mechanists.
There is however another notion of objectivity that is detached from these commitments. On this alternative view of objectivity, it is accepted that science cannot
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be purged of the prior commitments or perspectives of investigators—science is
not value–free, impartial and absent perspective, and so “it would be a mistake to
identify the objectivity of scientific methods with their empirical features alone”
(Longino 1990 pg. 75). In the case of ontic mechanism, it is a mistake to think
interventions provide objectivity. Between data and hypothesis—intervention and
mechanism—there remains an interpretive gap where values determine the sorts of
hypotheses that are selected, and the standards by which they are selected.
Instead objectivity can be thought of as an achievement founded on intersubjective criticism. When the commitments of a community of investigators are subjected to public critique from different critical perspectives, where those perspectives
represent communities holding to different contextual values, it makes those commitments visible and hence evaluable:
When...background assumptions are shared by all members of a community, they acquire an invisibility that renders them unavailable for
criticism. They do not become visible until individuals who do not share
the community’s assumptions can provide alternative explanations of
the phenomena without those assumptions, as, for example, Einstein
could provide an alternative explanation of the Michelson–Morley interferometer experiment. Until such alternatives are available, community
assumptions are transparent to their adherents. In addition, the substantive principles determining standards of rationality within a research
program or tradition are for the most part immune to criticism by means
of those standards.(Longino 1990, pg. 80)
A critical alternative brings to light the contextual values of the community.
It does not purge science of those values but makes them explicit and open to
discussion and revision. Objectivity is a condition that arises when these biases
have been evaluated, criticised, and controlled for. Hence objectivity is achieved not
in spite of the inherently value–laden character of scientific inquiry—those features
that Craver (2014) suggests might be “fascinating to anthropologists, psychologists,
and sociologists”, but irrelevant to objective scientific explanation—but precisely
because of it.
Mechanist criticism of dynamical explanation (Kaplan 2015) has illuminated
the otherwise invisible commitments of dynamicists—for instance their explanatory
taste for prediction—and spurred reappraisal (see Chapters 1 and 2), further proof
that “[c]riticism is thereby transformative” (Longino 1990, pg. 73). Ontic mechanism would therefore do well to open up to this sort of critique. Abandoning Craver’s
declaration of independence, as well as the closure of explanatory standards, is necessary to permit such criticism of the values of mechanism to be aired out. The
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alternative account of dynamical explanation I have provided in Chapters 1 and 2 is
also serves as a criticism of many conceptual commitments of mechanists, showing
how the standards used to separate genuinely explanatory mechanistic models from
merely descriptive dynamical models fail to do so. While the ontic mechanist could
respond that no matter the criticism, ontic mechanistic explanatory standards are
objectively correct, this would be a misstep.
There is another reason beyond, to again borrow Craver’s phrase, intellectual
curiosity, as to why should we be particularly concerned about this process of criticism. Longino’s (1990) discussion is motivated by the very real problem of biases in
science that entrench or reinforce social inequalities, for instance conceptual problems in research on the biology or cognitive basis of sex and gender differences, as
well as criticism thereof by feminist philosophers of science. Making the assumptions
of researchers explicit through external, public criticism, generated by a community
who do not share those assumptions, preserves the successes of science while also
subjecting its assumptions to illuminating criticism. These criticisms can and have
driven science to produce less biased and more conceptually sound research (Longino 1990). For instance, feminist critique of sex determination literature shows how
background assumptions about “active maleness” versus “passive femininity” curtail a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Beldecos et al 1988).
My goal is not to accuse contemporary Mechanism of holding to pernicious biases,
but rather to caution against eliminating the possibility of fair and open criticism
which acts as prophylaxis against them.

5.6

Conclusion

In this paper I have criticised the claim that mechanistic explanations are objective
explanations, and that mechanistic standards of explanation are closed to criticism
because they are objectively derived from nature. To this end I targeted the underdeveloped justification for this objectivity, in particular a reliance on revelations
of a mechanistic ontology via interventionism, which fails to guarantee objectivity
as required. I also showed how the closure of explanatory standards is undermined
when ontic mechanists introduce the normative explanatory standard of 3M. Against
the prevailing ontic mechanist position, I have argued that mechanistic standards of
explanation are influenced heavily by explanatory taste; the contextual values and
goals of investigators. A prime example of explanatory taste at work is the mechanist taste for control, in pursuit of which they gerrymander mechanistic standards of
explanation. I also suggest that, per Longino (1990), criticism between communities holding to different contextual values is a prerequisite for objectivity, and hence
mechanism would be better served by opening up to conceptual criticism.

Conclusion
This thesis has argued for a dynamical alternative for causal explanation, and against
attempts to subsume dynamical explanations (and its E-cognition proponents) into
mechanism (and cognitivism). It also argued against the integrative rationale of
Mechanism, which I identified as the supposed objectivity of mechanistic explanations.
In Chapters 1 & 2, I demonstrated how Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account can be put to work producing non–mechanistic explanations. This builds upon
and improves the earlier sketches of dynamical explanation, providing an account of
causal dynamical explanations in the special sciences. I also provided some reasons
to reject the 3M requirement in some cases.
Chapters 3 & 4 discussed related issues of integration. In Chapter 3 I argued
that Milkowski et al’s (2018) integrative account of cognitive science, based on mechanistic explanation, was not a suitable replacement for theories of cognition. Nor
was it able to subsume dynamical explanation. Chapter 4 covered two accounts
that attempted to integrate mechanistic explanations into enactive cognitive science. These accounts, however, both resulted in a form of subsumption rather than
genuine integration. I conclude that, so far at least, no genuine integration of these
research traditions—or modes of explanation—has been successfully outlined.
Returning from this foray into the philosophy of cognitive science, Chapter 5 dug
deeper into the ontological foundations of mechanistic explanation. In it, I argued
that ontic mechanisms claim to produce objective explanations based on objective
explanatory standards is not well-founded. I brought discussions of mechanistic
objectivity into contact with contextual empiricist account of scientific knowledge
(Longino 1990), and argued that the goals, values and background assumptions of
mechanist investigators give rise to a particular explanatory taste on their part. I
suggested that genuine objectivity is not achieved through completeness and accuracy though, but through inter–subjective criticism.
I hope that this thesis has achieved its goals. It has not been my intention
to undermine mechanism as a mode of explanation, but rather to recontextualise
it—to build up an alternative account of dynamical explanation, to show how this
alternative feeds into the special sciences in a way that cannot simply be folded into
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mechanism, and, lastly, to critique some of the mechanistic rationale driving claims
of integration, exclusivity and objectivity.
Where to next? The terrain from here is quite open, but a few key discussions
stick out. Previously wherever we have had the need for causal explanation, we
had also had the need for mechanistic explanation. But if the two do not totally
overlap—some causal explanations can be non–mechanistic—where, then, is mechanistic explanation appropriate? What are its natural boundaries, if indeed it has
them? I think this can be fruitfully studied in terms of the explanatory goals and
needs of particular theories or frameworks. I have sketched a few examples of causal
explanation outside the borders of mechanism: a more comprehensive story is required.
It would also useful to investigate whether dynamical explanations should pursue (to use the mechanist nomenclature) ontic or epistemic explanations. Are some
cognitive and biological phenomena, in an ontic sense, dynamical rather than mechanistic? Discussions around substance versus process ontologies (Nicholson & Dupre
2018) seem a useful resource here, and also feeds into often ontologically–loaded talk
about the nature of cognition and explanation of it.
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Dupré, J. (2013). Living causes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87 (1),
19–37.
Enver, T., Pera, M., Peterson, C. & Andrews, P. W. (2009). Stem cell states, fates,
and the rules of attraction. Cell Stem Cell, 4 (5), 387–397.
Ferrell, J. (2012). Bistability, bifurcations, and waddington’s epigenetic landscape.
Current Biology, 22 (11), R458–R466.
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (2010). Modelling social interaction as perceptual crossing: An investigation into the dynamics of the interaction process. Connection
Science, 22 (1), 43–68.
Gallagher, S. (2017). Enactivist interventions: Rethinking the mind. Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2018). Building a stronger concept of embodiment. In A. Newen, L.
De Bruin & S. Gallagher (Eds.), The oxford handbook of 4e cognition (pp. 353–
367). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gervais, R. & Weber, E. (2011). The covering law model applied to dynamical
cognitive science: A comment on Joel Walmsley. Minds and Machines, 21 (1),
33–39.
116

Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin.
Glennan, S. (1996). Mechanisms and the nature of causation. Erkenntnis, 44 (1),
49–71.
Glennan, S. (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69,
S342–S353.
Glennan, S. (2010). Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81 (2), 362–381.
Glennan, S. (2015). Mechanisms and mechanical philosophy (P. Humphreys, Ed.).
Oxford University Press.
Glennan, S. (2017). The new mechanical philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. I. (2012). A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review
of Philosophy and Psychology, 3 (1), 71–88.
Graf, T. & Enver, T. (2009). Forcing cells to change lineages. Nature, 462 (7273),
587–594.
Griffiths, P. E., Pocheville, A., Calcott, B., Stotz, K., Kim, H. & Knight, R. (2015).
Measuring causal specificity. Philosophy of Science, 82 (4), 529–555.
Haken, H. (2008). Brain dynamics. Springer series in synergetics. New York ; London: Springer.
Haken, H., Kelso, J. A. S. & Bunz, H. (1985). A theoretical model of phase transitions
in human hand movements. Biological Cybernetics, 51, 347–356.
Haken, H. (1983). Advanced synergetics: Instability hierarchies of self-organizing
systems and devices. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
37 (4), 747–749.
Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy
of Science, 15 (2), 135–175.
Hildebrand, T. (2013). Can primitive laws explain? Philosophers’ Imprint, 13, 1–15.
Huang, S. (2009). Reprogramming cell fates: Reconciling rarity with robustness.
BioEssays, 31 (5), 546–560.
Huang, S. (2012). The molecular and mathematical basis of waddington’s epigenetic
landscape: A framework for post-darwinian biology? BioEssays, 34 (2), 149–
157.
Huang, S., Eichler, G., Bar-Yam, Y. & Ingber, D. E. (2005). Cell fates as highdimensional attractor states of a complex gene regulatory network. Physical
Review Letters, 94 (12), 128701.
Huang, S., Guo, Y.-P., May, G. & Enver, T. (2007). Bifurcation dynamics in lineagecommitment in bipotent progenitor cells. Developmental Biology, 305 (2), 695–
713.

117

Huang, S. & Ingber, D. E. (2007). A non-genetic basis for cancer progression and
metastasis: Self-organizing attractors in cell regulatory networks. Breast Disease, 26 (1), 27–54.
Huneman, P. (2010). Topological explanations and robustness in biological sciences.
Synthese, 177 (2), 213–245.
Hutchins, E. (1995). How a cockpit remembers its speeds. Cognitive Science, 19 (3),
265–288.
Hutto, D. D. (2005). Knowing what? radical versus conservative enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4 (4), 389–405.
Hutto, D. D. & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Hutto, D. D. & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content.
MIT Press.
Illari, P. (2013). Mechanistic explanation: Integrating the ontic and epistemic. Erkenntnis, 78, 237–255.
Jaeger, J. & Monk, N. (2014). Bioattractors: Dynamical systems theory and the
evolution of regulatory processes: Bioattractors. The Journal of Physiology,
592 (11), 2267–2281.
Jones, J. (2015). From pattern formation to material computation. Emergence, Complexity and Computation. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Kaplan, D. M. & Bechtel, W. (2011). Dynamical models: An alternative or complement to mechanistic explanations? Topics in Cognitive Science, 3 (2), 438–
444.
Kaplan, D. M. (2011). Explanation and description in computational neuroscience.
Synthese, 183 (3), 339–373.
Kaplan, D. M. (2012). How to demarcate the boundaries of cognition. Biology &
Philosophy, 27 (4), 545–570.
Kaplan, D. M. (2015). Moving parts: The natural alliance between dynamical and
mechanistic modeling approaches. Biology & Philosophy, 30 (6), 757–786.
Kaplan, D. M. & Craver, C. F. (2011). The explanatory force of dynamical and
mathematical models in neuroscience: A mechanistic perspective. Philosophy
of Science, 78 (4), 601–627.
Kelso, J. A. S. (1995). Dynamic patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Kirchhoff, M. D. & Meyer, R. (2019). Breaking explanatory boundaries: Flexible
borders and plastic minds. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 18 (1),
185–204.

118

Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In
P. Kitcher & W. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (Vol. 8, pp. 410–505).
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kiverstein, J. (2012). The meaning of embodiment. Topics in Cognitive Science,
4 (4), 740–758.
Krickel, B. (2017). Making sense of interlevel causation in mechanisms from a metaphysical perspective. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48 (3), 453–
468.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago
Press.
Lamb, M. & Chemero, A. (2014). Structure and application of dynamical models in
cognitive science, 6.
Lange, M. (2013). What makes a scientific explanation distinctively mathematical?
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64 (3), 485–511.
Lange, M. (2009). Laws and lawmakers: Science, metaphysics, and the laws of
nature. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Levins, R. (1966). The strategy of model building in population biology. American
Scientist, 54 (4), 421–431.
Levy, A. (2013). Three kinds of new mechanism. Biology & Philosophy, 28 (1), 99–
114.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific
inquiry. Princeton University Press.
Machamer, P. (2004). Activities and causation: The metaphysics and epistemology
of mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18 (1), 27–
39.
Machamer, P., Darden, L. & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms.
Philosophy of Science, 67 (1), 1–25.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Matthiessen, D. (2017). Mechanistic explanation in systems biology: Cellular networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68 (1), 1–25.
Menzies, P. (2012). The causal structure of mechanisms. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological
and Biomedical Sciences. Causality in the Biomedical and Social Sciences,
43 (4), 796–805.
Meyer, R. (2018). The non-mechanistic option: Defending dynamical explanations.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Milkowski, M. (2013). Explaining the computational mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
119

Milkowski, M., Clowes, R., Rucinska, Z., Przegalinska, A., Zawidzki, T., Krueger, J.,
. . . Hohol, M. (2018). From wide cognition to mechanisms: A silent revolution.
Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2393.
Moris, N., Pina, C. & Arias, A. M. (2016, November 1). Transition states and cell
fate decisions in epigenetic landscapes. Nature Reviews Genetics, 17 (11), 693–
703.
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